Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Three commissioners of the Port of Benton—Scott Keller, William O’Neil, and Lori Stevens—were the subject of recall petitions filed by Benton County voters. The petitions alleged thirteen counts of misconduct for each commissioner, largely focusing on actions attributed to Keller, some of which occurred before he was elected commissioner. The essential allegations that occurred during their terms as commissioners were that the three retaliated against the Port’s executive director, Diahann Howard, by suspending her after she raised complaints leading to an investigation of Keller, and that they retaliated against the Port’s finance director, Alicia Myers, by terminating her after she released the investigation report. Additionally, Keller alone was accused of failing to disclose his ownership interest in an LLC with a lease from the Port, as required by state law.A Benton County Superior Court judge reviewed the recall petitions, dismissing most of the thirteen charges against each commissioner as legally or factually insufficient. However, the court found two charges—retaliation against Howard and Myers—factually and legally sufficient against all three commissioners, and found the failure to disclose financial information charge factually and legally sufficient against Keller alone. The recall proponents did not appeal the dismissal of other charges, and the commissioners appealed the sufficiency findings to the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the trial court’s rulings in all respects. The court held that the charges of retaliation for whistleblowing and failure to disclose material financial interests stated factually and legally sufficient grounds for recall under the Washington Constitution and statutes. Specifically, the court found that actual or threatened retaliation constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office, and that intentional nondisclosure of required financial information by an elected official is legally sufficient to support recall. The court’s disposition allows these charges to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of O'Neil" on Justia Law

An employee of the Internal Revenue Service, who also served as trustee for her goddaughter’s trust, was terminated from her position following an investigation into her tax returns and health insurance claims. The investigation revealed that she had improperly claimed her goddaughter and goddaughter’s son as dependents for several tax years and placed them on her federal health insurance plan, despite not meeting eligibility criteria. The employee acknowledged to investigators that she knew her actions were technically illegal. Additional incidents involving misuse of her government travel card were also considered as prior discipline. The employee challenged the resulting tax liabilities in the U.S. Tax Court, ultimately settling for a reduced amount based on a stipulation between her and the IRS.An Administrative Judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board initially reversed her removal, finding in her favor. However, following a petition for review by the IRS, the full Merit Systems Protection Board reversed the judge’s decision, sustaining her removal. The Board concluded that the IRS had proven its primary reason for removal by a preponderance of the evidence, and merged another reason into it, without reaching a third reason. The Board gave evidentiary weight to the Tax Court settlement and associated documents, which had been discounted by the Administrative Judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Board’s consideration of the Tax Court settlement documents violated evidentiary principles, specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in considering those materials to establish the fact of the admitted liability, and that even if there had been an evidentiary error, the petitioner failed to show harm or prejudice. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s final decision sustaining the removal. View "HARRIS-CAMPBELL v. TREASURY " on Justia Law

Two high-ranking officers in a city police department—one the chief and the other the deputy chief of operations—were subject to an internal firearms proficiency assessment. Department policy mandated regular qualifications, and there was confusion over which of two overlapping policies governed discipline for failures. After the deputy chief failed the assessment, she received an extra attempt to qualify, which she passed, and the chief subsequently allowed all failing officers a third attempt. A lieutenant, believing the chief had abused his authority to benefit the deputy chief, filed a complaint with the state ethics commission, prompting an investigation by commission officials.During the investigation, the commission’s special agent and general counsel relied on the allegedly superseded policy, policy 2.311, to argue that the deputy chief faced possible financial penalties and thus had a financial interest in the outcome. There was confusion among department officials and investigators regarding which policy was in effect, and both policies were referenced in departmental communications and disciplinary records. The commission found probable cause of ethics violations by both officers and referred the matter to the state attorney general. However, the attorney general found that the commission officials had relied on false evidence and misrepresentations. An internal review by the commission cleared its officials of wrongdoing.The officers sued the commission’s executive director, special agent, and general counsel in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process violations based on fabricated evidence, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, finding no substantial evidence that they fabricated evidence or acted in bad faith. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Finley v. Albritton" on Justia Law

A private company operating a hotel sought the renewal of a one-year, revocable state land permit for property fronting its hotel. A member of the public, who had long used the area for recreation, objected to the permit's renewal, particularly the practice of presetting hotel lounge chairs, which he argued deterred public use. He requested a formal contested case hearing on the permit renewal, asserting a property interest in the recreational and environmental quality of the public land. The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) denied his request for such a hearing, instead allowing only written and oral testimony at a public meeting.The objector appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which upheld the BLNR's denial, finding that he had been afforded due process through the public meeting process. On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in a clean and healthful environment and was entitled to a contested case hearing before the permit could be renewed. Because the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief, if any, remained available. The ICA granted costs but denied the appellant’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, reasoning that the requirements for such fees were unmet since the scope of relief was not yet determined.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s denial of attorney fees. The court held that the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain final relief before becoming eligible for attorney fees. Determining that all three prongs of the PAG test were met, the court remanded the matter for the ICA to determine the reasonableness of the appellant’s attorney fees and whether the hotel company was liable for them. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

An attorney whose license to practice law in Connecticut was suspended for one year sought reinstatement and, after delays in the consideration of her application, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. She alleged that the delay by the standing committee responsible for reviewing her reinstatement was racially discriminatory. When the standing committee sought guidance from the Superior Court regarding how to proceed given her discrimination complaints, the attorney filed a second complaint alleging retaliation. The Commission investigated this second complaint, found reasonable cause, and certified it for a public hearing.The Judicial Branch, named as a respondent in the administrative proceedings, moved to dismiss the retaliation complaint, arguing that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction, particularly because the underlying conduct implicated the core judicial function of regulating attorney admission. The Human Rights Referee denied the motion to dismiss, and the Judicial Branch appealed to the Superior Court under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. The Superior Court concluded that the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over attorney reinstatement decisions violated the separation of powers doctrine, as such matters fall within the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch, and ordered that the complaint be dismissed.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the Judicial Branch had asserted a colorable claim of immunity from suit based on the separation of powers doctrine, which would be irretrievably lost absent immediate review. The Supreme Court further held that, under the circumstances, the Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over complaints arising from attorney discipline or reinstatement proceedings would impermissibly interfere with the essential functions of the Judicial Branch, violating the separation of powers. The Court clarified, however, that its ruling does not shield the Judicial Branch from judicial review of discrimination claims arising from its regulation of the bar. View "State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities" on Justia Law

A sitting circuit court judge was the subject of an impeachment petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives by a former legislator who was not a party to any of the cases he cited. The petition alleged that the judge abused her discretion in six cases; five of these cases were still pending in the judicial system at the time. The petition did not include an affidavit, as required by Kentucky statute. The House referred the matter to its Impeachment Committee, which held a hearing and ultimately issued articles of impeachment against the judge. The Kentucky Senate scheduled a trial on these articles.The judge sought a temporary injunction in Franklin Circuit Court to stop the impeachment proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the injunction. She then sought emergency relief and review from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also denied relief. The judge subsequently filed emergency motions and a petition for a supervisory writ with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that the impeachment articles and proceedings violated the separation of powers and her due process rights, and requesting that they be declared void from the outset.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the petition for a supervisory writ. The Court held that the impeachment petition was invalid because it was not verified by affidavit, as required by statute. The Court further held that the allegations concerned discretionary judicial acts subject to correction through the appellate process or Judicial Conduct Commission proceedings, not impeachment, and that the Legislature’s actions violated the separation of powers. The Court also found that the impeachment process denied the judge due process, and that further proceedings would cause her irreparable harm. The Court enjoined the General Assembly from continuing the impeachment proceedings and ordered dismissal of the pending articles. View "GOODMAN V. NEMES" on Justia Law

Several individuals facing involuntary civil commitment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act were entitled to appointed counsel. The King County Department of Public Defense (DPD) was responsible for providing this representation. During the spring and summer of 2024, DPD’s attorneys assigned to these cases reached their annual caseload limits, which are set by state standards. Despite having sufficient funding, DPD was unable to recruit additional attorneys and therefore notified the court when it could not assign counsel to new cases without exceeding the limits. When the court ordered DPD to provide counsel, DPD complied. The King County Executive was also ordered by the trial court to provide counsel, although in King County, only DPD has that authority.The King County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued orders requiring both DPD and the King County Executive to provide counsel to respondents. The court’s amended orders clarified that the decision of which attorney to appoint, and how to allocate caseloads, rested with DPD and the Executive, not with the court. Both DPD and the King County Executive sought review in the Washington Supreme Court. The Executive argued it should not be included in the orders due to the county’s charter, which provides DPD with exclusive authority and independence. DPD argued the orders effectively required it to violate mandatory caseload limits.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the caseload limits for public defenders in the Standards for Indigent Defense are mandatory and that courts lack authority to order attorneys or agencies to violate these limits. However, the court found that the trial court did not actually order DPD to violate the caseload limits, as it left the method of compliance to DPD. The court reversed the orders as they applied to the King County Executive but affirmed the orders requiring DPD to provide counsel. View "In re Det. of M.E." on Justia Law

NonDoc Media and William W. Savage III submitted open records requests to the University of Oklahoma seeking two reports prepared by the law firm Jones Day. The reports resulted from investigations into allegations of misreporting alumni donor data and possible sexual misconduct involving high-ranking University officials. Jones Day was retained under an attorney-client relationship, and the reports included confidential interviews and legal analysis. Portions of the reports were provided to law enforcement under joint-interest agreements and excerpts of the sexual misconduct report were shared with the parties involved pursuant to Title IX protocols.The District Court of Cleveland County conducted an in camera review of both reports. It granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding the documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The court also found that the reports were exempt under the Open Records Act’s personnel record exemption, and that the sexual misconduct report was further protected by work-product and informer privileges. The court did not find that the University had waived any of these protections, and rejected NonDoc’s arguments to the contrary. NonDoc appealed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma retained the case.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects the reports from disclosure, and clarified that the privilege does not expire when the underlying investigation or action concludes. The court also found that the University did not waive the privilege by sharing the reports with law enforcement under joint-interest agreements or by limited disclosure required by law. Summary judgment for the University was affirmed. View "NONDOC MEDIA v. STATE Ex Rel. BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIV. of OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

The case centers on a dispute involving the Iowa Auditor of State’s authority to subpoena records from the City of Davenport, including documents claimed to be protected by the attorney–client privilege, in connection with a reaudit of city settlement payments. The city provided some documents but refused to produce others, asserting privilege. The Auditor sought enforcement of the subpoena, while the city moved to modify it. The controversy escalated due to public interest in the timing and propriety of the city’s settlements and the Auditor’s investigation into their legality.The Iowa District Court for Scott County ruled in favor of the Auditor, holding that Iowa law gave the Auditor broad access to city records, including attorney–client privileged materials, except for attorney work product, and ordered an in camera review of the contested documents. The city appealed, arguing the Auditor did not have authority to access attorney–client communications. During the appeal, the Auditor and the Iowa Attorney General disagreed fundamentally about the scope of the Auditor’s subpoena power and whether to defend the district court’s ruling. The Attorney General declined to make arguments supporting the Auditor’s position, citing broader state interests and a perceived conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of Iowa determined that, due to this conflict of interest, the Auditor may be represented by his own general counsel, rather than the Attorney General. The court reasoned that the Attorney General’s duties are materially limited by her responsibilities to other state agencies, constituting a conflict under Iowa’s professional conduct rules. The court further held that the Auditor does not need executive council approval to be represented by in-house counsel, as statutory provisions requiring such approval apply only to hiring outside counsel at state expense. The Attorney General was permitted to participate as amicus curiae. View "City of Davenport v. Office of the Auditor of the State of Iowa" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law