Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners the State and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) requested the Supreme Court declare a proposed tax referendum invalid under the Capital Project Sales Tax Act, sections 4-10-300 to -380 of the South Carolina Code, and enjoin Respondents the County of Florence, Florence County Council, and Florence County Registration and Elections Commission from placing the proposed referendum on the ballot for county elections. The Court found Respondents' actions valid pursuant to the Act, and denied Petitioners' request for an injunction. Accordingly, the tax referendum was permitted to go forward. View "South Carolina v. County of Florence" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents in this case. The case was dismissed after respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP. Because the Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that needed to be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "The circuit court and respondents [relied] on a single sentence found in 'Bradley v. Cherokee School Dist. No. One,' [470 S.E.2d 570 (1996)]: A law that is special only in the sense that it imposes a lawful tax limited in application and incidence to persons or property within a certain school district does not contravene the provisions of Article III, section 34(IX)." In this case, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's complaint centered on an impact fee, not a tax, and one that is placed on only some persons and not others. Moreover, since 'Bradley' was decided, the Court clarified that all challenges to education-related special legislation were subject to the test set forth in 'Kizer v. Clark,'(600 S.E.2d 529 (2004)). The Supreme Court found that appellants' complaint alleged facts which, if resolved in their favor, would result in a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The order granting respondents' Rule 12(c) motion was therefore reversed. View "Home Builders Association v. School District No. 2 of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

Appellant Centex International filed consolidated income tax returns for three of its corporate affiliates. It appealed an Administrative Law Court order that upheld the state Department of Revenue's denial of its claim for tax credits for the 2002-2005 tax years. Finding no error in the ALC's calculation of the tax, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Centex International v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

Employee-claimant Cathy Bone filed a workman's compensation claim for a work-related injury. The employer, U.S. Food Service, and its carrier Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America disputed the claim. The single commissioner and an Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission issued orders denying the claim. Under the procedure then in place, Bone appealed to the circuit court, which concluded the injury was compensable and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The employer appealed the circuit court's order, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis the order was not a "final judgment" and thus not immediately appealable because further proceedings were ordered before the administrative agency. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The high court subsequently granted a petition for rehearing filed by the employer, and it additionally granted the following two motions: (1) Bone's motion to argue against precedent, and (2) the motion of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association to accept its Amicus Curiae Brief in support of Petitioners. After considering the record in this matter, as well as the briefs and arguments, the Court adhered to its original decision to affirm. View "Bone v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

Appellant John Rainey sued the Honorable Nikki Haley, Goveror of South Carolina, seeking a declaration that the Governor violated the State Ethics Act when she was a member of the House of Representatives. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction to hear ethics complaints against its members. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Rainey v. Haley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Edward Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation filed suit in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for a determination of whether the South Carolina Transportation Infrastructure Bank was constitutional. Plaintiffs alleged the Bank violated both the dual office holding and the separation of powers prohibitions of the South Carolina Constitution. Finding the statute at issue here (11-43-140, So. Car. Code (2011)) was constitutional, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bank. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. SC Transportation Infrastructure Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Health Promotion Specialists, LLC sued the state Board of Dentistry based on the Board's enactment and enforcement of regulations relating to certain procedures performed by dental hygienists in school settings. The Board was awarded summary judgment; Health Promotion appealed, arguing the circuit court erred by concluding: (1) the Board was immune from suit under the state Tort Claims Act; (2) Health Promotion could not maintain an action under the state Unfair Trade Practices Act because the Board was not a "person" and its actions were not within "trade or commerce;" and (3) Health Promotions could not amend its complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Board was immune from suit and affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. View "Health Promotion Specialists v. SC Board of Dentistry" on Justia Law

In 1988, Respondents the Barnwell County Council passed an ordinance creating the Board of Trustees for the Barnwell County Hospital. The ordinance stated the Board was created "for the purposes of operating and maintaining adequate hospital facilities for the residents of Barnwell County[,]" and delineated the powers and duties of the Board. The ordinance also described the composition of the Board, set term limits, and provided members annual compensation. Over the years, the Council has passed various ordinances related to the Board. Appellants, former Board members, alleged that in 2009, during their time of service on the Board, the Council was developing a strategy in conjunction with Bamberg and Allendale Counties to close the respective county hospitals and create one hospital for all three counties. Appellants asserted the Council embarked upon various detrimental actions against the Hospital in connection with the strategy and maintain these actions financially crippled the Hospital. According to Appellants, when they resisted the Council's plan, which included the Hospital filing for bankruptcy, the Council voted to remove Appellants from the Board and appointed themselves as Board members. The Council, in their new, self-appointed status as Board members, placed the Hospital in bankruptcy. Appellants filed suit seeking a declaration that the Council violated the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding when it assumed positions as Board members. In response, the Council filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claim presented a non-justiciable political question, and the dual office prohibition was not violated by what it termed a "vertical" duality. They cited no authority to support this unique theory. The circuit court granted the Council's motion to dismiss, finding the issue was a non-justiciable political question. Nevertheless, the circuit court addressed and rejected the dual office holding challenge. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Appellants' declaratory judgment action, and reversed and remanded. View "Alexander v. Houston" on Justia Law

This matter began as a contested case in the administrative law court (ALC) brought by Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., (d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont)). The dispute arose out of Piedmont's contention that an urgent care center operated by a competitor, Carolinas Physicians Network, Inc. (CPN), was required to have a Certificate of Need (CON) or a Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC granted summary judgment to CHS and CPN on the basis the urgent care center was a licensed private physician's office and, thus, exempt from CON review as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding summary judgment was premature, and remanded to allow Piedmont the opportunity to conduct discovery. The Court of Appeals rejected DHEC's argument that the ALC did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the agency had issued no staff decision subject to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court granted DHEC's petition for a writ of certiorari as to the issue of jurisdiction and reversed. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding Piedmont has established the existence of a staff decision by DHEC that was properly the subject of a contested case hearing and in remanding the matter for discovery and further proceedings. View "Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law