Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Papesh had a GED and worked as a bakery helper. She reported long-term, low-back pain, which radiated to her hips and legs. She said the pain “is worse with working” because the bakery has concrete floors. She began treatment in 2009 (the year she turned 50) with Dr. Cash, who observed “tenderness throughout the lumbar spine to palpation, as well as pain with some spasm in the low back.” Papesh was also caring for her mother, who had severe dementia and suffered “worsened depression and anxiety” after her mother’s death. Papesh applied for disability and for supplemental security income in early 2010, alleging she was disabled due to degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and other impairments. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of benefits because the record contained two substantially similar residual function capacity opinions from a treating physician and neutral medical expert plus a consistent opinion from a second treating physician—all consistent with Papesh’s descriptions of her daily functioning. The ALJ’s determination that Papesh can perform light work was outside the available zone of choice. The substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding that Papesh is capable of sedentary work only. View "Papesh v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Robles worked collecting food grease from restaurants until his 2010 termination. Robles’s supervisor cited Robles’s attempt to buy shoes at the Red Wing store, where employees can use an annual $150 shoe allowance. Robles asked the clerk to measure his friend’s foot because he “intended to give it to my friend.” Robles reasoned that he had shoes and his friend needed them. The clerk told Robles “that was not possible.” Robles believes there was a misunderstanding of policy but no misconduct. Robles sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Development Department’s record contained no employer information about the incident. The EDD’notice stated that Robles’s claim was denied because he “broke a reasonable employer rule.” Robles appealed, stating his employer did not cite any specific rule, that he was not aware of any such rule, and that he did not obtain an improper benefit or cause his employer any harm. Despite being twice ordered to do by the trial court, EED continued to refuse to award benefits. The court of appeal affirmed the court’s most recent response to Robles’s motion to enforce writ of administrative mandate,ordering EDD “to pay withheld federal extension benefits, costs and interest in the amount of $45,560.39, within 30 days.” View "Robles v. Emp't Dev. Dept." on Justia Law

Petitioners were active and retired members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) who challenged two legislative amendments aimed at reducing the cost of retirement benefits: Senate Bill (SB) 822 (2013), and SB 861 (2013). Petitioners raised numerous challenges to the amendments but primarily argued that the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal Contract Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. "Although there is no doubt that the legislature passed SB 822 and SB 861 to address legitimate public policy concerns and with an appropriate sensitivity to the impact that the amendments would have on retirees, those concerns do not establish a defense to the contractual impairment that the amendments effect. The public purpose defense that respondents ask [the Oregon Supreme Court] to recognize imposes a high bar to justify the state’s impairment of a state contract, like PERS, and the record in this case does not meet that standard. We therefore hold that respondents constitutionally may cease the income tax offset payments to nonresidents as set out in SB 822 and that respondents also constitutionally may apply the COLA amendments as set out in SB 822 and SB 861 prospectively to benefits earned on or after the effective dates of those laws, but not retrospectively to benefits earned before those effective dates." View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

In 2013, Emma Reiger entered the Good Samaritan Society's basic care facility. She executed a general durable power of attorney appointing two women "to be my attorneys-in-fact and co-agents in my name and for my benefit." Rieger signed a "Designation of Authorized Representative" authorizing the Society to "(i) initiate an application for Medicaid benefits on my behalf, (ii) participate in all reviews of my eligibility for Medicaid benefits and (iii) take such action as may be necessary to establish my eligibility for Medicaid." On the same date, Rieger signed a separate document titled, "Assignment of Medicaid Benefits," which assigned to the Society her right to obtain Medicaid benefits for services provided to her by the Society, and an "Authorization for Release of Health Information." These documents were provided to the Department of Human Services. The Department oappealed a judgment reversing the Department's dismissal of Rieger's appeal challenging its denial of her Medicaid application and remanding for a fair hearing on the application. Because the law allowed The Evangelical Good Samaritan Society, doing business as the Good Samaritan Society - Mott ("Society"), to act as Rieger's authorized representative for purposes of appealing the Department's denial of her Medicaid application, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Evangelical Good Samaritan Society v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rachel Parks appealed an administrative law judge's denial of her application for supplemental security income on behalf of her minor son, D.P. D.P. suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and borderline intellectual functioning. An administrative law judge denied Parks’s application because D.P. did not suffer from a condition that entitled him to supplemental security income. Parks filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, and she submitted new evidence of D.P.’s academic struggles. The Appeals Council supplemented the record with the new evidence, but denied review. Parks then filed a complaint in the district court, which affirmed the denial of her application. She argued on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit: (1) the administrative law judge's denial of Parks's application was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Social Security Appeals Council needed to make explicit findings of fact about new evidence that it added to the record when it denied review. Because the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and the Appeals Council was not required to make specific findings about Parks’s new evidence, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "Parks v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, then age 40, applied to the Social Security Commission in 2009 for benefits, claiming to be disabled from gainful employment as a result of psychiatric disorders (depression and bipolar disorder), chronic back and hip pain, and an anal fissure. He had been trained as a machinist and, until 2002, had worked intermittently as a machinist and an assembly line worker. The administrative law judge denied his claim on the ground that he was capable of performing unskilled sedentary work. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting contradictions and gaps in the ALJ’s reasoning. The court did “not say that Voigt is in fact totally disabled from gainful employment, however— only that he’s entitled to a more careful analysis of his claim by the Social Security Administration.” View "Voigt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Bonnilyn Mascio filed an application with the Social Security Administration for supplemental security income benefits, alleging that she was disabled from degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, and adjustment disorder. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mascio was not disabled. The district court reversed. On remand, a second ALJ found that Mascio was not disabled and denied her application. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ erred (1) in assessing Mascio’s residual functional capacity because he did not conduct a function-by-function analysis; (2) by not considering Mascio’s moderate limitation in her ability to maintain her concentration, persistence, or pace; and (3) by determining Mascio’s residual functional capacity before assessing her credibility. Remanded. View "Mascio v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Wingard, a 20-year veteran, died in 2005, from causes unrelated to his military service. His daughter sought a burial-plot or interment allowance (38 U.S.C. 2303) and burial benefits (38 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1)), which provides for burial benefits only in the case of a deceased veteran “who at the time of death was in receipt of compensation . . . or was in receipt of pension.”. The Board of Veterans Appeals granted an interment allowance, but denied burial benefits. In 1989, the Department had assigned Wingard a 0% disability rating for a service-connected hernia that had been treated and showed no sign of recurrence. Wingard’s disability rating remained at 0%l. He never received disability compensation, had no claims pending, and never received a Veterans-related pension. The Veterans Court held that 8 U.S.C. 7252(b) did not preclude review and that sections 1110 and 1155 allowed the Department to find some disabilities noncompensable and assign a 0% rating. The court did not address whether “in receipt of compensation,” included “entitled to receive compensation.” The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that Congress has barred the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit from conducting such review, which must be conducted through a direct review of rulemaking determinations under 38 U.S.C. 502. View "Wingard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services imposed a civil money penalty on Plott Nursing Home in California for Plott’s violations of the Medicare Act’s standards of care for nursing home patients. The Department’s Appeals Board largely affirmed. Plott petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the Secretary’s determination that Plott violated the quality of care for bed sores; (2) the Secretary’s finding that Plott violated the quality of care for urinary tract infections was not supported by substantial evidence on the record; and (3) Plott was entitled to administrative review of all cited deficiencies. Remanded with directions to review or dismiss the violations that were not reviewed by the agency. View "Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell" on Justia Law