Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves several taxicab companies in Hillsborough County, Florida, which held certificates and permits issued by the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission (PTC). The PTC was a special district created by the Legislature to regulate taxicabs. In 2012, a law declared these certificates and permits to be the private property of their holders, allowing them to be transferred or devised. However, in 2017, the Legislature repealed the 2012 law, dissolved the PTC, and returned regulatory authority to Hillsborough County, which chose not to recognize the PTC-issued certificates and permits.The taxicab companies filed a lawsuit claiming that the repeal of the 2012 law and the dissolution of the PTC constituted a taking of their property without compensation, violating the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hillsborough County, concluding that the certificates and permits had effectively vanished when the PTC was dissolved. However, the court denied the State's motion to dismiss, allowing the possibility of claims for damages against the State.The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Hillsborough County and reversed the denial of the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the taxicab companies did not have a property interest in the PTC-issued certificates and permits for purposes of the Takings Clause. The taxicab companies then sought review by the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida held that the 2017 repeal did not implicate the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The Court concluded that the Legislature retained the discretion to revoke any property rights conveyed in the 2012 law, as the certificates and permits were revocable privileges rather than irrevocable property rights. Consequently, the repeal of the 2012 law did not constitute a taking requiring compensation. The Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Bojorquez v. State" on Justia Law

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In October 2016, BAS, LLC purchased commercial property in Paragould, Arkansas, listing its mailing address as 3735 Winford Drive, Tarzana, California. BAS failed to pay property taxes for 2017 and 2018, leading the Greene County Clerk to certify the property to the Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment. The Commissioner sent a notice of the upcoming tax sale to the Tarzana address via certified mail in August 2021, but did not receive a physical return receipt. USPS tracking data indicated the notice was delivered. In June 2022, the Commissioner sent another notice to the Paragould property, which was returned undelivered. The property was sold in August 2022, and BAS filed a lawsuit contesting the sale, alleging due process violations and unlawful taking.The Greene County Circuit Court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Commissioner violated BAS’s due process rights, thus preventing a determination on sovereign immunity. The Commissioner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and concluded that the Commissioner’s efforts to notify BAS were constitutionally sufficient. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and determined that the Commissioner’s actions met due process requirements. The court held that BAS failed to allege an illegal or unconstitutional act to overcome sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. View "Land v. BAS, LLC" on Justia Law

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Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

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The case involves Billings County and its commissioners, who appealed a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction preventing them from entering the property of Sandra Short, David Short, Donald Short, and Sarah Sarbacker. The dispute centers on the County's attempt to use eminent domain to construct a bridge over the Little Missouri River, known as the Little Missouri River Crossing (LMRC). The Shorts had previously settled a lawsuit with the County in 2021, where the County agreed not to pursue eminent domain for the LMRC project. Despite this, a newly elected Board of Commissioners decided to proceed with the project in 2023, leading the Shorts to file a new lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Shorts, finding that they were likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim based on the Settlement Agreement. The court refrained from deciding on the validity of the Settlement Agreement, leaving that issue for the state court to address. The district court also stayed its proceedings, pending the outcome of the state court case, and denied the County's motion to dismiss without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the County could not lawfully contract away its power of eminent domain, as it is an essential attribute of sovereignty. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement was contrary to law and that the Shorts were not likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Short v. Billings County" on Justia Law

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The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose over the authority of the Red Lake Watershed District (the District) to conduct improvement proceedings for Polk County Ditch 39, which lies within the District but under the drainage authority of the Polk County Board of Commissioners. In 2017, landowners filed a petition with the District to improve Ditch 39, aiming to increase its capacity and length to capture overflow from another ditch, Ditch 66. The District accepted the petition and initiated proceedings, but Keystone Township and several landowners challenged the District's order, arguing that the District lacked authority as the ditch was not transferred from the county.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Keystone, ruling that the District did not have the authority to order the improvement because it had not taken over the ditch from the county. The court of appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the District had the authority to conduct the improvement proceedings and that the proceedings substantially conformed to statutory requirements.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The court held that under Minn. Stat. § 103D.625, subd. 4, the District was authorized to conduct improvement proceedings for Ditch 39 without first taking over the ditch from the county. The court also concluded that the District's proceedings conformed to the statutory requirements, despite the involvement of county officials being inconsistent with the Watershed Law. The court rejected Keystone's procedural challenges, including the timeliness of the property owners' report and the final hearing notice, affirming that these did not affect the District's authority to establish the improvement project. View "In the Matter of Keystone Township vs. Red Lake Watershed District," on Justia Law

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James and Kim McCormick own a 128.75-acre tract in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, accessed by a private driveway from Modica Lott Road. The property was part of a larger tract subdivided without adhering to the Bossier Parish Subdivision Code, which requires a plat description for split-out tracts. The McCormicks' deed, recorded in 2014, did not comply with these regulations. After a fire damaged their home in 2018, they applied for a building permit in 2020, which was denied by the Bossier Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) due to non-compliance with subdivision regulations.The McCormicks filed a mandamus action against Joe E. Ford, the Parish Engineer, seeking a court order for the permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the McCormicks, requiring the BPPJ to issue the permit, subject to certain conditions regarding the driveway. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the permit but removed the conditions, stating that the five-year prescriptive period for enforcing subdivision regulations had expired, making the property non-conforming.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the McCormick Tract enjoyed non-conforming status under La. R.S. 9:5625, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions. The Court held that the prescriptive period began when the deed was recorded in 2014, and since no action was taken within five years, the property attained non-conforming status. Consequently, the McCormicks were entitled to the building permit without additional conditions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, confirming that the McCormick Tract complied with relevant statutes and regulations. View "MCCORMICK VS. FORD" on Justia Law

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In June 2020, the North Dakota Department of Health inspected ND Indoor RV Park, LLC and found several health, safety, and fire code violations. The Park was informed that its 2020 operating license would be revoked unless the violations were corrected. The Park did not address the violations, leading to the initiation of the license revocation process. The Park also requested a renewal of its license for 2021, which was denied due to the existing violations. The Park was allowed to operate until the hearing proceedings were final. The Park later withdrew its request for a hearing, and the Department of Health dismissed the renewal application and closed the case. Subsequently, the Park sold its property.The Park filed a complaint against the State of North Dakota, alleging regulatory taking, deprivation of substantive and procedural due process, inverse condemnation, unlawful interference with business relationships, systemic violation of due process, and estoppel. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming qualified immunity for individual defendants and lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the takings claims. The district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the takings and due process claims but granted summary judgment on the unlawful interference claim. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court granted a writ of supervision, directing the district court to dismiss counts II and III because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also directed the dismissal of counts I and IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Park failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Park could not prevail on its substantive and procedural due process claims and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the takings claims. View "ND Indoor RV Park v. State" on Justia Law