Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, owner of an apartment building in Manhattan, filed an application with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) in 2019 to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements. The petitioner claimed that the registrations erroneously stated that unit 1B was temporarily exempt from rent stabilization due to owner/employee occupancy, while it should have been permanently exempt due to a high rent vacancy in 2002. The petitioner sought to withdraw the erroneous registrations and submit new ones removing unit 1B from the total of rent-stabilized units.The Rent Administrator denied the application, stating that registration amendments could only correct ministerial issues, not substantive changes like recalculating rental history or removing an apartment from rent-stabilized status. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR upheld this decision, agreeing that the requested amendments went beyond the scope of an amendment application proceeding. The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul DHCR's determination.The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, reasoning that DHCR rationally determined the requested correction was substantive rather than ministerial. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, noting that DHCR's interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) as precluding the requested amendments was rational and reasonable.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and held that DHCR's interpretation of the RSC, which limits amendments to ministerial issues, was entitled to substantial deference. The court found that DHCR's decision to deny the petitioner's application was rational, as it aimed to protect tenants from fraud, preserve agency resources, and ensure rent stabilization disputes were litigated in the proper forum. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District and the Coronado Yacht Club, alleging that the lease of coastal public trust land to the private club violated the public trust doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, the Public Resources Code, and the Port’s Master Plan. Herron claimed that the lease was executed without public notice or competitive bidding and requested the court to compel the Port District to comply with proper procedures and award the lease to a qualified applicant who would operate the property for public benefit.The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District’s discretionary decisions under a writ for traditional mandamus and that the time for filing a writ for administrative mandamus had expired. The court dismissed Herron’s petition with prejudice, leading to Herron’s appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Herron failed to establish a claim for traditional mandamus because the Port District’s decision to lease the land involved discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty. The court also found that Herron’s petition for administrative mandamus was untimely, as it was filed more than four years after the lease became final, exceeding the 90-day statutory limit. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Herron was not entitled to relief under either theory and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. View "Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law

Linda Lee owned a motel in Pascagoula, Mississippi, which had deteriorated significantly and was being used improperly, attracting vagrants and drug users. The city council ordered the demolition of the motel after a hearing, citing it as a menace to public health and safety. Lee did not attend the hearing, but her son did. The city council decided the motel was beyond repair and ordered its demolition.Lee appealed the city council's decision to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing that the city failed to provide substantial evidence and did not comply with statutory notice provisions. The Circuit Court affirmed the city's decision. Lee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the city’s notice was insufficient and reversed and remanded the case for further determination.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the appeal was moot because the motel had already been demolished by a new owner, as admitted by Lee in her appellate filings. Additionally, Lee lacked standing to pursue the appeal because she had transferred the property to her son on the day of the city council meeting and no longer had any interest in it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed Lee's appeal. View "Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

GBSB Holding, LLC (GBSB) is the developer of Baker 80, a proposed subdivision adjacent to Whitefish Hills Village (WHV) in Flathead County. GBSB sought to use WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80, which was opposed by Flathead County, Whitefish Village, LLC, and the WHV Homeowners Association. GBSB also challenged the abandonment of a portion of Brady Way, a county road within WHV, by Flathead County.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court prohibited GBSB from using WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80. The court concluded that the public access easements on WHV roads did not include primary access for Baker 80 residents. Additionally, the court found that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the public access easements on WHV roads were easements in gross, benefiting the public at large and not specifically Baker 80 residents. The court determined that the scope of the public access easements did not extend to primary access for Baker 80. The court also upheld the District Court's conclusion that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way, as the abandonment process complied with statutory requirements and substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. View "GBSB Holding v. Flathead County" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law