Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Danny Fox, an active-duty servicemember, purchased a property in Norfolk, Virginia, in 2015. The City of Norfolk determined the property was unsafe and uninhabitable, repeatedly notifying Fox of building code violations. Despite these notices, Fox did not make the necessary repairs. In December 2018, the city demolished the house, deeming it a public nuisance. Fox subsequently sued the city, claiming inverse condemnation, among other things, arguing the property was not a nuisance and that the city's actions were pretextual to increase its tax base.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that Fox's federal constitutional claims were barred by the statute of limitations. It also ruled that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed because, whether or not the property was a nuisance, he could not demonstrate the city's public use requirement. The court found no evidence to support Fox's claim that the city's actions were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed regardless of whether the property was a nuisance. If the property was a nuisance, the city had the authority to abate it without compensation. If it was not a nuisance, Fox could not show a public use, a necessary element for an inverse condemnation claim. The court also found that Fox provided no evidence to support his pretext argument. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the city. View "D.A. Realestate Investment, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to deregulate certain Manhattan apartments under the luxury deregulation provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) issued deregulation orders for these apartments, but the leases did not expire until after the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) repealed luxury deregulation. The property owner argued that the apartments should still be deregulated despite the repeal.The Supreme Court dismissed the property owner's proceeding, holding that DHCR's interpretation of the HSTPA was reasonable. The court found that the apartments did not become deregulated because their leases had not expired before the HSTPA took effect. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that DHCR's interpretation was correct and that there was no improper delay by DHCR in processing the deregulation applications.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as eliminating luxury deregulation for apartments whose leases expired after the statute's effective date. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent supported DHCR's interpretation. Additionally, the court rejected the property owner's argument that DHCR caused undue delay in processing the deregulation applications, finding no evidence of negligence or willfulness by DHCR. The court concluded that the apartments remained subject to rent stabilization under the HSTPA. View "Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners (Board) manages state trust lands for the benefit of public schools. In Teton County, the Board issued temporary use permits to Basecamp Hospitality, LLC and Wilson Investments, LLC for commercial activities on state trust lands. Teton County challenged these permits, arguing they should be subject to local land use regulations. The district court dismissed Teton County's challenge, stating the county lacked standing for judicial review. Subsequently, Teton County issued abatement notices to the permit holders, which led the Board to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming sovereign immunity from local regulations.The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Teton County) filed a petition for review, which was dismissed by the Ninth Judicial District Court. The Board then filed for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Teton County's enforcement actions. Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands (CRUSL), formed by local property owners, sought to intervene, claiming their interests were directly impacted by the use of the state trust lands.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. CRUSL argued it had a significant protectable interest due to the proximity of its members' properties to the state trust lands. However, the court found CRUSL's interests were contingent on the outcome of the sovereign immunity issue and thus not significant protectable interests. Additionally, the court held that Teton County adequately represented CRUSL's interests, as both sought to enforce local regulations on state trust lands. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of CRUSL's motion to intervene as a matter of right under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). View "Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands v. State" on Justia Law

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law

Roberta Schlegel experienced flooding in her basement after a portion of a roadway near her home collapsed, causing debris to block a drainage culvert. Schlegel sued Summit County for the flood damage, alleging negligence in maintaining the roadway. The county claimed political-subdivision immunity as a defense.The trial court and the Ninth District Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of the county, concluding that the county was immune from liability under political-subdivision immunity laws. They determined that the negligent-roadway-maintenance exception to immunity did not apply because Schlegel was not a motorist or user of the roadway injured by the roadway condition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Ninth District's judgment. The court held that the exception to political-subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) for negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and free of obstructions is not limited to losses suffered by users of the roadway. The court found that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and it applies to any person who suffers loss to property caused by the political subdivision's negligence in maintaining public roads.The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the county's negligence in maintaining the roadway proximately caused the flooding and whether any defenses under R.C. 2744.03 could restore the county's immunity. View "Schlegel v. Summit County" on Justia Law

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

Habdab, LLC filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Lake County against the County of Lake and the Village of Mundelein, seeking to invalidate certain fees imposed under an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). Habdab claimed the fees violated the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law (Impact Fee Law) and sought to avoid paying unconstitutional road improvement impact fees. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Habdab's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision.The appellate court held that the fees imposed under the IGA did not constitute "road improvement impact fees" under the Impact Fee Law because they were not conditioned on the issuance of a building permit or a certificate of occupancy. The court also found that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions did not apply, as there was an essential nexus and rough proportionality between the fees and the legitimate state interest of preventing traffic congestion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the IGA fees did not fall under the definition of "road improvement impact fees" as per the Impact Fee Law, which specifically applies to fees imposed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy. The court also agreed that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply, as there was a legitimate state interest in minimizing traffic congestion and a rough proportionality between the fees and the impact of the proposed development. View "Habdab, LLC v. County of Lake" on Justia Law