Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the case of Planning and Conservation League et al., v. Department of Water Resources heard in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, the court considered whether the Department of Water Resources’ (department) approval of amendments to long-term contracts with local government agencies that receive water through the State Water Project violated various laws. The amendments extended the contracts to 2085 and expanded the facilities listed as eligible for revenue bond financing. Several conservation groups and public agencies challenged the amendments, arguing they violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act (Delta Reform Act), and the public trust doctrine. However, the court held that the department did not violate CEQA, the Delta Reform Act, or the public trust doctrine, and therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the department. The court found that the department used the correct baseline for its environmental impact report (EIR), properly segmented the amendments from related projects, and adequately considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the amendments. The court also held that the department adequately described the project and considered a reasonable range of alternatives, and that recirculation of the EIR was not required. The court rejected arguments that the amendments violated the Delta Reform Act or the public trust doctrine, finding that they did not impact "water that is imbued with the public trust." The court concluded that the department acted within its authority in approving and executing the amendments. View "Planning and Conservation League v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City and County of Honolulu, acting through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART), and Victoria Ward, Limited, over the amount of just compensation to be paid for two acres of easements on property previously owned by Victoria Ward. The easements were obtained by HART for the construction of a fixed rail system and a proposed Kaka‘ako Station. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i ruled that the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment on many of the issues in the case. The supreme court ruled that the circuit court had incorrectly used summary judgment to resolve disputed factual issues including whether Victoria Ward was estopped from seeking severance damages, whether Victoria Ward's claims relating to a "lost tower" were too speculative, and whether Victoria Ward was precluded from seeking severance damages for impacts to non-taken properties. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on some issues, but vacated others and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's pause of the accrual of "blight of summons" interest during the pendency of the appeal. View "HART v. Ward " on Justia Law

In Missouri, Jackson County and its public officials sought a writ of mandamus to overturn a circuit court's order which had denied their motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by Jackson County property owners. The property owners alleged that the County had unlawfully increased assessed property values by failing to provide timely notice of increases and not conducting physical inspections for properties with increases of over 15%. The County argued that the property owners should have exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit.The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with the County's argument, stating that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an aggrieved party to seek available administrative remedies before courts will act. The court found that the County's failure to provide timely notice did not prevent the property owners from pursuing administrative remedies. At the time they filed the lawsuit, they could have exercised their appellate rights to the County's Board of Equalization or the State Tax Commission, but they chose not to. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that because the property owners failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit, the action must be dismissed, making permanent its preliminary writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Jackson County, Missouri v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In the State of Idaho, Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC ("Yellowstone") owned a rental property in the City of Rigby that was extensively damaged after BorTek Utilities and Construction, LLC bored through a lateral sewer line connected to the rental property. The City of Rigby had failed to mark the service lateral sewer pipe connected to the rental property prior to the excavation. Yellowstone sued the City of Rigby for both negligence per se and common law negligence for failing to mark the service lateral. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Rigby, determining that Yellowstone did not have standing under the Idaho Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, and even if it did, it failed to prove the City breached any duty owed to it.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Rigby. The court found that while the Act does not explicitly provide a private right of action for "end users" like Yellowstone, it does impose a duty on the City to mark underground sewer lines in a public right-of-way, which it did not do. The court also held that whether the City breached this duty by failing to maintain records of the location of service laterals, failing to adequately mark service laterals, or failing to take other precautions to protect customers’ service laterals within the public right of way are questions of fact for a jury to decide. Thus, the court concluded that the City of Rigby owed Yellowstone a duty to act as a reasonable manager of its property under the circumstances. View "Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC v. City of Rigby" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, the Sargent County Water Resource District ("District") initiated an eminent domain action to acquire permanent and temporary easements over five properties adjacent to Drain 11 for a drainage project ("Project"). The landowners argued that the project was unlawful because it did not qualify as “maintenance” and exceeded the six-year maximum maintenance levy without the approval of the majority of landowners. The District countered that the landowners’ arguments were foreclosed because they did not appeal the District’s “Resolution of Necessity” and their arguments were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The district court ruled that the landowners’ arguments were not foreclosed and granted condemnation of the property for the Project.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the landowners' arguments were not foreclosed and the district court did not err in reaching this conclusion. The Court ruled that the landowners were not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel from challenging whether the Project was authorized by law in defending against an eminent domain action.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's finding that the Project was a use authorized by law and that no landowner vote was required for the Project. The Court concluded that the Project as currently designed and approved exceeded the statutory maximum maintenance levy and could not proceed without the approval of the majority of landowners as required by state law. The judgment was therefore reversed. View "Sargent Cty. Water Resource District v. Beck" on Justia Law

In Texas, the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, Christina Mitchell Busbee, objected to the sale of a property that was purchased with the District's forfeiture funds and was legally owned by Medina County. The District Attorney argued that the County could not sell the property without her consent and that she was entitled to the sale proceeds. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled that the District Attorney did not have standing to make these claims because the relevant statute, Chapter 59, authorizes only the Attorney General to enforce its terms. The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that the question of whether the District Attorney was authorized to sue under Chapter 59 did not pertain to her constitutional standing to sue, but rather to the merits of her claims. The Court concluded that the District Attorney did have constitutional standing to sue because she had alleged a concrete injury traceable to the County's conduct and redressable by court order. The case was remanded back to the trial court to consider the County's additional jurisdictional challenges. View "BUSBEE v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, TEXAS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Constance Swanston (“Swanston”), Shannon Jones (“Jones”), and Women’s Elevated Sober Living, LLC (“WESL”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Swanston is an individual in recovery from substance use disorders (“SUDs”) and the owner and operator of WESL. In November 2018, WESL opened a sober living home (the “Home”) on Stoney Point Drive in Plano, Texas. Jones is a caretaker and resident of the Home. Defendant-Appellant, the City of Plano (the “City”) appealed the district court’s judgment holding that it violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) due to its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs as to the capacity limits in the applicable zoning ordinance. The district court enjoined the City from (1) restricting the Home’s occupancy to fewer than fifteen residents; (2) enforcing any other property restriction violative of the FHA or ADA; and (3) retaliating against Plaintiffs for pursuing housing discrimination complaints under the FHA and ADA. Following a hearing, awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded it. The court held that the district court erred in determining that the evidence satisfied the applicable legal standard. The court explained that the Third Circuit concluded that, based on its strict reading of Section 3604(f)(3)(B) and the prior jurisprudence in its court and its sister circuits, the resident failed to prove that her requested accommodation was necessary considering the definition of the term, the purpose of the FHA, and the proffered alternatives. The court wrote that for the same reasons, it holds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that their requested accommodation was therapeutically necessary. View "Women's Elevated v. City of Plano" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are three Texas residents whose assets escheated to the State under Texas’s Unclaimed Property Act. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against the Texas Comptroller and a director in the Comptroller’s office, alleging that the State is abusing the Unclaimed Property Act to seize purportedly abandoned property without providing proper notice. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot invoke Ex parte Young because they lack standing to seek prospective relief and have not alleged an ongoing violation of federal law.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with Defendants and reversed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for prospective relief without prejudice. The court explained that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts indicating that Texas’s alleged abuse of the UPA is ongoing or will continue in the future. As there is no ongoing violation of federal law sufficiently pleaded in the complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Ex parte Young requirements, and their claims for prospective relief are barred by sovereign immunity. View "James v. Hegar" on Justia Law