Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC owns and operates a 360-unit apartment complex in Las Vegas, Nevada, where units are leased for long-term stays under agreements prohibiting unauthorized subletting. Clark County received numerous complaints regarding short-term rentals in certain units, which included disturbances such as loud parties. The County investigated and verified that some units were being rented for short-term stays through Airbnb. After notifying Diamond Sands of the violations and conducting follow-up inspections, the County issued two administrative citations assessing $2,000 fines for each violation, as permitted under its ordinance, which prohibits unauthorized short-term rentals and allows for fines between $1,000 and $10,000 per violation.Diamond Sands filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the County’s ordinance under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The company sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally penalized property owners for short-term rental activity conducted by tenants. The district court denied Diamond Sands’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the fines were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the violations and that Diamond Sands had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and underlying legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that Diamond Sands bore some culpability due to its knowledge and failure to prevent ongoing violations. The fines imposed were at the low end of the authorized range, and the ordinance aimed to deter harm to residents. The court also determined that Diamond Sands had not shown the ordinance was unconstitutional in every application. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "DIAMOND SANDS APARTMENTS, LLC V. CLARK COUNTY NEVADA" on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

Several trusts and entities purchased properties in Nevada that were subject to deeds of trust held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After unsuccessful attempts in state court to extinguish the deeds of trust and quiet title, each property remained encumbered. Between 2022 and 2024, foreclosure proceedings were initiated on these properties, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acting through their conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In response, the plaintiffs brought suit against the FHFA and its Director, seeking to prevent foreclosure and challenging the constitutionality of the FHFA’s funding mechanism under the Appropriations Clause and the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief, then dismissed their amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the FHFA’s funding structure was constitutional. The court determined that the Recovery Act, which created the FHFA and provides for its funding via regulatory assessments rather than Congressional appropriations, met constitutional standards by specifying both a source and purpose for the funds. The court also found that the Recovery Act’s limitation to “reasonable costs” provided an intelligible principle, satisfying the nondelegation doctrine. Leave to amend was denied as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, but rejected their arguments on the merits. It concluded that the FHFA’s funding mechanism, as established by the Recovery Act, does not violate the Appropriations Clause because it identifies a source and purpose for expenditures, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited. It further held the mechanism does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, as the statute provides an intelligible principle. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "DAISEY TRUST v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY" on Justia Law

A group of cities holding junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer sought judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. This order updated the methodology used to assess whether pumping by junior ground water users caused material injury to senior surface water rights holders who divert water from the Snake River. The Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order revised technical aspects of the model and data, and after a hearing on objections by the cities, the Director affirmed the methodology with modifications and issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order regarding the Fifth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions, upholding the methodology and the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that the Director did not prejudice the cities’ substantial rights. The district court’s judgment specifically affirmed the Post-Hearing Order but did not address the operative Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the cities had properly invoked its jurisdiction. The Court held that the cities failed to challenge the currently operative Sixth Methodology Order in district court, and therefore, under Idaho law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal or award the requested relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Idaho Department of Water Resources but denied attorney fees to the intervening Surface Water Coalition, granting them costs only. View "City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned and operated a hotel that had a record of serious structural and safety problems, including a window and a stone falling from the building, and repeated failures to correct code violations. After a fire occurred without activation of the sprinkler system, a follow-up inspection revealed that several fire code violations remained unaddressed, along with new violations. Based on these findings, the city’s building administrator ordered the hotel to be closed immediately, citing imminent safety risks. The owners sought to appeal and demanded hearings, but the city cited the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason for delay and directed them to other appellate avenues. The closure order was lifted once the most urgent hazards were remedied, and the owners eventually fixed all violations.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the city and the building administrator, finding no violations of procedural due process or the Fifth Amendment, and that qualified immunity protected the administrator in his individual capacity. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the procedural due process provided for the closure, the application of qualified immunity, and asserting that the closure constituted a regulatory taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, even assuming a protected property interest existed, the risk of erroneous deprivation was low due to specific regulations and the availability of prompt post-deprivation remedies. The court also found that swift action in the face of public safety threats justified summary administrative action without additional pre-deprivation process. Regarding qualified immunity, the court determined that no clearly established law prohibited the administrator’s conduct. Finally, the court held that the temporary closure was a lawful exercise of police power and did not amount to a compensable regulatory taking. View "reVamped LLC v. City of Pipestone" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises owned an 11.8-acre parcel adjacent to Detroit’s Coleman A. Young International Airport, with about 20 percent of the property falling within a regulated runway “visibility zone” that restricted development. Over time, the City of Detroit acquired other properties in a nearby area for airport compliance but did not purchase HRT’s. By late 2008, HRT’s property had become vacant and vandalized, and HRT alleged it could no longer use, lease, or sell the property due to City actions and regulatory restrictions.HRT first sued the City in Michigan state court in 2002, alleging inverse condemnation, but the jury found for the City; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, HRT sued in federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice because HRT had not exhausted state remedies. HRT then filed a second state suit in 2009, which was dismissed on res judicata grounds; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. HRT did not seek further review.In 2012, HRT filed the present action in federal court, alleging a de facto taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the City’s preclusion arguments, granted summary judgment to HRT on liability, and held that a taking had occurred, leaving the date for the jury. A first jury found the taking occurred in 2009 and awarded $4.25 million; the court ordered remittitur to $2 million, then a second jury, after a new trial, awarded $1.97 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that HRT’s claim was ripe, not barred by claim or issue preclusion, that the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, and that its remittitur decision was not an abuse of discretion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual who left his Florida residence in August 2018 to care for his terminally ill brother, a tenant in a New York City Mitchell-Lama apartment. After the brother’s death in March 2020, the petitioner sought succession rights to the apartment, which required him to prove that the apartment was his primary residence for at least one year prior to his brother’s death. The petitioner submitted various documents, including income certifications, power of attorney forms, and certain public assistance records. However, some materials listed his Florida address, and much of his supporting documentation either fell outside the relevant one-year period or was not addressed to the apartment in question.The housing company denied his application, concluding that he failed to establish primary residency during the required time. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) upheld this decision after an administrative appeal, finding the evidence insufficient. The petitioner then challenged the agency’s determination through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court annulled the agency’s decision and granted succession rights, ruling the denial irrational. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the agency’s denial had a rational basis, especially given the petitioner’s failure to supply certain key documents such as New York State tax returns or proof of exemption.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that, under the applicable regulations, the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to prove the apartment was his primary residence for the required period was supported by a rational basis. The Court emphasized that the agency’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and the evidence provided by the petitioner did not meet the burden required to establish primary residency for succession rights. The order dismissing the petition was affirmed. View "Matter of Mantilla v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev." on Justia Law

Pedro Castaneda died in a traffic accident at an intersection on State Highway 249 that was under construction. At the time, the intersection’s traffic lights were installed but not yet operational, and there was a dispute about whether they were properly covered to indicate their status. Castaneda’s family sued the contractors involved in the project, SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. and Third Coast Services, LLC, alleging that negligence in the construction and installation of the traffic signals contributed to the fatal accident. The construction project was governed by an agreement between the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Montgomery County, with the County responsible for the project’s design and construction, but with TxDOT retaining authority over the adjacent frontage roads and final approval of plans.The trial court denied the contractors’ motions for summary judgment that sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 97.002, which grants immunity to contractors under certain conditions. The contractors appealed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Section 97.002 applies only to contractors who are in direct contractual privity with TxDOT, and since neither contractor had a direct contract with TxDOT, they could not invoke the statute’s protection.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that Section 97.002 does not require direct contractual privity with TxDOT for a contractor to qualify for statutory immunity. The court determined that, based on the summary judgment record, SpawGlass and Third Coast performed work "for" TxDOT within the meaning of the statute, as their activities directly related to frontage roads that TxDOT would own and maintain. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the contractors met the remaining requirements of Section 97.002. View "THIRD COAST SERVICES, LLC v. CASTANEDA" on Justia Law

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan.The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law