Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (LaFHAC) sued Azalea Garden Properties, LLC (Azalea Garden), alleging that Azalea Garden discriminated on the basis of race and disability at its apartment complex in Jefferson, Louisiana, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed LaFHAC’s disability claim but allowed its disparate impact race claim to proceed, subject to one caveat: The district court certified a permissive interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the “predictably will cause” standard for FHA disparate-impact claims remains viable after Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).   The Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss LaFHAC’s claims without prejudice. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Along the same lines, the court wrote that it cannot consider the district court’s certified question. The court explained that LaFHAC has plausibly alleged a diversion of resources, as it shifted efforts away from planned projects like its annual conference toward counteracting Azalea Garden’s alleged discrimination. But “an organization does not automatically suffer a cognizable injury in fact by diverting resources in response to a defendant’s conduct.” The court wrote that LaFHAC failed to plead an injury because it failed to allege how its diversion of resources impaired its ability to achieve its mission. Thus, the court held that because LaFHAC has not alleged a cognizable injury, it lacks standing to bring the claims it alleges in this action. View "LA Fair Housing Action v. Azalea Garden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on January 30, 2020, alleging disability since March 1, 2017,due to PTSD, depression, anxiety, insomnia, headaches, and a right knee injury. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. A medical expert confirmed that Plaintiff would be markedly limited when interacting with others. The medical expert suggested that Plaintiff’s Residual Function Capacity (RFC) includes “some limitations in terms of his work situation.” Once the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff sought judicial review. The district court affirmed the agency’s denial of benefits. On appeal, Plaintiff only challenged the ALJ’s finding that his mental impairments were not disabling.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the ALJ did not err in excluding Plaintiff's VA disability rating from her analysis. McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an ALJ is required to address the Veterans Administration disability rating) is no longer good law for claims filed after March 27, 2017. The 2017 regulations removed any requirement for an ALJ to discuss another agency’s rating. The panel held that the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony about the severity of his symptoms by enumerating the objective evidence that undermined Plaintiff’s testimony. The panel rejected Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s experts. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet all of the specified medical criteria or equal the severity of a listed impairment. View "JEREMY KITCHEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Hospitals treating Medicare beneficiaries receive greater reimbursements to the extent that the beneficiaries are also entitled to supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Secretary of Health and Human Services understands this population to include only patients receiving cash payments during the month in question. Various hospitals contend that this population also includes patients receiving a subsidy under Medicare Part D and vocational training. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the hospitals argued that Empire compels their construction of the phrase “entitled to supplementary security income benefits.” The court wrote that this s argument misses key distinctions between the Part A and SSI schemes. First, Part A benefits extend well beyond payment for specific services at specific times. Moreover, the court explained that age or chronic disability makes a person eligible for Part A benefits “without an application or anything more,” and individuals rarely, if ever lose this eligibility over time.   Moreover, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS arbitrarily excluded patients whose SSI benefits were withheld under the so-called “cross-program recovery” scheme. The court reasoned that this assertion is mistaken. Next, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS unreasonably focused on whether patients receive SSI payments when hospitalized because the payments depend on income and resource levels from earlier months. But “eligibility” for the SSI benefit “for a month” depends on the individual’s income, resources, and other characteristics “in such month.” View "Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Appellant applied for Supplemental Security Income based on disability. While her application was pending, the Social Security Administration promulgated rules with new criteria for demonstrating disability and made them applicable to pending claims like Appellant’s. An Administrative Law Judge subsequently found Appellant ineligible for benefits under those updated criteria. Appellant then filed suit in federal district court, and the court overturned the agency’s decision on the ground that application of the new criteria was impermissibly retroactive. The court ordered the agency to reconsider Appellant’s case under the criteria in place when she first filed her claim. The district court rejected all of Appellant’s other challenges to the agency’s decision. Both parties appealed.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. The court held that hat application of the new criteria to Appellant’s pending claim was not retroactive, but that the Administrative Law Judge erred in his analysis of evidence from Appellant’s treating physician. The court remanded with instructions to the district court to remand the matter to the Administration to reconsider Appellant’s claim while either according controlling deference to her treating physician’s opinion or offering a substantively reasonable explanation for not doing so. View "Angela Cox v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a claim for reimbursement of emergency medical services may be maintained against a health care service plan when the plan is operated by a public entity and that the Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code 810 et seq., did not immunize the County of Santa Clara from such a claim in this case.Two hospitals submitted reimbursement claims for the emergency medical services they provided to three individuals enrolled in a County-operated health care service plan. The hospitals sued for the remaining amounts based on the reimbursement provision of the Knox-Keene Act, and the trial court concluded that the hospitals could state a quantum merit claim against the County. The court of appeal reversed, determining that the County was immune from suit under the Government Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was not immune from suit under the circumstances of this case and that the hospitals' claims may proceed. View "County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment for the United States and rejecting the lawsuit brought by Appellant asking the district court to overturn the finding of the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the United States Department of Agriculture that Appellant was disqualified from further participation in the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), holding that there was no error.FNS disqualified Appellant from further participation in SNAP after investigating evidence of unlawful trafficking in SNAP benefits. Thereafter, Appellant brought this action seeking to overturn the FNS's liability finding and asking the court to vacate the order of program disqualification as arbitrary and capricious. The district court entered summary judgment for the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the United States on the liability issue; and (2) the sanction of the permanent disqualification order from the program was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "AJ Mini Market, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. View "VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

The VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities includes diagnostic codes (DCs), each with a corresponding disability rating, 38 U.S.C. 1155. A particular veteran’s disability may not clearly fall under a delineated DC. VA regulations provide: When an unlisted condition is encountered it will be permissible to rate under a closely related disease or injury in which not only the functions affected but the anatomical localization and symptomatology are closely analogous. The VA considers the functions affected by ailments, the anatomical localization of the ailments, and the symptomatology of the ailments.Webb served in the Army, from 1968-1970, receiving an honorable discharge. Webb later developed service-connected prostate cancer, the treatment for which caused him to develop erectile dysfunction (ED). In 2015, Webb was assigned a non-compensable (zero percent) rating for his ED. The Schedule did not then include a diagnostic code for ED. The VA rated Webb’s disability by analogy to DC 7522, which provides a 20 percent disability rating for “[p]enis, deformity, with loss of erectile power.” The Board explained that DC 7522 required Webb to show “deformity of the penis with loss of erectile power.” Without such a deformity, he was not entitled to a compensable disability rating. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. The listed disease or injury to which a veteran’s unlisted condition is being rated by analogy must be only “closely related,” not identical. View "Webb v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Out-of-work residents of Michigan may claim unemployment benefits if they meet certain eligibility criteria. The State’s Unemployment Insurance Agency oversees the benefits system. In 2011, with the help of private contractors, the Agency began to develop software to administer the unemployment system. The Agency sought to equip the software to auto-adjudicate as many parts of the claims process as possible. The Agency programmed software that used logic trees to help process cases and identify fraud. A claimant’s failure to return the fact-finding questionnaire, for example, led to a fraud finding, as did the claimant’s selection of certain multiple-choice responses. In August 2015, problems arose with some features of the system, prompting the Agency to turn off the auto-adjudication feature for fraud claims.Plaintiffs are four individuals who obtained unemployment benefits, which were terminated after the Agency flagged their claims for fraud. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against three government contractors and nineteen Agency staffers, raising claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6402(f), and Michigan tort law. In a previous proceeding, the court held that plaintiffs’ due process rights clearly existed because they had alleged a deprivation of their property interests without adequate notice and without an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.At this stage, because the remaining plaintiffs have failed to show that these procedures violate any clearly established law, the supervisors of the unemployment insurance agency are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that an intervening plaintiff was properly prevented from joining the case, based on her untimely filing. View "Patti Cahoo v. SAS Institute, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of social security benefits by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Reviewing de novo the district court’s decision, Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit reversed The ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. Here, Claimant argued that the ALJ’s question posed to the vocational expert inaccurately described her actual limitations. First, the hypothetical posed to the expert did not provide that claimant was limited to jobs with “little or no judgment.” The panel concluded that the error was harmless because the vocational expert identified only jobs with that limitation. Second, the hypothetical did not provide that Claimant could “follow short, simple instructions” only. Third, in the question posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ described a hypothetical person who “can work in an environment with occasional changes to the work setting.” The panel concluded that the ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. View "CAROLINE LEACH V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law