Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A mining company sought to secure water rights in the Dixie Creek-Tenmile Creek basin to support a mining operation. The Nevada State Engineer issued a decision concerning the relinquishment of groundwater rights by the Nevada Division of State Lands (NDSL), which effectively reduced the amount of water available for future appropriation in the basin. The mining company did not hold any established water rights in the basin but had filed several applications for future rights and had objected to NDSL’s filings. The State Engineer did not notify the company of his decision, and the company only learned of it months later through a third party.After learning of the decision, the company petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court for judicial review, claiming the relinquishment adversely affected its interests and the prospects of its water rights applications. The State Engineer moved to dismiss, arguing that the company lacked standing and that the petition was untimely. The district court agreed, finding that the company was not an aggrieved party under NRS 533.450(1) and had no standing, and also found the petition was untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court determined that under NRS 533.450(1), unless a decision is made pursuant to certain enumerated statutes, the party seeking review must have a personal or property right affected by the challenged decision. The mining company had no such existing right; its interest was speculative and based only on pending applications. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition for lack of standing and did not reach the issues of timeliness or equitable relief. The holding clarifies that only parties with a personal or property right affected by a State Engineer’s decision may seek judicial review under the relevant statutory provision. View "Gold Standard Ventures (US) Inc. v. Thorson" on Justia Law

A group of residents and an association challenged actions taken by the Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1 (CID) in Boise, Idaho. The dispute arose after the CID’s board adopted resolutions in 2021 authorizing payments to a developer for infrastructure projects—such as roadways, sidewalks, and stormwater facilities—and issued a general obligation bond to finance those payments. The residents objected to the projects, arguing they primarily benefited the developer, imposed higher property taxes on homeowners, and allegedly violated the Idaho Community Infrastructure District Act (CID Act) as well as state and federal constitutional provisions. Previously, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District reviewed the matter after the residents filed a petition challenging the board’s decisions. The district court ruled in favor of the CID and the developer, concluding most of the residents’ claims were either time-barred under the CID Act’s statute of limitations or had been waived because they were not preserved before the CID board. The court also found that the remaining claims failed on their merits, holding that the challenged projects qualified as “community infrastructure,” the stormwater facilities satisfied ownership requirements, and the CID was not the alter ego of the City of Boise. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court clarified that, given the lack of formal administrative proceedings under the CID Act, the preservation doctrine did not apply to bar the residents’ arguments. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any challenge to the CID’s original formation and the 2010 bond election was time-barred. The court further held that the roadways and stormwater facilities qualified as community infrastructure, the CID’s actions did not violate constitutional requirements regarding taxation or lending of credit, and the CID was not the alter ego of the city. The Supreme Court awarded costs on appeal to the CID and the developer but denied attorney fees to all parties. View "Doyle v. The Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1" on Justia Law

Christopher and Jennifer Atkinson purchased a lot in the Ridgeview Trails Major Subdivision in Livingston, Montana, in 2012. The City of Livingston had approved the subdivision in 2005 and 2006, and a geotechnical report identifying problematic soils was created for the subdivision developers but was not provided to the Atkinsons when they purchased the lot. The Atkinsons received a building permit from the City to construct a residence, which was substantially completed in June 2013. In 2021, the Atkinsons began to observe cracking and structural problems in their home. After later discovering the existence of the geotechnical report, they sued the City in April 2024, alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation for the City’s failure to disclose known soil issues during the permitting process.The case was heard in the Montana Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County. By agreement, the parties proceeded directly to cross-motions for summary judgment to address threshold legal issues before discovery. The District Court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that the claims were barred by Montana’s statute of repose for construction-related claims, found in § 27-2-208, MCA. The District Court also found that the City owed no duty to the Atkinsons, that the public duty doctrine barred the claims, that the Atkinsons had disclaimed claims relating to permits and inspections, and that the geotechnical report was for the developer’s exclusive use.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Atkinsons’ claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose in § 27-2-208, MCA, because their claims arose from the City’s planning and inspection activities and were filed more than ten years after substantial completion of the home. The Court also held that the statute applies to municipalities and that no statutory exception applied. View "Atkinson v. Livingston" on Justia Law

Several trusts owned by the Garaas family hold mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. operates a well on these lands, which are subject to two distinct spacing units created by orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC): a base unit and an overlapping unit. NDIC issued an order allocating production from the well in the overlapping unit to Section 20, which is part of the base unit but not wholly contained within the overlapping unit. This allocation reduced the Trusts’ royalty interests, prompting them to seek declaratory relief and damages.The Trusts first brought their claims in the District Court of McKenzie County, but the court dismissed the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Trusts were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the NDIC. Subsequently, Petro-Hunt applied to NDIC for clarification on production allocation, and NDIC issued Order No. 33453, allocating production from the overlapping unit to the base unit. The Trusts appealed NDIC’s order to the district court, which affirmed NDIC’s order. The Trusts then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that NDIC had legal authority under statute to allocate oil and gas production among spacing units. However, the court concluded that NDIC did not regularly pursue its authority because it failed to follow proper procedures, including providing notice and opportunity to participate to all affected interest owners. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated NDIC Order No. 33453. The request for attorney’s fees by the Trusts was denied, as the record did not show NDIC acted without substantial justification. View "Garaas v. NDIC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a referendum petition submitted in Norman, Oklahoma, regarding a municipal ordinance that adopted the Rock Creek Entertainment District Project Plan. The ordinance created two tax increment financing districts to support the construction of a multipurpose arena, parking garage, and related infrastructure. The increments from local sales and ad valorem taxes were designated to fund the project up to certain financial limits or for a maximum period of twenty-five years. The ordinance was enacted without voter approval, prompting proponents to submit a referendum petition seeking a public vote on the ordinance.After the petition was filed, including 10,689 signatures, a protest was lodged in the District Court of Cleveland County, challenging both the legal sufficiency and signature count of Referendum Petition 2425-1. The protest focused on alleged inaccuracies and omissions in the petition’s gist, which is intended to briefly and accurately describe the purpose and effect of the proposed measure for potential signatories. The District Court, presided over by Judge Jeff Virgin, concluded that the gist was insufficient, specifically finding that it misrepresented the financial triggers and duration of the tax districts, and ordered the petition invalidated and stricken.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the sufficiency of the gist de novo. The Court determined that the gist failed to accurately state the maximum amount of public assistance and omitted the fact that the tax districts would expire upon the earliest of three specified events, not necessarily after twenty-five years. These deficiencies rendered the gist misleading and legally insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order invalidating Referendum Petition 2425-1, holding that the petition’s gist was legally insufficient and therefore the petition could not proceed. View "Allison v. McCoy-Post" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC owns and operates a 360-unit apartment complex in Las Vegas, Nevada, where units are leased for long-term stays under agreements prohibiting unauthorized subletting. Clark County received numerous complaints regarding short-term rentals in certain units, which included disturbances such as loud parties. The County investigated and verified that some units were being rented for short-term stays through Airbnb. After notifying Diamond Sands of the violations and conducting follow-up inspections, the County issued two administrative citations assessing $2,000 fines for each violation, as permitted under its ordinance, which prohibits unauthorized short-term rentals and allows for fines between $1,000 and $10,000 per violation.Diamond Sands filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the County’s ordinance under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The company sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally penalized property owners for short-term rental activity conducted by tenants. The district court denied Diamond Sands’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the fines were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the violations and that Diamond Sands had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and underlying legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that Diamond Sands bore some culpability due to its knowledge and failure to prevent ongoing violations. The fines imposed were at the low end of the authorized range, and the ordinance aimed to deter harm to residents. The court also determined that Diamond Sands had not shown the ordinance was unconstitutional in every application. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "DIAMOND SANDS APARTMENTS, LLC V. CLARK COUNTY NEVADA" on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

Several trusts and entities purchased properties in Nevada that were subject to deeds of trust held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After unsuccessful attempts in state court to extinguish the deeds of trust and quiet title, each property remained encumbered. Between 2022 and 2024, foreclosure proceedings were initiated on these properties, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acting through their conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In response, the plaintiffs brought suit against the FHFA and its Director, seeking to prevent foreclosure and challenging the constitutionality of the FHFA’s funding mechanism under the Appropriations Clause and the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief, then dismissed their amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the FHFA’s funding structure was constitutional. The court determined that the Recovery Act, which created the FHFA and provides for its funding via regulatory assessments rather than Congressional appropriations, met constitutional standards by specifying both a source and purpose for the funds. The court also found that the Recovery Act’s limitation to “reasonable costs” provided an intelligible principle, satisfying the nondelegation doctrine. Leave to amend was denied as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, but rejected their arguments on the merits. It concluded that the FHFA’s funding mechanism, as established by the Recovery Act, does not violate the Appropriations Clause because it identifies a source and purpose for expenditures, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited. It further held the mechanism does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, as the statute provides an intelligible principle. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "DAISEY TRUST v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY" on Justia Law

A group of cities holding junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer sought judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. This order updated the methodology used to assess whether pumping by junior ground water users caused material injury to senior surface water rights holders who divert water from the Snake River. The Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order revised technical aspects of the model and data, and after a hearing on objections by the cities, the Director affirmed the methodology with modifications and issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order regarding the Fifth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions, upholding the methodology and the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that the Director did not prejudice the cities’ substantial rights. The district court’s judgment specifically affirmed the Post-Hearing Order but did not address the operative Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the cities had properly invoked its jurisdiction. The Court held that the cities failed to challenge the currently operative Sixth Methodology Order in district court, and therefore, under Idaho law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal or award the requested relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Idaho Department of Water Resources but denied attorney fees to the intervening Surface Water Coalition, granting them costs only. View "City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR" on Justia Law