Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael Crisp, Jr. worked for Employer SouthCo, Inc., seeding grass and performing odd construction jobs. In 2004, Petitioner and other workers were installing silt fencing to combat ground erosion. Petitioner held a pole while another worker operated the Bobcat. As Petitioner bent down to reach for a pole, the bucket of the Bobcat fell on Petitioner, covering him. Petitioner suffered injuries to his head and hands. At the emergency room, Petitioner was treated for abrasions and bruises to the back of the head and neck and a complex fracture in his right hand. There was no mention of a brain injury in Petitioner's hospital records. Nearly two years after his injury, Petitioner's doctor opined that Petitioner sustained physical brain injury as a result of his 2004 injury. Petitioner's eventual workers' compensation claim for the brain injury was denied, and he petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's decision to reverse a circuit court's finding that he sustained a compensable brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further consideration of whether Petitioner sustained physical brain damage as contemplated under the Workers' Compensation Act which would entitle him to benefits for life. View "Crisp v. SouthCo." on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc. employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. Six doctors opined regarding whether Petitioner had suffered a physical brain injury. The Commission found that Petitioner had sustained a compensable injury to his head. It also found him to be totally and permanently disabled. The Commission ruled that Petitioner should receive only five hundred weeks of compensation as a result of his total and permanent disability and medical expenses causally related to the three compensable injuries. On appeal, the circuit court remanded to the Commission for it: (1) to explain whether the "physical brain injury" it found "border[ed] on the frivolous" was intended to be the same as or different from "physical brain damage" as used in section 42-9-10 (C); and (2) to reconcile the order's seemingly contradictory findings that Petitioner suffered a compensable injury to the head with its finding of no physical brain injury. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Commission's order. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the circuit court. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Appellants Robert Buchanan, Jr. and Adele Pope, formerly personal representatives for The Estate of James Brown and trustees of The James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust, appealed circuit court orders that: (1) approved a settlement agreement of pending litigation concerning the estate; and (2) removed Appellants from their fiduciary positions and appointed Russell L. Bauknight as personal representative and trustee. At the heart of this case is the estate of singer-entertainer James Brown, estimated to be worth between $5 million to $100 million. Brown devised all of his personal and household effects to six named adult children, with the remainder left to the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Albert Dallas, Alfred Bradley, and David Cannon were named as the co-personal representatives of Brown's estate and as the co-trustees of the 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Brown's will and trust each contained a no-contest clause, which provided that any beneficiary who challenged the will or the 2000 Irrevocable Trust "shall forfeit his or her entire interest thereunder." Brown expressly disavowed any other potential beneficiaries. In 2001, Brown and Tommie Rae Hynie executed a prenuptial agreement whereby she waived any right to Brown's property or the receipt of alimony, including any claim for an interest in his estate. In 2004, Brown sought to annul the marriage, finding Tommie Rae was married to someone else. The couple had one child born prior to the prenuptial agreement or marriage. The parties dismissed their respective suits in a consent order late 2004, whereby Tommie Rae waived any claim of common law marriage. In 2007, five of the six adult children Brown named in his will and Tommie Rae, brought actions to set aside Brown's will and the 2000 Irrevocable Trust based on undue influence. They alleged Brown's estate should pass by the laws of intestate succession. Tommie Rae claimed that she was entitled to an elective share or an omitted spouse's share of Brown's estate and that her son, James B. (via a guardian ad litem), was entitled to a share of the estate as an omitted child. The probate court transferred these claims to the circuit court. Ultimately, the three original fiduciaries either resigned or were removed from their positions as personal representatives and trustees. A (New) Charitable Trust, similar to the existing Charitable Trust formed from the 2000 Irrevocable Trust, was to be created by the Attorney General (AG) with the advice and counsel of the parties. An Advisory Board was to be established, whose members would "serve at the pleasure of and on such terms as the [AG] shall decide." The number of members on the Advisory Board was to be determined by the AG, but would include a member selected by Tommie Rae and one selected by each of Brown's adult children, and the roles of all members of the board were expressly stated to "be solely advisory." A trust similar to the Brown Family Education Trust was to be established for the education of the grandchildren and their issue, to be funded with $2 million. The circuit court approved the compromise agreement and directed Appellants to execute the agreement. At the request of the settling parties, the circuit court appointed Bauknight to have full authority as the personal representative for Brown's estate and as trustee, and Appellants were removed from those positions. Appellants appealed these rulings as well as additional, related orders, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's removal of Appellants from their fiduciary positions, but, in light of its decision invalidating the circuit court's approval of the compromise agreement, the Court directed the circuit court to appoint new, neutral fiduciaries to oversee these matters. View "In re: The Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the question of when tax liability for property is determined. Appellant Hampton Friends of the Arts challenged the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) finding that real property it acquired in March 2008 was subject to 2008 property taxes because the property was subject to taxes on December 31, 2007. Appellant contended that, as a non-profit corporation, it was entitled to a property tax exemption for the 2008 tax year. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the ALC: "pursuant to settled law, the 2008 tax status of the Hampton County property was determined on December 31, 2007. Because the property was subject to property taxes as of December 31, 2007, the property is subject to 2008 property taxes." View "Hampton Friends v. So. Carolina Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters and police officers who worked for the City of Columbia all elected to have group health insurance provided to them by the city. Prior to July 2009, the City paid all costs to fund the group health insurance for employees and retirees. The retirees received newsletters stating that their health insurance was free and were told by the City's human resources department that retiree health insurance would be at no cost to the retiree. In planning the 2009-2010 budget, the City considered a number of cost-saving measures including shifting part of rising health care costs to participants in the group health plan. The retirees sued under claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the retirees' causes of action. Seven of the thirteen retirees appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the retirees on their contract and estoppels claims to the extent that those claims were based on an employee handbook and benefits booklet each received when they were hired. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the retirees on their estoppel claims based upon representations made by their supervisors and the City's human resources personnel. View "Bishop v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant Dunes West Golf Club, LLC, challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Town of Mount Pleasant. In 2006, the Town of Mount Pleasant amended its zoning ordinance to create the Conservation Recreation Open Space zoning district, which imposed land-use restrictions on all golf course properties in Mount Pleasant, permitting only recreation and conservation uses. Appellant desired to carve out residential lots on its golf course property by designating several noncontiguous parcels as potential home sites. Because the new zoning designation did not permit construction of new homes, Appellant sought to have the golf course property rezoned to allow residential development. The Town denied the rezoning request, and Appellant filed suit, claiming the Town's actions violated its equal protection and due process rights, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. Following discovery, the Town of Mount Pleasant successfully moved for summary judgment. The Court carefully reviewed each assignment of error and found summary judgment was properly granted. View "Dunes West v. Town of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the parties appealed the circuit court's order authorizing Storm M. H. ("Student"), who resided in Berkeley County, to enroll in the Academic Magnet High School ("AMHS") located in the Charleston County School District ("CCSD") provided she purchase real property in the CCSD with a tax-assessed value of $300 or more. Student resided with her parents in Berkeley County. In January 2010, she applied for admission to the 9th grade class at the AMHS for the following academic year. In her application, Student identified her Berkeley County address. Student was accepted by the AMHS and required to confirm her intention to enroll by January 28, 2010. The Confirmation Form requested a "Charleston County Residence Address." After seeing this request, Student's mother, Gayla S. L. McSwain ("Parent"), spoke with someone at the AMHS and explained that Student could not provide a Charleston County address because she did not "live in Charleston County yet." As a result of this conversation, Parent completed the Confirmation Form by indicating that she would "provide [a Charleston County residence address] prior to enrollment." The circuit court held that the CCSD's policy of requiring domicile for a child to attend a CCSD magnet school violated section 59-63-30(c) because "domicile" by a child and that child's parent or guardian was not required by the statute only property ownership. Both parties appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals. Subsequently, Student purchased real property in Charleston County and enrolled in the AMHS on August 18, 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that CCSD's policy of excluding all non-resident children from attendance at its magnet schools was contrary to the plain language of section 59-6330, and the Student was entitled to continue attending AMHS. "We are not unsympathetic to the Board's argument that allowing non-resident children to attend its magnet schools displaces other qualified resident children. However, we are constrained to interpret the unambiguous language of section 59-63-30. . . . As the statute is written, the Board does not have the authority to unilaterally exclude children who qualify to attend its schools." View "Storm M. H. v. Charleston County Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the petition of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Petitioner) in its Original Jurisdiction to assess constitutional challenges to Act No. 26 of the South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions, which regulates coverage provided by commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies for construction-related work. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the retroactivity clause of Act No. 261 violated the Contract Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, and that the statute may only apply prospectively to CGL insurance contracts executed on or after its effective date of May 17, 2011. View "Harleysville Mutual v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case returns to the Supreme Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court (USSC) for reconsideration in light of its decision in "Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.," (131 S.Ct. 1311 (2011)). In the South Carolina Court's previous decision, it concluded Appellant's state-law products liability claims against Ford Motor Company were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 205. The Court reaffirmed its previous decision. Appellant filed a products liability claim against Respondent Ford Motor Company premised on the allegation that its 1997 Ford F-150 pick-up truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it did not incorporate laminated glass in the vehicle's side and rear windows. In connection with implied conflict preemption, "Williamson" revisited the Supreme Court's decision in "Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.," (529 U.S. 861 (2000)). "We construe the key language in Williamson to hold that manufacturer choice among alternatives operates to preempt a state law claim only where the state law stands as an obstacle to a significant federal regulatory objective. Similarly, our previous decision was not based upon the notion that the mere presence of manufacturer choices in FMVSS 205 preempted Appellant's state tort suit. We adhere to the view that the manifest purpose of the federal regulatory scheme underlying FMVSS 205 would be frustrated if these state claims were allowed to proceed. Assuming implied conflict preemption remains a viable part of preemption, we believe it applies here to preclude Appellant's state law claims." View "Priester v. Cromer" on Justia Law