Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff Arthur Toegemann was involved in a motor vehicle accident at a street intersection in Providence, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in superior court against the city, alleging that the city had negligently installed and maintained an unsafe, dangerous road at the intersection, which caused plaintiff's accident. Specifically, plaintiff contended the speed limit was too fast, the speed limit signs were hidden by vegetative growth, and the intersection was unsafe because it had only two stop signs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that based upon the public-duty doctrine, its decisions with respect to the traffic design of the intersection were discretionary and not actionable. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the hearing justice wrongfully applied the public-duty doctrine in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to constitute an exception to the public-duty doctrine. Accordingly, because the issues in the case were controlled by the public-duty doctrine, there was no basis for municipal liability and the grant of summary judgment was proper.

Defendant Michael English pled nolo contendere to four counts of first-degree child molestation, one count of second-degree molestation, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of his relationship with victim, M.B. More than a decade later, the state filed a probation-violation notice, alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to adhere to the terms of the no-contact order after M.B. complained that defendant had come into contact with her. The hearing justice concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the superior court adjudicated defendant a violator of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that his contact with M.B. was merely coincidental and therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's determination that the state's evidence supported an adjudication of probation violation was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Plaintiff Linda Pereira injured her left ankle when she fell into a depression in the grass at at park owned by the city of East Providence. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the city, alleging that the city negligently breached its duty to maintain the park in a reasonably safe condition and that it negligently failed to warn her of an unsafe condition on the premises. The defendant affirmatively alleged that the city was shielded from liability under the state Recreational Use Statute and filed a motion for summary judgment on this basis. The trial justice granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Recreational Use Statute immunized the city from liability.

In 2001, the planning board of the town of East Greenwich granted final plan approval to plaintiff Carmine D'Ellena's proposed subdivision. In 2004, plaintiff's attorney requested a time extension, which the planning board granted. A condition to the extension was that plaintiff connect the development to a public water supply. In 2008, plaintiff filed a petition in the superior court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asking the court to declare the board's decision regarding the extension null and void. In support of his petition, plaintiff alleged that the planning board (1) violated state law by amending a final decision without application for and notice to plaintiff, (2) violated the notice rules by failing to provide notice to the plaintiff of its action, and (3) violated the open meetings law by failing to provide notice. The superior court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished and thereby waived whatever procedural and statutory rights were his regarding the 2004 board meeting when he took the action of telling his attorney that he agreed to add the condition of public water.

Defendants Charles and Nancy Rogers and plaintiff Shelter Harbor Conservation Society owned contiguous lots in the same subdivision. The Society filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Rogerses and town officials after the town zoning official issued zoning certificates designating three of the Rogerses lots for single-family residences, alleging that the certificates were void because they were issued after a merger of the lots. The superior court eventually granted summary judgment to the Rogerses, finding the lots were unmerged pursuant to the merger provision of the zoning ordinance. The Society appealed, contending (1) the evidence contained divergent interpretations of the map depicting the Rogerses' lots, and therefore the trial justice therefore improperly weighed the evidence at the summary-judgment stage and a trial on the merits was necessary to resolve the issue; and (2) the trial justice erred when she stayed the Society's attempts to obtain discovery from the Rogerses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the map was unambiguous; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in staying deposition notices that were not intended to obtain information relevant to the issue under consideration.

Plaintiff City of Providence filed a complaint against John Doe et al. and Jane Doe et al., unknown defendants, for trespassing on city-owned land by setting up an encampment. The complaint sought injunctive relief enjoining defendants from trespassing on the property. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed, arguing (1) the trial court improperly denied their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) because other remedies at law may exist, the grant of equitable relief was inappropriate, and (3) the preliminary injunction failed for indefiniteness because it applied only to unknown persons and therefore was unenforceable at a contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction and R.I. Gen. Laws 8-8-3(a)(2) did not divest the court of jurisdiction, (2) because the trespass was continuous injunctive relief was appropriate, and (3) the terms of the order were specific enough to enable someone reading the injunctive order to understand what he or she may not do under it.

In a financial dispute between two charter schools and a local school district about how the local share of the charter school tuition reimbursement should be computed, the commissioner of elementary and secondary education directed that enrollment during the reference year, or 2008, be used to calculate the district's share. The board of regents reversed, interpreting the Charter Public School Act of Rhode Island to mean that the district must pay sums due to charter schools using as a computational basis the current fiscal year, or 2010. The Supreme Court upheld the board's decision, holding that the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and the board's determination was not clearly erroneous. The Court also found that the board did not err when it affirmed the commissioner's decision to sever the district's asserted defense of unclean hands and treat it as a counterclaim.

The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the Town of North Providence complied with the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991 when it amended the town's zoning ordinance in 1999. The zoning law in question dealt with the notice and hearing requirements for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances. Plaintiff Generation Realty, LLC and several others owned or were prospective purchasers of land in North Providence. They brought suit against Defendants Kristen Catanzaro and other town officials, alleging that the town did not provide adequate notice of a public hearing on the 1999 amendments. Plaintiffs asserted that lack of such notice rendered the amendments null and void. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance at issue in this case was a "general amendment" under the Act, and as such, required only a public notice. The Court found that the lower court erred in deciding that the ordinance was specific, and therefore erred in ruling in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The City of Newport appealed a Superior Court order that ultimately made it liable for injuries sustained by Plaintiff Geraldine Sloat. In 2004, Ms. Sloat sued the City and State because she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Newport. She argued that the City and State were responsible for maintaining the sidewalks. The State denied liability but did not cross-claim the City. The City moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the State assumed maintenance of the sidewalk through a "Construction and Maintenance Agreement." The State responded to the City by producing another agreement that placed responsibility back on the City. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City alleged multiple technical errors at trial that lead to a misapplication of the law. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.