Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.”

Arnaz Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009. Crawford subsequently applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI benefits) due to a mental condition, but the social security administration (Administration) denied the claim. Meanwhile, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits. The division of employment security (Division) awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford until March 20, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Administration determined Crawford had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009. The Division subsequently determined (1) Crawford was unable to work from December 20, 2009 to March 20, 2010 and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits; and (2) Crawford had received $3,080 in benefits that he was ineligible to receive. The labor and industrial relations commission (Commission) affirmed the determination that Crawford was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the Commission's decisions to the extent they authorized the Division to collect the overpayment from Crawford; but (2) otherwise affirmed the Commission's decision.

The Department of Health and Human Services denied Medicare coverage of the BIO-1000, a piece of durable medical equipment used to treat osteoarthritis of the knee. In four decisions, the Medicare appeals counsel, the highest level of agency adjudication, ruled that the BIO-1000 had not been shown to be reasonable and necessary for the treatment at issue. The supplier of the device challenged those decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIO-1000 supplier. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and joined the Fourth Circuit in holding that the appeals council's coverage denials for the BIO-1000 were not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, as (1) the appeals council adequately explained its reasons for denying coverage; and (2) the coverage denials were supported by substantial evidence. Remanded.

The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) imposed a civil money penalty on Greenbrier Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a skilled nursing facility in Arkansas, for noncompliance with Medicare participation requirements. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Greenbrier's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported HHS's finding that Greenbrier was not in substantial compliance with 42 C.F.R. 483.25; (2) the finding that Greenbrier's noncompliance with section 483.25 rose to the level of immediate jeopardy was not erroneous; and (3) judicial review of two of Greenbrier's objections to the monetary penalty was barred, and Greenbrier received adequate notice of its noncompliance.

Locane, born in 1983, was adopted and does not know her family medical history. She suffered her first symptoms within two weeks of being vaccinated in 1997 and was diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease. She sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, alleging that she suffered Crohn’s disease as a result of hepatitis B vaccination. A special master denied the claim, finding Locane’s disease began before her vaccination and that Locane failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine caused or significantly aggravated her disease. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Dilley appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Missoula. The district court concluded the City acted within its legal authority when it purchased the Missoula Civic Stadium with tax increment financing (TIF) funds designated for urban renewal. The stadium was originally planned and developed by Play Ball Missoula, Inc. (Play Ball), a volunteer, non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of bringing a minor league baseball team to Missoula. In 2000, Play Ball and the City entered a development agreement that permitted Play Ball to finance and construct a stadium on blighted City property and later convey the facility to the City. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed suit prior to the City's acquisition of the stadium, alleging the planned purchase using TIF funds was an "illegal payoff of private enterprise debt." On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously failed to specify which provision under Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42 of the Montana Code that permitted the "payoff." He also argued that the City could not make such an expenditure of TIF funds simply because the practice was not prohibited by statute. Finding that the City's use of TIF money to acquire the stadium was a proper exercise of its urban renewal posers, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor.

Howard Back filed this suit alleging that Secretary of Heath and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius violated her duties under the Medicare Act and the Due Process Clause by failing to provide an administrative process for beneficiaries of hospice care to appeal a hospice provider's refusal to provide a drug prescribed by their attending physician. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for judgment on the pleadings because Back had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that although the government led Back to believe there was no appeal process, such a process did exist. Accordingly, no controversy existed and the appeal was moot.

Plaintiff-Appellant Valinda Kornhauser filed suit to challenge the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied her claim for disability benefits. The District Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation ("R&R"). After receiving and considering memoranda on the matter, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that the District Court vacate the Commissioner's decision and remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge, in addition to explaining why Plaintiff was entitled to a vacatur, observed that the memorandum her attorney had submitted failed to comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 1.05(a). The non-compliance, according to the Magistrate Judge, consisted of "smaller margins than authorized" by the rule and "footnotes . . . smaller than ten-point type." In a footnote to this observation, he stated: "These intentional violations would justify striking the memorandum. However, this sanction would unfairly punish the plaintiff. Consequently, I propose that, when plaintiff's counsel seeks attorney's fees, that the typical request for a cost-of-living increase be denied." Following the entry of judgment, Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). The parties stipulated to the amount of attorney fees, but after its consideration of the petition, the Magistrate Judge issue an R&R recommending that the district court award a lower amount in fees as have been stipulated because of Plaintiff's brief being submitted with small margins and unacceptable font sizing. Plaintiff's attorney filed an objection to the R&R, asking the district court not to adopt it because she did not intend to violate the local rule. Finding that the sanction was a reasonable exercise of the Magistrate Judge's disciplinary authority, the district court adopted the R&R with the sanction. Plaintiff appealed the imposition of the sanction. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sanction, finding "no procedural rule that sanctions the conduct involved" in this case.

The State Department of Labor and Industry appealed a district court's order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Petitioner Sheila Callahan & Friends, Inc. (SC&F). SC&F, a radio broadcasting company entered into a one-year contract with Joni Mielke. During the term of employment, SC&F evaluated Mielke as being an excellent radio personality and announcer but as underperforming other responsibilities because she either did not want to do them or preferred announcing-related duties. Mielke elected not to renew her contract with SC&F, and on an exit interview form, Mielke indicated her reason for leaving was that she "quit." After Mielke left her employment with SC&F, she was hired by another radio station. After a brief employment with this subsequent employer, she was laid off and filed for unemployment benefits in October 2009. The Department of Labor sent a Notice of Chargeability Determination to SC&F assessing a pro rata share of the costs of Mielke’s unemployment insurance benefits to SC&F’s experience rating account. The Department administratively determined that Mielke was employed for SC&F on a contract basis during her base period of employment and that SC&F’s account was chargeable for a portion of benefits drawn by Mielke. SC&F requested a redetermination, arguing that Mielke had voluntarily left her employment. The Department issued a Redetermination affirming the initial Determination. An administrative hearing was then conducted by telephone; the hearing officer determined that Mielke neither voluntarily quit nor was discharged for misconduct and affirmed the decision to charge SC&F’s account. On appeal, the Department argued the District Court improperly failed to defer to the Board’s findings of facts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the error of the Board was primarily premised upon application of legal standards, in the nature of a conclusion of law. Given the inapplicability of the imputation rules to the situation here, the District Court properly concluded that the evidence did not support the Board’s determination that Mielke’s work separation was involuntary.

Plaintiff Lisa R. Chapo appealed a district court's order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. At step five the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled because, "[c]onsidering [her] age, education [high school], work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform," namely the jobs of appointment clerk, escort vehicle driver, and office helper identified by the vocational expert (VE) who testified at the evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision in several respects, in particular the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion evidence in the record. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ALJ’s handling of a testifying doctor's findings was erroneous and, as a result, the dispositive hypothetical inquiry put to the VE was fatally defective. "Indeed, that hypothetical did not even include a restriction (to 'simple' work) that the ALJ himself recognized in his decision." The Court concluded that this matter be remanded for further proceedings, "wherein the ALJ must either obtain a mental RFC determination from an examining source to oppose [the doctor], articulate some other adequate basis for discounting [his] findings, or come back to the VE with a proper hypothetical including those limitations (and his own restriction to 'simple' work, should the ALJ find it appropriate to re-impose such a restriction in the RFC determined on remand)."