Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners - four residents of the Westwood Valley Addition to Sioux Falls, which is a part of the Tea Area School District (TASD) - submitted a petition to the Tea Area School Board requesting that the TASD’s boundary be changed to exclude their residences, which would instead be annexed by the Sioux Falls School District. After a publicly noticed meeting at which none of Petitioners appeared, either personally or through counsel, the Board denied the petition. One petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) the Board’s denial of the petition for a minor boundary change was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Schaefer v. Tea Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

On December 31, 2009, Employee was injured during the scope of her employment at Employer. One week later, Employee suffered a massive intraventricular hemorrhage in her brain, which caused her to undergo brain surgery. Employer denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that Employee’s brain injuries were the result of a different incident on January 4, 2010. After a hearing, the Department of Labor ruled in favor of Employee, finding (1) the work-related injury was a major contributing cause of the hemorrhage and Employee’s resulting disabilities, and (2) the alleged second incident did not take place after the workplace incident as Employer claim, if it occurred at all. After the Department clarified compensable damages, the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department was not clearly erroneous in finding that the workplace injury was a major contributing cause to Employee’s injury and disability and that there was no second incident; and (2) the Department did not abuse its discretion in admitting the undisclosed testimony of an expert witness. View "Sorensen v. Harbor Bar, LLC" on Justia Law

Montana Dakota Utilities Co. and Otter Tail Power Company (together, Applicants) applied to the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (Commission) for a permit to construct a high-voltage electrical transmission line. Applicant’s project would cross one part of Gerald Pesall’s farm. Pesall intervened and was granted party status. Pesall objected to the project, arguing that excavating and moving soil to construct the project could unearth and spread a crop parasite. The Commission granted the permit subject to conditions, including a condition to identify and mitigate the potential parasite problem. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s decision to grant a conditional permit rather than requiring reapplication; (2) the permit condition relating to the parasites did not constitute an improper delegation of the Commission’s authority to a private party; and (3) the Commission timely rendered complete findings on the permit application. View "Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utils., Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) commenced an audit of Taxpayer’s excise tax and sales tax licenses for tax period 2009 through 2012. At issue in this case was whether Taxpayer’s construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities were subject to a contractor’s excise tax under S.D. Codified Laws 10-46A-1. Taxpayer did not remit excise tax on the gross receipts it received from its construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities. As a result of the audit, the Department issued Taxpayer a certificate of assessment for $43,020, which included excise tax and interest. The circuit court reversed the Department’s certificate of assessment, ruling that Taxpayer’s services were not subject to a contractor’s excise tax under section 10-46A-1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer’s act of entering into a contract with a public entity to guarantee a satisfactorily completed public improvement project by a specific date for a specific cost was subject to excise tax under section 10-46A-1. View "Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Eric Kolda, a City of Yankton police officer, was terminated for violating police department policies. The City terminated Kolda by delivery of a termination letter. Kolda appealed, and the city manager upheld Kolda’s termination for cause. Kolda did not appeal to the Department of Labor and Regulation but, instead, filed a wrongful discharge action in circuit court. The circuit court ruled that Kolda could only be terminated for cause with notice and that the City failed to provide pre-termination notice. A jury found cause for the termination, and Kolda’s wrongful discharge claim was denied. However, the circuit court awarded Kolda procedural due process damages for lost wages that accrued between the time of his summary termination and the post-termination evidentiary hearing. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the circuit court to vacate the award of damages because Kolda failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the circuit court thus lacked jurisdiction to resolve Kolda’s claims. View "Kolda v. City of Yankton" on Justia Law

The Moody County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to allow Mustang Pass, LLC (Mustang) to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation in Moody County. Several citizens (Citizens) petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to invalidate Mustang’s CUP, asserting (1) the Moody County Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction because Moody County failed, in 2003, to property enact its zoning ordinances creating the Moody County Board of Adjustment; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable to the appeal procedure from a board of adjustment decision violates the Equal Protection Clause. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme comports with the Equal Protection Clause because a rational relationship exists between a legitimate legislative purpose and classifications the statute creates among citizens; and (2) the 2003 ordinances were validly enacted. View "Tibbs v. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Employee was injured at work and underwent surgery. Employee’s health insurer covered the surgery’s costs at a discounted rate. After the Department of Labor found Employer liable for Employee’s condition Employer accepted Employee’s claim and reimbursed Employee for his out of pocket expenses and reimbursed Employee’s insurer for payments it made on Employee’s behalf. Employee challenged the payment, arguing that Employer was required to pay the full medical expense without the health insurance discount. The Department concluded that Employer fulfilled its obligation. The circuit court reversed and found Employer liable for the full medical expense billed before adjustments. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Department’s order, holding that the Department correctly applied the law in determining that Employer satisfied its statutory reimbursement obligation. View "Whitesell v. Rapid Soft Water & Spas, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned property located in Lincoln County that was unplatted and zoned for agricultural use. The property owner voluntarily petitioned for its annexation to the City of Sioux Falls. Sioux Falls subsequently adopted an annexation resolution under S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-1 annexing the property to be developed for a Walmart store. Neighbors of the property, joined as “Save Our Neighborhood,” petitioned the circuit court for writs of prohibition and certiorari, seeking to invalidate the City’s annexation resolution and to prohibit the City from rezoning the property. Petitioners argued that S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-5 required the City to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before adopting a rule to annex the property. The circuit court denied the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ writs of certiorari and prohibition, holding that the Legislature did not intend section 9-4-5 to apply to a resolution adopted for a voluntary petition for annexation under section 9-4-1. View "Save our Neighborhood v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Paul Nelson Farm (“Appellee”) operated an all-inclusive hunting lodge in South Dakota. The Department of Revenue and Regulation conducted an audit on Appellee and determined that Appellee owed unpaid use tax on food, beverages, and ammunition. Appellee argued that it was not required to pay use tax on those items because the food, beverages, and ammunition were not purchased for end use by Appellee but were instead purchased for resale to hunting lodge customers in Appellee’s ordinary course of business. The circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Appellee was not required to remit use tax on the food but was required to remit use tax on the beverages and ammunition. The Supreme Court held that use tax was not properly imposed on any of the goods because the items were purchased for resale to Appellee’s customers in the regular course of business, and therefore, Appellee’s control and possession of the items did not constitute “use” as defined by S.D. Codified Laws 10-46-1(17). View "Paul Nelson Farm v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered work-related injuries in 2000 and received workers' compensation benefits until 2004. Appellant filed another first report of injury in 2009 based on the same injuries. Employer denied benefits. Appellant filed a petition for rehearing. The Department of Labor & Regulation, Division of Labor & Management found that S.D. Codified Laws 62-7-35.1 barred Appellant's second claim for workers' compensation benefits because more than three years had passed between the date of the last payment of benefits and the date Appellant filed a written petition for a hearing. The circuit court affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing section 62-7-35.1 should not apply to this case because his injuries were from cumulative trauma. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the cumulative trauma doctrine did not change section 62-7-35.1's application to this case because the cumulative trauma doctrine applies to the date of injury, which is irrelevant to section 62-7-35.1. View "Schuelke v. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law