Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A developer entered into an agreement with a city to develop a downtown district, which included provisions for three large signs identifying the area as "Reno's Neon Line District." The city council approved the agreement and adopted it by ordinance. A nonprofit organization dedicated to scenic preservation objected, arguing that the signs were actually billboards prohibited by city code and that the developers lacked the necessary interest to enter into the agreement.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County partially granted the nonprofit’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the nonprofit had standing to challenge the agreement. It ruled that one sign (the archway sign) was a permissible area identification sign, but determined that the other two signs (the gas station sign and the cemetery sign) were, respectively, an on-premises advertising display and a billboard, both in violation of city code. The court severed the provisions for these two signs from the agreement and issued a writ preventing their construction.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether the nonprofit had standing and whether the district court properly reclassified the signs. The Supreme Court held that the city’s classification of the signs as area identification signs was entitled to a presumption of validity and that substantial evidence supported this classification. The court further held that the nonprofit lacked standing to seek writ relief because it did not have a direct and substantial beneficial interest in the agreement, as the signs were not billboards and thus not covered by a prior settlement agreement with the city. The court also found that the nonprofit had waived any argument for representational standing. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RENO REAL ESTATE DEVEL., LLC VS. SCENIC NEVADA, INC." on Justia Law

Owners of developed commercial and residential properties in Athens-Clarke County challenged the county’s stormwater utility charge, arguing that it was an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The charge, established by county ordinances in 2004, funds stormwater management services required by federal law, with the amount assessed based on impervious surface area and land-use classification. The ordinance exempts certain properties, such as public roads and sidewalks, and offers credits for on-site stormwater management. The funds collected are used for flood prevention, pollution minimization, and compliance with federal regulations.Previously, the Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County granted summary judgment to the county, finding that the stormwater utility charge was a fee, not a tax, and thus not subject to the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. This decision relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, which had addressed the same ordinance and held it imposed a fee rather than a tax. The appellants also pursued related claims in federal court, but those were dismissed on abstention grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County controlled, reaffirming that the stormwater utility charge is a fee and not a tax, and therefore the uniformity provision does not apply. The court also rejected the appellants’ arguments that the charge constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Georgia and United States Constitutions, finding no basis for such a claim. Finally, the court found that the trial court had properly applied the summary judgment standard and had not improperly resolved factual disputes. The judgment in favor of the county was affirmed. View "HOMEWOOD ASSOCIATES INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the validity of Measure C, a citizens’ initiative placed on the ballot by the City of San Diego for the March 2020 election. Measure C proposed an increase in the city’s transient occupancy tax, with revenues earmarked for homelessness programs, street repairs, and convention center improvements. The measure also authorized the City to issue bonds repaid from the new tax revenues. Measure C received 65.24 percent of the vote, and the city council subsequently passed resolutions declaring the measure approved and authorizing the issuance of related bonds.After the election, Alliance San Diego and other plaintiffs filed actions challenging the City’s resolution declaring Measure C had passed, arguing it was invalid. The City responded with a validation complaint seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of Measure C and the related bond resolutions. California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN) and other opponents answered, contending that Measure C required a two-thirds vote and was not a bona fide citizens’ initiative. The Superior Court of San Diego County initially granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that a two-thirds vote was required, and entered judgment against the City. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative.On remand, the trial court conducted a bench trial and rejected CTAN’s arguments, finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the case was ripe, the special fund doctrine exempted the bonds from the two-thirds vote requirement, and Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative requiring only a simple majority vote. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Measure C and the related bond resolutions were valid, and that the trial court properly excluded certain hearsay evidence. View "Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

Dakota Bay, LLC owns property adjacent to McCook Lake in Union County, South Dakota, and planned to construct a canal connecting its land to the lake. To facilitate this, Dakota Bay’s owner, Michael Chicoine, applied for a shoreline alteration permit and a water permit to use an existing irrigation well to fill and maintain the canal. The McCook Lake Recreation Area Association, which holds a permit to pump water from the Missouri River into McCook Lake, opposed the project. The Association argued that constructing the canal would require a permit to appropriate water from McCook Lake and that the canal would increase water loss from the lake, potentially impairing the Association’s ability to maintain lake levels.The South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Water Management Board held hearings and ultimately denied the Association’s petition for a declaratory ruling, finding that the canal’s construction would not constitute an appropriation of water from McCook Lake. The Board also granted Dakota Bay’s application to use well water for the canal, finding that unappropriated water was available, the use was beneficial and in the public interest, and that it would not unlawfully impair existing water rights. The Association appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the Board’s rulings and also upheld the Board’s decision to quash subpoenas issued by the Association.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Court held that constructing the canal would not result in an appropriation of water from McCook Lake and thus did not require a water appropriation permit. The Court also held that Dakota Bay’s proposed use of well water for the canal was a beneficial use in the public interest and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas, clarifying that administrative proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, not the rules of civil procedure. View "Mccook Lake Recreation Area V. Dakota Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

Three non-profit corporations, each formed by littoral homeowners in the Portlock neighborhood of East Honolulu, purchased narrow beachfront reserve lots that separated their homes from the ocean. In 2003, Hawai‘i enacted Act 73, which declared certain accreted lands—land gradually added to the shoreline by natural forces—to be public property, preventing private parties from registering or quieting title to such land. Shortly after purchasing the lots, the non-profits (the Ohanas) filed an inverse condemnation action, alleging that Act 73 resulted in an uncompensated taking of accreted land seaward of their lots, in violation of the Hawai‘i Constitution. The parties stipulated that, if a taking occurred, just compensation would be based on the fair market rental value of the accreted land.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially granted partial summary judgment to the Ohanas, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed in part, holding that Act 73 effected a taking of existing accreted lands. On remand, after a bench trial with expert testimony, the circuit court found that the fair market rental value of the accreted land was zero dollars, based on credible evidence that the land’s use was highly restricted and had no market value. The court declined to award nominal damages or attorneys’ fees. The ICA affirmed, finding the circuit court’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that sovereign immunity barred attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment. It held that the circuit court did not err in awarding zero dollars as just compensation, nor in declining to award nominal damages, because the Ohanas suffered no compensable loss. The court further held that the just compensation clause of the Hawai‘i Constitution does not waive sovereign immunity for attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation cases. View "Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

A charter city in California was required by state law to update its housing element—a component of its general plan addressing housing needs—by October 15, 2021. The city submitted a draft housing element to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which found the draft would comply with state law if adopted. However, the city refused to adopt the revised housing element, citing concerns about environmental impacts and the number of affordable housing units required. The city also filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Housing Element Law, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.The People of California, represented by the Attorney General and the HCD, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Orange County Superior Court, later transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court, seeking to compel the city to adopt a compliant housing element. The Kennedy Commission, an affordable housing advocacy group, intervened. The trial court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the city had a ministerial duty to adopt a compliant housing element, but the court’s order did not include a 120-day compliance deadline or provisional remedies limiting the city’s permitting and zoning authority, as requested by the State. The court also stayed further proceedings due to pending appeals and unresolved cross-petitions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Article 14 of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7 of the Government Code, which includes the 120-day compliance deadline and provisional remedies, applies to enforcement actions against charter cities. The court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and issue a new order including the required compliance deadline and provisional remedies, and to lift its stay and expeditiously resolve remaining issues. The court declined to order entry of final judgment while other pleadings remained unresolved. View "Kennedy Commission v. Superior. Ct." on Justia Law

Elmer Miller, a general contractor and owner of a construction company, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for failing to provide fall protection for workers. OSHA sent the citation by certified mail to an address (433 E. County Road, 100 North, Arcola, Illinois) that it had used for Miller in the past. The certified mail was twice refused at that address and returned. OSHA then resent the citation to the same address using UPS, which was marked as received by “Miller.” Miller later argued that the citation was not properly served because it was sent to the wrong address and that there was no proof he received it, claiming his correct address was 435 E. County Road, not 433.After Miller did not contest the citation within the statutory period, the citation became a final order. The Secretary of Labor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for summary enforcement of the order. In response, Miller raised the issue of improper service, asserting that the Commission failed to prove adequate service because the citation was not sent to his correct address. The Secretary countered with public records and prior court documents showing Miller and his business had repeatedly used the 433 address for official purposes, including previous OSHA citations and court filings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that OSHA’s service of the citation to the 433 address was reasonably calculated to provide Miller with notice, satisfying due process requirements. The court found that Miller’s history of using the 433 address and his prior acceptance of service there undermined his claim. The court granted the Secretary of Labor’s petition for summary enforcement and issued the enforcement decree pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §660(b). View "Chavez-DeRemer v. Miller" on Justia Law