Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award.

At issue in this case was a 1966 property division that created Lot 733, an undeveloped parcel owned by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs requested a zoning certificate from the zoning enforcement officer for the town, the officer refused based on his belief that Lot 733 resulted from an illegal subdivision in contravention of the town zoning and subdivision regulations in force in 1966. The zoning board dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs then filed suit requesting that the zoning board's decision be overturned and that the court declare that Lot 733 was a lawful lot. The trial justice determined that the 1966 property division that created the disputed lot was proper. Defendants, owners of property adjoining Lot 733, appealed, arguing that the property division constituted an illegal subdivision because it lacked adequate street access. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but on different grounds, holding that the creation of Lot 733 was not a subdivision.

Plaintiff, Defendant's employee, was traveling as a passenger in a pickup truck owned and operated by Defendant when the truck collided with another vehicle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendant and Defendant's Insurer, alleging negligence. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, reasoning that because Plaintiff had collected workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained while traveling with Defendant on work-related business, the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precluded double recovery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff relinquished his right to sue Defendant in tort after accepting workers' compensation benefits based on the exclusivity provision of the Act.

Dennis Gallagher was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, an occupational disease, and ultimately succumbed to the disease. A trial judge of the workers' compensation court entered decrees holding USGEN New England, Inc. (USGEN) liable to pay benefits to Dennis and to his wife, Maureen Gallagher, as Dennis's last employer under R.I. Gen. Laws 28-34-8. The appellate division of the workers' compensation court vacated those decrees and entered final decrees assessing liability against National Grid USA/Narragansett Electric (National Grid), USGEN's predecessor as owner of the plant where Dennis had worked and been exposed to asbestos. Maureen and National Grid each petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate division's final decrees. The Supreme Court issued both writs and consolidated the cases. The Court then affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in vacating the trial judge's decrees and in entering final decrees assessing liability against National Grid instead.

The City of Cranston, by and through its tax assessor, valued Plaintiff Narragansett Electric Company's tangible personal property located within that municipality at $23,290,814. Plaintiff appealed the tax assessment. The tax assessor and Tax Board of Review denied Plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the superior court, naming as defendants Cranston's finance director and its tax assessor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not timely filed his appeal to the tax assessor. The hearing justice agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) because Defendants failed to plead as an affirmative defense Plaintiff's noncompliance with a condition precedent in accordance with R.I. Sup. Ct. 9(c), Defendants waived their contention that Plaintiff did not file its appeal with the tax assessor in a timely manner; and (2) therefore, the hearing justice should have exercised the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction and heard Plaintiff's appeal.

After failing two field sobriety tests, Respondent Lewis Quattrucci was arrested for DUI and later charged with refusing to submit to a chemical test. The charge was subsequently dismissed by a traffic tribunal magistrate on the ground that Respondent had not been afforded a confidential telephone call, as required by R.I. Gen. Laws 12-7-20. The traffic tribunal upheld the magistrate's order dismissing the refusal charge, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the district court and vacated the dismissal of the refusal charge, holding (1) Respondent was entitled to the use of a telephone to call an attorney under section 12-7-20; but (2) because there was no evidence that Respondent made or wished to make a telephone call for the purpose of securing an attorney, nor any showing that Respondent suffered substantial and extreme prejudice because he did not receive a private telephone call, the magistrate erred in ruling that Respondent's rights were violated under section 12-7-20.

National Grid filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in which it sought additional revenues for its electricity distribution operations in Rhode Island, requesting an increase in electric distribution rates sufficient to enable it to collect additional revenues of $75.3 million. The PUC subsequently issued a report and order that (1) reduced National Grid's increase in its revenue requirement to $15.9 million, (2) set the common equity component of National Grid's capital structure at 42.75 percent, and (3) reduced by half the company's request to establish a variable pay scheme for certain of its employees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC's decision to disallow fifty percent of the incentive compensation proposed by National Grid; and (2) vacated the portion of the order that used the capital structure of National Grid plc, the twice removed parent of National Grid, to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid.

When Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island (NHP), a not-for-profit corporation that operated a licensed health maintenance organization that provided health insurance coverage to its enrollees, began reimbursing ophthalmologists at a higher rate than the rate paid to optometrists for performing the same services, two optometrists brought an action on behalf of all optometrists who had entered into participating provider agreements with NHP during the period that the differential reimbursement policy was in effect, contending that this differential reimbursement violated state law. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of NHP, reasoning that the antidiscrimination provision in R.I. Gen. Laws 5-35-21.1(b) applied only to expenditures of public funds and that NHP did not violate the statute because NHP paid for the ophthalmologists' services using private money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute at issue was not ambiguous; and (2) the motion justice did not err in concluding that NHP is not an agency or department of the state and cannot otherwise be considered a state actor.

Three property owner companies filed with the planning board an application for a land development project on their property. The planning board denied the plaintiffs' application after members of the state advisory commission on historical cemeteries identified certain features on the plaintiffs' property as historical cemeteries and notified the town as to the existence of the cemeteries. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the advisory commission in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the action. One property owner (appellant) appealed, alleging that (1) the advisory commission exceeded its authority under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-18.3-1 by registering the features as historical cemeteries, (2) the advisory commission violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory commission's role is purely advisory and therefore it could not register the historical cemetery within the meaning of the statute or violate plaintiffs' due process rights, and (2) because plaintiffs did not suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the advisory committee's actions, appellant failed to establish an essential element of its slander of title claim.