Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Supreme Court certified the following question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "In the case of a partial failure of title which is covered by an owner's title insurance policy, where the title defect cannot be removed, should the actual loss suffered by the insured as a result of that partial failure of title be measured by the diminution in value of the insured property as a result of the title defect as of the date of the purchase of the insured property, or as of the date of the discovery of the title defect?" The Court answered the question: consult the contract. "[W]here the insurance contract unambiguously identifies a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provides for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such date or method is controlling. Where, as here, the insurance contract does not unambiguously identify a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provide for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such ambiguity requires a construction allowing for the measure of damages most favorable to the insured. . . .In sum, although [the Court acknowledged] the apparent inequity in [its] answer to the certified question, the resolution of this question [was] not a matter of equity. Rather, [the] Court [was] faced with the task of construing an insurance policy, and in the presence of an ambiguity [it was] constrained to interpret it most favorably to the insured." View "Whitlock v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

Appellant Jay Warren appealed an order that denied his Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP motions, as well as his independent motion to set aside a judgment sale. On appeal, he contested only the denial of his motion to set aside. Warren is a state bail bondsman, and Respondent Arrow Bonding Company is also in the bond business. Warren agreed to be responsible if a mutual client forfeited a surety bond issued by Respondent. In October 2006, Respondent obtained a $5,120.00 judgment against Warren after the client forfeited. In August 2007, the clerk issued a Judgment Execution, and on September 19, 2007, the sheriff issued an Execution Account Statement. In this statement, he reported receiving a $1,000 payment from Warren, from which he deducted his $52.50 fee, leaving $947.50 to be applied against the debt. After deducting the $947.50 and adding the interest accrued as of September 19, 2007, Warren's judgment debt stood at $4,705.15. In January 2008, Respondent brought an action to foreclose its judgment lien. Warren did not answer, and the clerk granted Respondent's motions, ordering entry of the default against Warren, and referring the matter to the Master-in-Equity. On the sales day, Warren went to the sheriff's office and tendered the amount due under the original judgment, not the amount then due in light of the accumulated interest and other fees. The Master issued a deed to Respondent, who bought all of Warren's properties, which were sold at the sale as a single lot, leaving a deficiency. Warren filed a motion to set aside the default order under Rule 55(c) and/or Rule 60(b), and to set aside the foreclosure deed. The Master denied all relief requested, and denied the request to reconsider his decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Master did not err in refusing to set aside the sale or by selling the properties as a single lot. View "Arrow Bonding Company v. Warren" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer.

Employee-Respondent Aletha Johnson hurt her back while working for Employer-Appellant Rent-A-Center, Inc. The company contended that the appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission erred by awarding Respondent workers' compensation benefits. The appellate panel found Respondent was disabled and did not constructively refuse light duty work. The Supreme Court found that Respondent qualified as disabled under section 42-1-120 of the South Carolina Code, and affirmed the appellate panel's decision to award benefits.

Appellant Brandon Bentley, a deputy sheriff with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, alleged that he developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD) and depression after he shot and killed a suspect who attempted to assault him. An Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission unanimously found that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing a compensable mental injury that arose out of an "unusual or extraordinary condition" of employment for a Spartanburg County deputy sheriff. "Whether the shooting and killing of a suspect by a deputy sheriff while on duty is an extraordinary and unusual employment condition such that mental injuries arising from that incident are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act" was the issue central to this case. Appellant asked the Supreme Court to reframe the issue, take it out of its particular employment context, and ask "whether killing another human being is "unusual." Upon review, the Court held that Appellant's testimony that he "might be in a situation where he might have to shoot someone," similar testimonies by Sheriff Wright that officers were aware of the possibility that they might be required to shoot and kill, Appellant's training in the use of deadly force, and the department's policy addressing when deadly force should be used constituted substantial evidence supporting the Appellate Panel's conclusion that Appellant's involvement in the shooting was not "extraordinary and unusual," but was a standard and necessary condition of a deputy sheriff's job.

Brentwood Homes, Inc. and the other appellants in this case (collectively "Brentwood Homes") appealed a circuit court's order denying a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Petitioner Fred Bradley that arose out of his purchase of a home in South Carolina. Although Brentwood Homes conceded the Home Purchase Agreement did not meet the technical requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA"), it claimed the court erred in denying the motion because the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a completed residential dwelling and not the construction, the Court found the FAA did not apply. Furthermore, the existence of the national warranty and Bradley's use of out-of-state financing did not negate the intrastate nature of the transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Brentwood Homes' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as Brentwood Homes failed to offer sufficient evidence that the transaction involved interstate commerce to subject the Agreement to the FAA.

Appellant Richard Freemantle challenged the legality of a severance agreement between Anderson County and Respondent Joey Preston, a former Anderson County administrator. Respondent was hired as County Administrator in 1998. His contract with the County provided for an initial employment term of three years, with an annual renewal in the absence of written notice not to renew the contract. The November 2008 election changed the "balance of power" on the Anderson County Council. One of the final acts of the outgoing Council was to execute a severance agreement for Respondent that provided him over one million dollars in benefits which was "well in excess of that provided in his employment contract." The severance agreement also included a release provision stating that the County would never seek legal redress against Respondent for any claims relating to his employment with the County. Appellant filed a complaint against Respondents on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated seeking monetary relief and various declaratory judgments. Specifically, Appellant alleged that Council's vote approving the severance agreement was invalid. In addition, Appellant contended the successor Anderson County Council was not bound by the severance agreement. Relief was sought pursuant to various causes of action, including covin and collusion, breach of fiduciary duties, illegal gift of county funds, misfeasance, malfeasance, conspiracy, violations of public policy, and violations of FOIA, The trial court dismissed the action finding that Appellant's status as a taxpayer did not confer standing to challenge the severance agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court in most respects concerning Appellant's lack of standing. However, the Court disagreed with the trial court "only insofar as the FOIA claim is concerned, for traditional standing principles do not apply under FOIA because the legislature has conferred standing on any citizen to enforce the Act's provisions." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Bobbie Manigo challenged his civil commitment to the Department of Mental Health for long-term control, care, and treatment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"). Specifically, Petitioner contended that, although he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, he was exempt from the SVPA evaluation procedure simply because his most recent offense was not explicitly designated as sexually violent. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's commitment, finding the language of the SVPA unambiguous and applicable to Petitioner. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.

Appellant Lisa Argabright and Respondent Wayne Argabright were formerly married, are now divorced and share joint custody of their minor daughter. Appellant appealed the family court's issuance of a restraining order enjoining her from permitting any contact between her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, and the parties' minor daughter. The family court further required Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and the guardian ad litem fees. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was the only person available to supervise contact between Child and the boyfriend. And given Appellant's pattern of deception and pursuit of her own interests over those of Child, an order entrusting Appellant to ensure no future unsupervised contact between Child and the boyfriend would be suspect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was declaratory relief in connection with an alleged improper certification of certain candidates by the Florence County Republican Party for the June 12, 2012, party primary.  Plaintiffs Florence County Election Commission, David Alford, South Carolina State Election Commission, and Marci Andino contended these candidates were improperly certified because they failed to comply with the requirements for filing a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI) contained in S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356 (Supp. 2011), as interpreted by the Court in "Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm'n," Op. No. 27120 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 2, 2012).  The County Republicans argued the candidates were exempt under 8-13-1356(A) from the filing requirements of 8-13-1356(B).  The Court granted declaratory relief to Plaintiffs and declared the County Republicans improperly construed the relevant statutory provisions to determine certain candidates were exempt from the requirements of 8-13-1356(B).