Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An East Providence zoning officer issued a notice of violation, finding violations of a use variance that was granted in 1998 to the owner and operator of a construction and demolition debris processing facility known as Pond View Recycling. The East Providence Zoning Board of Review upheld the notice of violation. The owner and operator of Pond View appealed. The superior court reversed, concluding that the zoning board’s decision was “clearly erroneous and made upon unlawful procedure.” The City of East Providence and the zoning board sought review. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for the City, holding that the zoning board’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the trial justice erred by reversing the decision of the zoning board. View "Kenlin Props., LLC v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Morse, a long-time fire-rescue captain, had separate work-related back injuries in 2009 and 2011. In both cases he was eventually released to work. Morse injured his back again while lifting a patient during a 2012 rescue call. After the third injury, he did not return to work. Pursuant to the Providence Code of Ordinances, Morse was evaluated by three independent medical examiners. There was disagreement concerning whether the code covers disability as the result of multiple injuries. One of the consultants found Morse not to be disabled. The Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence denied Morse’s application for an accidental disability pension, based solely on the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the decision. The board’s adoption of the unanimity rule effectively abandoned its authority to a single disagreeing physician. Because the board failed to make any factual findings with regard to the petitioner’s application, this matter was remanded to the board for reconsideration. View "Morse v. Employees Ret. Sys. of the City of Providence" on Justia Law

Five corporate plaintiffs sued the East Greenwich Fire District and the Town of East Greenwich alleging that Defendants’ imposition and collection of development impact fees from developers who applied for a building permit to develop land within the Town violated Rhode Island’s Development Impact fee Act (RIDIFA). The fire district adopted the schedule of impact fees by a resolution rather than through an ordinance. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Defendants did not have the authority to impose development impact fees and, if they did, the process by which they imposed the fees was deficient. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the resolution adopted by the fire district was invalid because it did not comply with either RIDIFA’s mandate that the fees be imposed through an ordinance or the Town’s notice and public-hearing requirements for the enactment of ordinances. View "5750 Post Road Med. Offices, LLC v. East Greenwich Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a dimensional variance by the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown. After the Board denied the variance, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision and granted Plaintiffs’ variance application. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for an award of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act. The trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Board was not an “agency” within the purview of the Act and that the hearing before the Board was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as the term is defined in the Act. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment below, holding that the Board is an agency and that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ variance application was an adjudicatory proceeding on the Act. Remanded for written findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining prerequisites for relief. View "Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

Pawtucket police officer Laprade was convicted of disorderly conduct, stemming from a 2010 incident, during which two women observed the off-duty Laprade masturbating and exposing himself while driving his personal vehicle. The city charged Laprade with violations of regulations stemming from that conviction and other incidents, including sleeping while on duty. After being notified of the city’s recommendation that his employment be terminated, Laprade requested a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights Act (LEOBOR), G.L. 42-28.6-4. A committee was selected. Nine days before the scheduled hearing and one day after the statutory deadline, the city provided Laprade with a list of its witnesses and evidence. Because of the timing and a personal conflict, a member of the committee unsuccessfully sought a continuance. Although no complaint or petition had been filed, the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court issued an order stating that failure to present the list 10 days before the hearing date did not present good cause to extend the date. The committee refused to accept evidence on the first scheduled date. Ultimately the committee found that, due to procedural errors, the city had not proven its case. The superior court affirmed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated, based on procedural errorsView "City of Pawtucket v. Laprade" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and John, Alfred, and Anna Tillinghast (Defendants) executed a consent agreement regarding the actions Defendants would take to remedy alleged violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the establishment of five campsites in the Bowdish Lake Camping Area. When Defendants purportedly failed to comply with the consent agreement, the superior court appointed a master to resolve the issues in dispute. The master issued a report, and Defendants filed a motion asking the trial justice to approve the master’s report. After a hearing, the trial justice adopted the report and ordered that the master’s findings be implemented. Plaintiff, named in her official capacity as the director of the DEM, appealed. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the order confirming the master’s report was not final, the appeal was interlocutory and thus not properly before the Court. View "Coit v. Tillinghast" on Justia Law

Power Survey Company sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court contending that the Public Utilities Commission improperly interpreted and applied the Contact Voltage Statute when it approved the portion of the Narragansett Electric Company’s (NEC) contact voltage program providing for the issuance of a request for proposal for the purpose of choosing a vendor to provide the technology for the NEC’s contact voltage testing. The Supreme Court issued the writ. Respondents, the NEC and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, moved to quash the writ on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court granted Respondents’ motions, holding that, under the facts of this case, Power Survey’s petition was untimely. View "In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully seeking reimbursement from the State Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, Plaintiffs, a school district and school department, filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the Commissioner and State Treasurer were required to reimburse them for the salary, fringe benefits, and travel expenses of the directors and guidance counselors in their vocational-technical programs. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and that the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiffs reimbursement was discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial. Plaintiffs subsequently sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a clear legal right to be reimbursed for certain costs associated with the operation of their career and technical centers. View "Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Gist" on Justia Law

David Alba was appointed to serve as principal of an elementary school in Cranston, Rhode Island. Alba and the Cranston School Committee subsequently entered into an employment contract. Later, after a hearing, the Committee rejected a recommendation to renew Alba’s employment contract. Alba appealed the Committee’s decision. The Commissioner of Education denied and dismissed Alba’s appeal, concluding that Alba had received all the process to which he was entitled under the contract and the School Administrators’ Rights Act. The Board of Regents affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee acted within its authority when it voted against the recommendation to renew Alba’s contract; and (2) the Committee’s nonrenewal of Alba’s contract did not deprive Alba of his rights under the Administrators’ Rights Act. View "Alba v. Cranston Sch. Comm." on Justia Law