Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Washington Department of Retirement Services (DRS) and the State of Washington appealed an order granting summary judgment to a class of public employee unions and unaffiliated employees and holding that the 2011 repeal of legislation granting future uniform cost of living adjustments (UCOLA) to the respondents' monthly pension payments was an unconstitutional impairment of the State's contractual obligation with its employees. The Supreme Court found that because the legislature reserved its right to repeal the pension rights at issue and the original enactment of UCOLA did not impair any existing contract rights of state employees. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. Dep't of Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Washington legislature's 2007 repeal of gain sharing-a pension enhancement provided in years of extraordinary investment return-unconstitutionally impaired the contract between the State and its employees. The Court held that the legislature reserved its right to repeal a benefit in the original enactment of that benefit and the enactment did not impair any preexisting contractual right. As to the employees' alternative argument, the Court held that the explanatory materials provided by the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) do not rise to the level of making a promise or creating an inconsistent statement and thus reject the employees' contention that the state was estopped from repealing the gain-sharing benefit at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's award of summary judgment to the employees. View "Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. Dep't of Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

The Hospital filed suit against various federal agencies and officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 4006(b)(1), where Congress has elected to impose the Medicare rate as full compensation for medical services rendered to federal detainees, is unconstitutional as applied. The court concluded that the Hospital voluntarily opted into the Medicare program and is, as a result, required to provide emergency services to federal detainees. Consequently, the Hospital was foreclosed from challenging this compensation scheme as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court noted that the Hospital's most effective remedy may lie with Congress rather than the courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Baker County Medical Services v. U.S. Attorney General, et al." on Justia Law

Moon was a 26-year-old mother who had worked as a cashier, bank teller, and certified nursing assistant. She suffered from documented back and joint problems, mild sleep apnea, depression, and migraine headaches. Most of these problems are related to exceptional obesity: at a height of 5’5”, she weighs more than 400 pounds. In support of her application for disability benefits, Moon submitted extensive medical records. Her migraine headaches were diagnosed as early as 2005 and she saw doctors about her headaches many times. She was taking Imitrex and Motrin at the time of her May 2010 hearing. In his written decision denying benefits, the ALJ went through the standard five-step analysis and found that Moon was no longer engaged in substantial gainful activity and that her combination of impairments qualified as “severe,” but that she was still capable of doing sedentary work if she would be permitted to sit or stand at will. The ALJ relied on the opinions of two doctors who had reviewed medical records but had not examined Moon. The ALJ referred to “alleged headaches” dismissively. The Appeals Council and the district court upheld the denial. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly discounted evidence of chronic migraine headaches. Because Moon is receiving disability benefits based on a later application, the only issue on remand will be whether she was disabled between August 2008 and the later date from which benefits have been paid.View "Moon v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for Employer. Relator began receiving workers’ compensation benefits in 2010. In 2012, Relator began receiving a retirement annuity from the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA). At some point, Relator began receiving federal social security retirement benefits. While Employer was entitled under Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) to offset Relator’s permanent total disability benefits by the amount of her social security retirement benefits, the parties disagreed as to whether Employer was entitled to apply the offset to Relator’s PERA retirement benefits. A compensation judge granted Employer the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, concluding that Relator’s PERA retirement annuity was an “old age and survivor insurance benefit.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the reasoning in Ekdahl v. Independent School District #213, also decided today, section 176.101(4) does not permit permanent total disability benefits to be offset by public employee pension benefits. Remanded. View "Hartwig v. Traverse Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for a School District. Relator eventually sought and was awarded permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Relying on Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) and claiming that the statute authorizes an offset for “any old age and survivor insurance benefits,” the School District sought to offset its PTD benefit payment by the amount of government-service pension benefits Relator was receiving. A compensation judge concluded that the School District was not entitled to the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that government-service pension benefits are included in the phrase “old age and survivor insurance benefits” and therefore can be offset from the School District’s disability-benefit payment. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and reinstated the decision of the compensation judge, holding that the phrase “old age and survivor benefits” refers only to federal social security benefits, and therefore, the WCCA erred when it applied section 176.101(4) to Relator’s retirement annuity. View "Ekdahl v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #213" on Justia Law

Because of a 2007 car accident, Glenn suffers from degenerative disc disease, a closed head injury and cerebral concussion that cause dizziness and memory loss, left shoulder tendonitis, and post-traumatic headaches. She also suffers major depression, with slow thought processes, mood swings, agitation, poor concentration, anxiousness, feelings of anger and hopelessness, paranoia, auditory hallucinations, and suicidal and homicidal ideation. She has a chronic skin condition that has caused cysts around the vulva that occasionally prevent her from walking and require frequent bathroom breaks. In 2008, Glenn sought social security benefits. Following her hearing, at which Glenn appeared without counsel, the ALJ denied the application at the fifth step of the required analysis: whether, taking into account age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court remanded, based on five errors, but denied attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding that the government’s position on appeal was “substantially justified” because the magistrate rejected three of Glenn’s claims of error. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of fees. Regardless of what happens on remand, Glenn had to retain counsel to ensure that her claim would be properly adjudicated.View "Glenn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Petitioner David Eskeland began work at the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game in 1990 and, accordingly, became a mandatory member of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS). On October 1, 2010, he retired from the Department of Fish and Game with twenty years and three months of creditable service, at which point he began receiving his service retirement pension. After he retired, a friend told the petitioner that he should have retired on a disability retirement allowance rather than on a service retirement allowance. As a result of this conversation, and three months after he retired, petitioner filed an application for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related injuries he sustained in 2002 and 2004. In December, 2011, the board accepted the hearings examiner's recommendation to deny the petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement. The recommendation was based upon a medical certification that the petitioner was not permanently incapacitated by a work-related injury because he had worked full-time, without accommodation, for six years following his most recently accepted workers' compensation injury. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the board referred the request to the hearings examiner. In reviewing the request for reconsideration, the hearings examiner became aware of a potential jurisdictional issue and notified petitioner that, because he "was a beneficiary when he applied for disability retirement, his membership appears to have terminated and the Board of Trustees appears to lack jurisdiction to award him a disability retirement." After a three-day hearing, the hearings examiner recommended that the board find that it did not have jurisdiction to grant accidental disability retirement benefits. The board accepted the recommendation. Finding no reversible error with the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of David Eskeland" on Justia Law

Sterling, a former coal miner, received a favorable decision from an administrative law judge (ALJ) declaring him eligible for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition by Sterling’s employer that argued that the ALJ wrongly applied the statutory presumption of pneumoconiosis, improperly discredited certain medical opinions disputing Sterling’s pneumoconiosis diagnosis, and failed to explain his resolution of conflicting evidence about the extent of Sterling’s past cigarette smoking. View "Central OH Coal Co. v. Dir.r, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

Johnson served in the U.S. Army, 1970-197171. Years after leaving the service, he filed a claim for increased disability ratings for his service-connected disabilities, including rheumatic heart disease (then rated 10% disabling), and degenerative changes of the right and left knees (each knee rated 10% disabling). A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims, finding that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based on individual unemployability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed and denied his claim for extra-schedular consideration of the combined impact of his service-connected rheumatic heart disease and right knee disability under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1). The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the CFR language ambiguous and deferring to the VA’s interpretation. The Federal Circuit reversed, citing plain language. Section 3.321(b)(1) entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extraschedular evaluation based on an individual disability not adequately captured by the schedular evaluations; it also entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extra-schedular evaluation based on multiple disabilities, the combined effect of which is exceptional and not captured by scheduler evaluations.View "Johnson v. McDonald" on Justia Law