Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Defendant's employee, was traveling as a passenger in a pickup truck owned and operated by Defendant when the truck collided with another vehicle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendant and Defendant's Insurer, alleging negligence. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, reasoning that because Plaintiff had collected workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained while traveling with Defendant on work-related business, the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precluded double recovery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff relinquished his right to sue Defendant in tort after accepting workers' compensation benefits based on the exclusivity provision of the Act.

Dennis Gallagher was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, an occupational disease, and ultimately succumbed to the disease. A trial judge of the workers' compensation court entered decrees holding USGEN New England, Inc. (USGEN) liable to pay benefits to Dennis and to his wife, Maureen Gallagher, as Dennis's last employer under R.I. Gen. Laws 28-34-8. The appellate division of the workers' compensation court vacated those decrees and entered final decrees assessing liability against National Grid USA/Narragansett Electric (National Grid), USGEN's predecessor as owner of the plant where Dennis had worked and been exposed to asbestos. Maureen and National Grid each petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate division's final decrees. The Supreme Court issued both writs and consolidated the cases. The Court then affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in vacating the trial judge's decrees and in entering final decrees assessing liability against National Grid instead.

The City of Cranston, by and through its tax assessor, valued Plaintiff Narragansett Electric Company's tangible personal property located within that municipality at $23,290,814. Plaintiff appealed the tax assessment. The tax assessor and Tax Board of Review denied Plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the superior court, naming as defendants Cranston's finance director and its tax assessor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not timely filed his appeal to the tax assessor. The hearing justice agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) because Defendants failed to plead as an affirmative defense Plaintiff's noncompliance with a condition precedent in accordance with R.I. Sup. Ct. 9(c), Defendants waived their contention that Plaintiff did not file its appeal with the tax assessor in a timely manner; and (2) therefore, the hearing justice should have exercised the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction and heard Plaintiff's appeal.

After failing two field sobriety tests, Respondent Lewis Quattrucci was arrested for DUI and later charged with refusing to submit to a chemical test. The charge was subsequently dismissed by a traffic tribunal magistrate on the ground that Respondent had not been afforded a confidential telephone call, as required by R.I. Gen. Laws 12-7-20. The traffic tribunal upheld the magistrate's order dismissing the refusal charge, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the district court and vacated the dismissal of the refusal charge, holding (1) Respondent was entitled to the use of a telephone to call an attorney under section 12-7-20; but (2) because there was no evidence that Respondent made or wished to make a telephone call for the purpose of securing an attorney, nor any showing that Respondent suffered substantial and extreme prejudice because he did not receive a private telephone call, the magistrate erred in ruling that Respondent's rights were violated under section 12-7-20.

National Grid filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in which it sought additional revenues for its electricity distribution operations in Rhode Island, requesting an increase in electric distribution rates sufficient to enable it to collect additional revenues of $75.3 million. The PUC subsequently issued a report and order that (1) reduced National Grid's increase in its revenue requirement to $15.9 million, (2) set the common equity component of National Grid's capital structure at 42.75 percent, and (3) reduced by half the company's request to establish a variable pay scheme for certain of its employees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC's decision to disallow fifty percent of the incentive compensation proposed by National Grid; and (2) vacated the portion of the order that used the capital structure of National Grid plc, the twice removed parent of National Grid, to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid.

When Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island (NHP), a not-for-profit corporation that operated a licensed health maintenance organization that provided health insurance coverage to its enrollees, began reimbursing ophthalmologists at a higher rate than the rate paid to optometrists for performing the same services, two optometrists brought an action on behalf of all optometrists who had entered into participating provider agreements with NHP during the period that the differential reimbursement policy was in effect, contending that this differential reimbursement violated state law. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of NHP, reasoning that the antidiscrimination provision in R.I. Gen. Laws 5-35-21.1(b) applied only to expenditures of public funds and that NHP did not violate the statute because NHP paid for the ophthalmologists' services using private money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute at issue was not ambiguous; and (2) the motion justice did not err in concluding that NHP is not an agency or department of the state and cannot otherwise be considered a state actor.

Three property owner companies filed with the planning board an application for a land development project on their property. The planning board denied the plaintiffs' application after members of the state advisory commission on historical cemeteries identified certain features on the plaintiffs' property as historical cemeteries and notified the town as to the existence of the cemeteries. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the advisory commission in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the action. One property owner (appellant) appealed, alleging that (1) the advisory commission exceeded its authority under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-18.3-1 by registering the features as historical cemeteries, (2) the advisory commission violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory commission's role is purely advisory and therefore it could not register the historical cemetery within the meaning of the statute or violate plaintiffs' due process rights, and (2) because plaintiffs did not suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the advisory committee's actions, appellant failed to establish an essential element of its slander of title claim.

After plaintiff Arthur Toegemann was involved in a motor vehicle accident at a street intersection in Providence, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in superior court against the city, alleging that the city had negligently installed and maintained an unsafe, dangerous road at the intersection, which caused plaintiff's accident. Specifically, plaintiff contended the speed limit was too fast, the speed limit signs were hidden by vegetative growth, and the intersection was unsafe because it had only two stop signs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that based upon the public-duty doctrine, its decisions with respect to the traffic design of the intersection were discretionary and not actionable. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the hearing justice wrongfully applied the public-duty doctrine in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to constitute an exception to the public-duty doctrine. Accordingly, because the issues in the case were controlled by the public-duty doctrine, there was no basis for municipal liability and the grant of summary judgment was proper.

Defendant Michael English pled nolo contendere to four counts of first-degree child molestation, one count of second-degree molestation, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of his relationship with victim, M.B. More than a decade later, the state filed a probation-violation notice, alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to adhere to the terms of the no-contact order after M.B. complained that defendant had come into contact with her. The hearing justice concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the superior court adjudicated defendant a violator of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that his contact with M.B. was merely coincidental and therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's determination that the state's evidence supported an adjudication of probation violation was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Plaintiff Linda Pereira injured her left ankle when she fell into a depression in the grass at at park owned by the city of East Providence. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the city, alleging that the city negligently breached its duty to maintain the park in a reasonably safe condition and that it negligently failed to warn her of an unsafe condition on the premises. The defendant affirmatively alleged that the city was shielded from liability under the state Recreational Use Statute and filed a motion for summary judgment on this basis. The trial justice granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Recreational Use Statute immunized the city from liability.