Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law

In a social security disability or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) must evaluate the effect of a claimant's mental impairments on her ability to work using a "special technique" prescribed by the Commissioner's regulations. At the second step of a five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the mental impairment is "severe" or "not severe." If "not," then the ALJ must determine and discuss them as part of his residual functional capacity (RFC) analysis at step four. A question that is frequently encountered in social security disability appeals cases is how much further discussion of a non-severe impairment is required at step four? The Tenth Circuit found that in assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments; the Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simply rely on his finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis. In this case, the ALJ found that Petitioner's alleged mental impairments were medically determinable but non-severe. He then used language suggesting he had excluded them from consideration as part of his RFC assessment, based on his determination of non-severity. Under the regulations, however, a finding of non-severity alone would not support a decision to prepare an RFC assessment omitting any mental restriction. The ALJ's specific conclusions he reached in this portion of his analysis were unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the ALJ's decision and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings at step four. View "Wells v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Mother and Appellant/Cross-Appellee Lisa Kinney Lindstrom sought a ruling as to the number of "occurrences" for which the MCARE Fund is liable based on allegations that her physician failed to diagnose discrete in utero infections suffered by her twins, which caused severe injuries to both children. The Commonwealth Court granted summary judgment in favor of the MCARE Fund, holding that the physician's failure to diagnose Mother's infection constituted the single cause of the children's injuries, and, therefore, there was a single occurrence, limiting MCARE coverage to the statutory limit of one payment of $1 million. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court erred by granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the children's injuries arose from the physician's failure to diagnose a single infection, or whether the children's injuries resulted from the physician's failure to diagnose multiple infections from different organisms that infected each child in utero at different times. View "Kinney-Lindstrom v. MCARE Fund" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Welfare appealed an order that disallowed its attempt to recover assets in a probate proceeding. The Department sought to recover assets of a dead Medicaid recipient for medical assistance payments made on the decedent's behalf from her widower. The magistrate court held that the Department could not reach the separate property of the decedent's spouse. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Department was permitted to seek recovery from the decedent's community property that was transmuted to her widow as his separate property. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law

The Department of Veterans Affairs promulgated a rule that purported to eliminate certain procedural and appellate rights for veterans appearing before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates (NOVA) sought review. During the course of review it became clear that the new rule was invalid; the VA made assurances to NOVA and to the Federal Circuit about how the matter would be handled pending resolution. It later became clear that these assurances were not honored by the VA. The Federal Circuit ordered the VA to show cause why it should not be sanctioned. The VA, conceding error, provided a detailed remedial plan. After clarifications, NOVA indicated its satisfaction with, and agreement to, the plan, under which the VA agreed to notify relevant claimants before the Board, to vacate the affected Board decisions, and to provide affected claimants with a new hearing even if relevant deadlines would otherwise have expired. The Federal Circuit approved the plan and did not enter sanctions. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Mingo Logan challenged the award of benefits to claimant under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Because the court concluded that the ALJ did not in fact apply rebuttal limitations to Mingo Logan, and the Board affirmed the ALJ's analysis, the court did not reach Mingo Logan's challenge to the standard announced by the Board to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption of entitlement to benefits. The court affirmed the Board's award of benefits because it also found that Mingo Logan's other challenges to the ALJ's factual findings lacked merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. Owen" on Justia Law

Claimant was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901-945. At issue was whether the awards of attorneys' fees properly reflected market-based evidence of counsel's hourly rate, as required by the lodestar analysis in Hensley v. Eckerhart. The court held that neither the ALJ nor the BRB abused its discretion in concluding that counsel provided sufficient market-based evidence of rates, and that the number of hours billed for attorneys' services reasonably reflected the work completed. The court also held that the award of fees for work performed by certain legal assistants was not supported fully by the record, and modified that award accordingly. View "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

After the court reversed and remanded for an award of social security disability benefits to plaintiff, plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the fees where the government's underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and remanded for an award of fees and costs. View "Meier v. Colvin" on Justia Law