Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an eleven-year-old special education student, lived in the Minnesota Independent School District No. 15 (district). An ALJ for the Minnesota Department of Education determined that the district had denied plaintiff a free appropriate public education (FAPE) within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1482. After plaintiff filed an action in federal court seeking attorney fees and costs, both parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The district court reversed the ALJ's decision and denied plaintiff's motion for fees and costs and plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that plaintiff was not denied a FAPE where the district court did not fail to give "due weight" to the results of the administrative hearing; where the district court did not commit procedural violations of the IDEA; and where the district court did not violate the IDEA's substantive requirements.

The applicant sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming that she is disabled by bipolar disorder and numerous physical impairments. The Social Security Administration denied the application; a magistrate judge affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ erred in discounting the testimony of the treating physician and in finding that the applicant exaggerated her difficulties.

In 2003, Joshua Micone applied for Medicaid benefits for himself and his family. In his applications, Joshua did not report his wife Jennifer's interest in a family limited partnership. The Department of Public Health and Human Services approved Joshua's application, and the Micone family received Medicaid benefits from 2003 to 2006. Subsequently, the Department notified Joshua that his household was ineligible for benefits paid over the past three years because of Jennifer's interest in the partnership and demanded repayment. Joshua contested the demand of benefits paid. The State Board of Public Assistance upheld a hearing officer's findings that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was a countable and available resource. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that that the hearing officer did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-623 when he did not issue a decision within ninety days after the case was deemed submitted; and (2) the district court correctly determined that substantial credible evidence supported the Department's finding that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was an available resource.

The court agreed to rehear this case en banc to clarify under what circumstances the exhaustion requirement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(l), barred non-IDEA federal or state law claims. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where the district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff did not initially seek relief in a due process hearing and therefore, failed to comply with one of the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement of the IDEA. The court held that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement was not jurisdictional and that plaintiff's non-IDEA federal and state-law claims were not subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment.

Plaintiff Duane Barber (Barber) appealed the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of benefits claiming that an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to properly consider the evidence he presented in support of his claim. Plaintiff claimed he was disabled by schizophrenia, anti-social personality disorder, depression, anxiety and bipolar disorder. Barber eventually applied for Supplemental Security Income but the ALJ concluded at step five of the five-step evaluation process that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, and a magistrate judge, acting on the parties' consent, affirmed. Plaintiff then brought his appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review of the administrative record, the Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ properly explained his findings throughout. Because the record supported the ALJ's decision in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ's decision to deny Plaintiff's application for benefits.

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).

Plaintiff Rosemary Kilinski sought social security benefits in 1999. The Commissioner determined that she was disabled as of October 2003. In this case, Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment that upheld the Commissioner's determination that her disability onset date was in 2003 rather than 1999. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the Administrative Law Judge erred in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision.

Plaintiff Laurie Harper appealed a district court's order that affirmed the denial of her disability benefits. Plaintiff alleged her disability was based on fibromyalgia and depression. The Social Security Administration denied her applications initially and on reconsideration. The Administrative Law Judge determined that she was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Upon review of the testimony of the expert witnesses and the record of the Commission's analysis of her case, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence to support Ms. Harper's claim of disability in this case. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

The World War II veteran died in 2004, during litigation of whether a hip injury was service-related. The VA dismissed a pending appeal as moot and rejected the widow's request to be substituted. The Federal Circuit reversed. The widow filed her own claim for accrued benefits. The motion to substitute was denied, but the widow was awarded accrued benefits and sought $87,802.17 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. The veterans' court determined that the widow had the right, as representative of the estate, to recover fees for attorney hours expended prior to his death, but had no right to recover fees for work performed after her husbandâs death. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that attorney work performed after the veteran's death was directly related to his claim; it was his claim, not the widow's claim, that was being litigated.