Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to eight felony counts relating to his unethical conduct as a member of the town council. On the day of his sentencing, the U.S. district court entered an order of forfeiture requiring Defendant to forfeit $46,000 to the federal government, representing the bribe money Defendant received to perform official acts as town council member. While Defendant was employed, he had contributed $30,554 to the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI). While a member of the town council, Defendant had contributed $5,490 to the Municipal Employees' Retirement System (MERS). Both ERSRI and MERS were administered by the Retirement Board of ERSRI (Board). After the Board refused to refund Defendant's contributions to ERSRI, Defendant filed a complaint against the Board, contending that the Board was obligated to return his contributions to him. The trial justice (1) revoked Defendant's MERS pension in its entirety, and (2) ordered the Board to return to Defendant the contributions he had made to ERSRI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because the federal court issued neither a judgment nor an order of restitution against Defendant, the Board had no statutory basis upon which it could refuse Defendant's demand for a return of his contributions. View "Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while he was working for Defendant. Plaintiff began receiving partial disability benefits. Several years later, Plaintiff was notified that his benefits would be terminated. Plaintiff filed a petition requesting continuation of his benefits and/or a finding that he was totally disabled. After a trial, the workers' compensation court (WCC) denied the petition. The appellate division of the WCC affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari and affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to partial incapacity benefits because, contrary to Plaintiff's position, his failure to regain his earning capacity did not constitute a "material hinderance" to his finding employment suitable to his limitations within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws 28-33-18.3(a)(1); and (2) section 28-33-18 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Rhode Island Constitution. View "Nichols v. R&D Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Two enforcement officers of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) boarded a boat owned by Daniel Barlow when Barlow was not on board and allegedly discovered the amount of summer flounder Barlow caught that day was more than was permitted under the applicable regulations. A notice of violation followed. In the ensuing litigation, the DEM found Barlow ineligible to participate in its 2010 Summer Flounder Sector Allocation Pilot Program because of a previous consent agreement he had entered into with the department. The agreement reflected a settlement of the allegation that Barlow violated a state marine fisheries regulation for catch limits. The Administrative Adjudication Division of DEM reversed, finding the consent agreement was not an administrative penalty because it absolved Barlow of all liability arising from the alleged violation. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court and found in favor of Barlow, holding that DEM wrongly used the consent agreement as a reason to bar him from the program. View "State Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Admin. Adjudication Div." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, broadcasted that the bus she was driving, which was full of elementary-school children, had been struck by gunfire and that panic had spread among the children. Displeased with the manner in which Plaintiff handled the situation, the Town of Johnson school department requested that Plaintiff no longer be assigned to transport Johnson students. Eventually, Plaintiff left her employment. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination against members of the Johnson public schools (Defendants), alleging that Defendants wrongfully requested that Plaintiff be terminated from her employment. In response to the trial justice's remarks, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim of tortious interference, which the trial justice denied. Thereafter, the superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint without specific findings. Remanded. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this petition was whether G.L. 1956 section 5-6-2 permits only licensed electricians to install underground hollow polyvinyl chloride (PVC) material that is devoid of any electrical wiring or conductors. The Board of Examiners of Electricians, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT), and the Superior Court all determined that 5-6-2 required a licensed electrician to perform such work. The petitioners, Reilly Electrical Contractors, Inc. (Relco), Michael McSheffrey, Robert Rutledge, John Brewer, and Ray Bombardier, disagreed and petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari. Upon review of the statute at issue here, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Plaintiff Roderick McGarry appealed a final judgment in favor of Defendant Town of Cumberland School Department which granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his age. After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor. However, the trial justice granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended the trial justice's post-trial Rule 50 ruling was in error and argued that the jury verdict should be reinstated. Specifically, plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred by granting judgment as a matter of law because: (1) defendant failed to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff; and (2) the trial justice erred in ruling that an adverse inference resulting from the spoliation of evidence, without additional extrinsic evidence, could not satisfy plaintiff's burden of proof (plaintiff contended that he did present such extrinsic evidence). Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed the superior court, and partly reversed. The Court found the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court agreed with the trial justice in granting defendant's motion for a new trial. The case was remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the State of Rhode Island Tax Administrator, filed this collection action against Defendants William J. and Marielle Reilly, in pursuit of more than $1 million in assessed-but-unpaid personal income taxes. In their answer, Defendants denied that they owed any personal income taxes for the assessed years. Eventually Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by a justice of the Superior Court. Defendants timely appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the motion justice erred because: (1) they were nonresidents who were not subject to Rhode Island income tax; (2) that the period of limitation for filing a tax collection action had expired; and (3) that the equitable doctrine of laches should bar the tax administrator's suit under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed; Defendants were not entitled to judicial review of the tax administrator's assessment of taxes for the contested tax years because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court agreed with Plaintiff that "a taxpayer cannot 'simply wait to be sued for the income tax to then raise objection to the assessment or payment in [the] collection proceeding.'"

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award.

At issue in this case was a 1966 property division that created Lot 733, an undeveloped parcel owned by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs requested a zoning certificate from the zoning enforcement officer for the town, the officer refused based on his belief that Lot 733 resulted from an illegal subdivision in contravention of the town zoning and subdivision regulations in force in 1966. The zoning board dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs then filed suit requesting that the zoning board's decision be overturned and that the court declare that Lot 733 was a lawful lot. The trial justice determined that the 1966 property division that created the disputed lot was proper. Defendants, owners of property adjoining Lot 733, appealed, arguing that the property division constituted an illegal subdivision because it lacked adequate street access. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but on different grounds, holding that the creation of Lot 733 was not a subdivision.