Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Saluda County Council, a motion was made and seconded to amend the posted agenda to take up a resolution. Both the motion and the resolution were voted upon and passed unanimously during the meeting, which was open to the public. The nonbinding resolution pertained to water and sewer services, although that subject was not originally listed on County Council's agenda. Dennis Lambries filed this action in the circuit court against the Saluda County Council and its members alleging County Council's amendment of the agenda without notice and in the absence of exigent circumstances and its passage of a resolution that was not on the posted agenda violated FOIA's notice provision in section 30-4-80. Lambries brought the action as a citizen of Saluda County and noted he was also the Chairman of the Saluda County Water and Sewer Authority. Specifically, Lambries asked the circuit court to declare that all resolutions, acts, ordinances, and statements made by County Council in violation of FOIA were null and void, and he sought injunctive relief to prevent future amendments of an agenda in the absence of "truly exigent circumstances." The circuit court noted the purpose of FOIA is for the activities of government "to be in open session and not behind closed doors." The court found that "the amendment of the agenda was performed in open session and in accordance with Saluda County Council rules of order as codified in their ordinances," and S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-110 (1986) authorized counties to establish their own rules and order of business. The circuit court denied Lambries's motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, reiterating that it "d[id] not agree with the plaintiff's fundamental position that a county council cannot amend agendas for regularly scheduled meetings without advance notice or exigent circumstances." The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, the majority finding (1) an agenda is required for regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) County Council's amendment of an agenda less than twenty-four hours before the meeting violated the "spirit" and "purpose" of FOIA's notice requirement. The Supreme Court concluded FOIA's notice statute did not require an agenda to be issued for a regularly scheduled meeting, and FOIA contained no prohibition on the amendment of an agenda for a regularly scheduled meeting. View "Lambries v. Saluda County Council" on Justia Law

Appellant, Horry Telephone Cooperative Inc. (HTC), is a telecommunications company providing services in the Georgetown and Horry County areas. In 2007, as required by the South Carolina Competitive Cable Services Act, HTC filed for a state-issued certificate of franchise authority, where it sought to provide cable television services in the City of Georgetown (City). The Secretary of State, pursuant to 58-12-310, forwarded the notice of application to the City which was required to respond to the request within 65 days. On second reading from a city council meeting, the request was denied. The City informed the Secretary of State of the denial, and notice was sent to HTC informing them that their franchise for the City of Georgetown had been denied. HTC filed for reconsideration, which was ultimately denied. Finally, HTC applied for a third time, and after consideration, the application was tabled and subsequently failed. HTC then filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court to declare that the City's denial was unlawful under the Act. The circuit court held a bench trial and ruled that the Act did not create a private cause of action and the City's denial of HTC's consent request was a reasonable and valid exercise of legislative discretion. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed HTC's complaint with prejudice. This issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the City's denial HTC's multiple franchise applications was a violation of the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it was not, and affirmed the circuit court. View "Horry Telephone v. City of Georgetown" on Justia Law

Ten health care entities, along with the South Carolina Hospital Association and the South Carolina Health Care Association sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHEC) was obligated to enforce the State Certification of Need and Health Facility Licensure Act (the CON Act) and fund the certificate of need (CON) program despite the South Carolina House of Representative's failure to override the Governor's veto of the line item in the state budget providing funding for the program. Upon review of matter in its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted the Petitioners' requested relief. View "Amisub v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal centered on a court of appeals' decision to reverse the administrative law court's (ALC) final order, which reversed and denied the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) issuance of a permit to respondent MRR Highway, 92, LLC for a commercial construction, demolition waste and land-clearing debris (C&D) landfill (the Landfill). Upon review of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in reversing the ALC, so it reversed and reinstated the ALC's final order. View "Engaging & Guarding Laurens County's Environment v. South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control" on Justia Law

When the Respondent City of Myrtle Beach transferred $302,545 of accommodations tax (A-Tax) funds into the City's general fund and bypassed the Act's provisions, Appellant Tourism Expenditure Review Committee (TERC) invoked its authority under section 6-4-35(B) and certified those expenditures as "noncomplian[t] to the State Treasurer." The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed TERC's noncompliance certification. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the ALC's acceptance of the City's characterization of the funds as "general funds" was error, because the City's internal documents unmistakably revealed that it "decided to sweep accommodations tax funds to the General Fund to cover tourism related public services." View "City of Myrtle Beach v. Tourism Expenditure Review Committee" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case consist of four Charleston citizens' groups. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction against what they believed to be the unlawful use of a terminal by the Carnival Corporation's cruise ship, the "Fantasy." The Terminal is within the City's Old and Historic District which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places maintained by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiffs' complaint sought injunctive relief based on ten claims: seven based on City ordinances, a public nuisance claim, a private nuisance claim, and a claim based on the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court commissioned a report which concluded: that as a matter of law, none of the ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal; the Pollution Control Act did not govern the Fantasy's discharges in South Carolina waters; but that the complaint made sufficient allegations to set forth both a private and a public nuisance cause of action. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed exceptions to the report. After considering the report and the exceptions, the Supreme Court dismissed the noise ordinance, sign ordinance, and Pollution Control Act claims, and withheld ruling on the motions to dismiss on the five zoning and two nuisance claims. After ordering briefing on the issues of standing, preemption, and whether the zoning ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court granted Carnival's motions to dismiss. View "Carnival Corporation v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood" on Justia Law

The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court to review two municipal courts' rulings addressing whether the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in magistrate and municipal courts. The first case involved Defendant Paul Gwinn who was charged with Criminal Domestic Violence (CDV). When the case was called for trial, Gwinn made a motion that the Attorney General could not prosecute the case because the municipal court was not a court of record, citing S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 24 (2009). The municipal court found that the Attorney General could prosecute the case. The second case involved the prosecution of Defendant Michael Long, also charged with CDV. Long moved to disqualify the Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case, arguing that the Attorney General is authorized to prosecute cases only in courts of record. The court granted the motion, ruling that the Attorney General did not have the authority to prosecute the case under art. V, sec. 24. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that art. V, sec. 24 does not prevent the Attorney General from prosecuting cases in summary courts. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in Gwinn's case, and reversed the trial court in Long's case. View "South Carolina v. Gwinn" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Petitioner Phillip Brown's driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Hearing Officer for the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings ("OMVH") rescinded the suspension on the ground that the arresting officer failed to present reliable evidence that the breathalyzer test was administered and the sample obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 56-5-2950. Specifically, the OMVH found that the required "simulator test" was not conducted prior to the actual test. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed and reinstated Petitioner's license suspension. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the ALC's order, finding Petitioner's failure to contemporaneously object to the arresting officer's testimony with respect to the functioning of the breathalyzer precluded the review of the issue on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's driver's license suspension. View "SCDMV v. Brown" on Justia Law

Donald Austin filed suit against Stokes-Craven, an automobile dealership, after he experienced problems with his used vehicle and discovered the vehicle had sustained extensive damage prior to the sale. The resolution of this case involved an interpretation of a narrow portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in “Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.,” (691 S.E.2d 135 (2010)). Specifically, the consolidated appeals were the result of a dispute over the Court's holding concerning Austin's entitlement to trial fees under the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act and whether the Supreme Court's denial of Austin's motion for appellate costs under Rule 222 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules had preclusive effect on his right to pursue appellate and post-appellate fees under the Dealer's Act. After careful review of the appellate record in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's award of trial fees to Austin and remanded this case to the circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine what amount of appellate and post-appellate fees should be awarded to Austin. View "Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding" on Justia Law