Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Alabama
Moore v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission
On January 23, 2015, Judge Callie Granade of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, issued an order declaring unconstitutional both the Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act, as violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thereafter, the federal court entered an injunction prohibiting the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing any Alabama law that prohibited same-sex marriage. The injunction was to allow time for an appeal of that decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 27, 2015, Roy Moore, Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, sent a letter, on Supreme Court of Alabama letterhead, to then Governor Robert Bentley regarding Judge Granade’s orders, expressing "legitimate concerns about the propriety of federal court jurisdiction over the Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment." In his three-page letter, Chief Justice Moore laid out his arguments as to why Judge Granade’s federal-court orders were not binding upon the State of Alabama, and ultimately directed Alabama’s probate judges not to recognize marriage licenses for same-sex couples. Months later, the Alabama Supreme Court released a per curiam opinion ordering the probate judges named as respondents to discontinue issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in compliance with Alabama law. Chief Justice Moore’s name did not appear in the vote line of this opinion, nor did he author or join any of the special writings. On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in “Obergefell,” holding that "same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States" and that "there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character." The Court of the Judiciary ultimately suspended Chief Justice Moore for his defiance of the laws. He appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court determined it was “obligated to follow prior precedent” that it had no authority to disturb the sanction imposed by the Court of the Judiciary: “[b]ecause we have previously determined that the charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence and there is no indication that the sanction imposed was plainly and palpably wrong, manifestly unjust, or without supporting evidence, we shall not disturb the sanction imposed.” View "Moore v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission" on Justia Law
Nix v. Franklin County Dept. of Human Resources
Jerry Nix appealed the entry of summary judgment which found he was an adult in need of protective services under the Adult Protective Services Act of 1976. The Franklin County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") alleged that Nix, then 78 years old, was an "adult in need of protective services." The petition claimed that Nix had not been taking his medications for diabetes and hypertension and that he had been the victim of a postal scam costing him thousands of dollars. DHR further alleged that Nix urgently required nursing-home care to protect his health and safety and that, otherwise, Nix was in immediate danger. DHR requested emergency-protective placement for Nix and that the court set a hearing to determine Nix's need for protective services. The trial court thereafter ordered DHR to provide protective services for Nix, appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Nix in the proceedings, and appointed Nix's son, Darren Nix, as conservator of Nix's estate and guardian of his person. While the Alabama Supreme Court did not question that all involved in this case desired the best for Nix, it was troubled by the "apparent lack of urgency and attention to statutory formalities in the prosecution of this petition for protective services," finding the trial court granted DHR's emergency petition on December 7, 2015; Nix was entitled to a hearing within 30 days. Seven months passed before the trial court entered the summary judgment finding Nix to be an adult in need of supervision, and fifteen months had passed since Nix was removed from his home. "It may very well be that an assisted-living facility is the appropriate and lawful protective placement for Nix, but he is still entitled to all the procedural safeguards due him under the Act, including a timely adjudication of his need for such services. Indeed, without a faithful adherence to the Act and the due process protections owed to each person protected by the Act, we risk unnecessary and wrongful deprivation of liberty and property. For those 'protected persons' dispossessed of their house and their assets, this may seem a fate far worse than a foreign-lottery postal scam." View "Nix v. Franklin County Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law
Woodfin v. Bender
Defendants were members of the Birmingham Board of Education and the superintendent of the Birmingham City School System. Defendants appealed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of twenty-four "classified employees" of the Birmingham Board of Education ("the plaintiffs"). The trial court held that the plaintiffs' salaries had been miscalculated and awarded them monetary relief. The defendants argued, among other things, that they were entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court agreed that the defendants were entitled to immunity. For that reason, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its judgment was void. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Woodfin v. Bender" on Justia Law
Ex parte City of Homewood
Officer J.C. Clifton and Officer Jason Davis, law enforcement officers for the City of Homewood, and the City of Homewood petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the ground of immunity. In 2013, the officers were dispatched to the Babies "R" Us retail store in the Wildwood Shopping Center in response to a shoplifting incident involving Bristinia Fuller and Bria Mines. When the officers arrived, they learned that Fuller and Mines were leaving the parking lot of the store in a vehicle being driven by Fuller. Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, driving separate patrol cars, attempted to stop the vehicle. Instead of stopping, Fuller eluded the officers by speeding through the parking area and onto Lakeshore Drive. The officers pursued. Fuller continued speeding and ran through multiple red traffic lights before losing control of her vehicle. The vehicle struck a light pole and a stopped vehicleat the intersection. Fuller was killed and Mines was seriously injured. 2015, Mines sued Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, both in their official and individual capacities, Homewood, and others alleging she was injured as a result of the negligent, reckless, and/or wanton conduct of the officers and Homewood during the officers' pursuit of Fuller's vehicle. She also alleged that Homewood was vicariously liable for the officers' conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising the officers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the officers established they were entitled to immunity as to Mines' claims against them in both their official and individual capacities. Moreover, because the officers were entitled to immunity, Homewood was also entitled to immunity. The Court therefore granted their petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for Officer Clifton, Officer Davis, and Homewood. View "Ex parte City of Homewood" on Justia Law
City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System v. McGough
Kevin McGough, then a firefighter employed by the City of Birmingham ("the city"), alleges that he sustained an injury to his left knee on April 30, 2011, during the course of his employment. For approximately one year after he injured his left knee, McGough received medical treatment from numerous doctors and continued to work as much as he was able. In 2012, McGough filed a claim with the Retirement System for extraordinary-disability benefits and ordinary-disability benefit to be paid out of the City Retirement and Relief System. The Retirement System denied McGough's request for extraordinary-disability benefits and granted McGough's request for ordinary-disability benefits. It was undisputed that the Retirement System did not notify McGough by certified mail of its decision. More than one year after the Retirement System's final decision denying McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits, the Retirement System sent McGough a certified letter. The parties submitted to the circuit court two different certified letters sent by the Retirement System to McGough, both dated December 3, 2013. One notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to approve McGough's application for ordinary-disability benefits; the other notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to deny McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The latter certified letter was delivered to McGough on December 5, 2013. In 2014, McGough filed a mandamus petition in an effort to challenge the Retirement System's decision denying his application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The circuit court denied the Retirement System’s motion to dismiss. The System thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to grant its motion. After review, the Supreme Court found that McGough’s mandamus petition was untimely, and as such, reversed the circuit court’s judgment. View "City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System v. McGough" on Justia Law
Ex parte Ingram
Teachers Becky Ingram and Nancy Wilkinson petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them in an action filed by a female student, L.L., by and through her mother, and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. At the time of the incident at issue, L.L. was an 11-year-old eighth-grade student, suffering from spina bifida, and paralyzed from the waist down. She is confined to a wheelchair; she does not have full use of her arms and hands; she requires a urinary catheter; and she wears a diaper. L.L. also has significant mental impairment. The other eighth-grade student involved in the incident was described as having mental retardation. In 2007 when the incident underlying this case occurred, Ingram was the eighth-grade science teacher and Wilkinson was a teacher's aide assigned to Ingram's class. M.M. had a history of aggressive behavior toward teachers and other students. The incident in question happened when the teachers assisted L.L. in going to the bathroom. In a moment after lunch when students returned to classes, a moment passed when M.M. was unaccounted for, and L.L. was in the bathroom by herself. L.L. was discovered partially undressed and exposed, because M.M. had “messed with her.” L.L., by and through her mother, originally filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, Sterling, and Ingram, alleging violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983; Title IX; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought several Alabama state-law claims. The federal district court entered a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on L.L.'s federal claims. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that by the written policy requiring that students be escorted back to their classrooms by teachers, Ingram reportedly did escort the students back to their classroom, and the Court found no basis for holding Wilkinson, who served merely as an aide to the classroom teacher, liable to the same degree as Ingram. Therefore the Court overturned the circuit court’s judgment with respect to Wilkinson, but declined to overturn the circuit court's decision to deny with respect to Ingram. View "Ex parte Ingram" on Justia Law
Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Assn.
In 2016, the Alabama High School Athletic Association ("the Association") and its executive director, Steven Savarese, filed petitions for a writ of mandamus challenging certain conflicting circuit court orders, issued by the Geneva and the Washington Circuit Courts. The Alabama Supreme Court issued an order granting the petitions and issuing the writs. In that order, the Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Association and declared the orders of the two circuit courts to be void. A.J.K. was a student at Washington County High School, and he played high-school football for the school during the 2016-2017 school year. During the high-school football playoffs, the Association determined that A.J.K. was ineligible to participate on the football team, and, because A.J.K. had participated for the school as an ineligible player, the Association removed the school from the playoffs. At the request of interested persons and entities, the Association's decision was reviewed by both the Geneva and Washington Circuit Courts. The Geneva Court issued an order directing that the Association's decision be enforced, but the Washington Circuit Court issued an order reversing the Association's decision and prohibiting the Association from removing Washington County High School from the playoffs. The Association and Savarese then filed petitions for writs of mandamus arguing that both the Circuit Courts improperly asserted jurisdiction, and asked the Supreme Court to void the orders. In this case, the requirements needed for the Circuit Courts to properly exercise jurisdiction were not present. The Supreme Court therefore granted mandamus relief, and the playoffs proceeded accordingly. View "Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Assn." on Justia Law
Hasting v. Roberts
Melvin Hasting appealed a trial court's order dismissing his claim seeking injunctive relief against Christopher Roberts, individually and in his official capacity as the director of the Office of Indigent Defense Services ("OIDS"). For the fiscal years 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015, the advisory board in Cullman County chose the contract counsel system as its method of providing indigent defense in that county and submitted recommendations to the director of OIDS of the attorneys it had determined should receive the contracts to provide indigent defense. Hasting was one of the attorneys recommended by the advisory board to receive a felony indigent-defense contract for a shortened term in 2013 and for the fiscal years 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. OIDS accepted the advisory board’s recommendations and awarded Hasting an indigent-defense contract in each of those fiscal years. The advisory board did not recommend Hasting as one of those attorneys who should receive an indigent-defense contract for fiscal year 2015-2016. On September 1, 2015, Hasting sued Roberts, individually and in his official capacity, seeking among other things, that Roberts, as the director of OIDS, was required to develop standards governing the provision of indigent-defense services in Cullman County and that Roberts had failed to develop those standards; that the advisory board was in violation of the law because, Hasting said, its membership was not composed as mandated by statute; that the advisory board operated without "guidelines and criteria" for how it chose contract counsel; and that the advisory board recommends giving indigent-defense contracts to attorneys who have obvious conflicts of interest, including members of the advisory board themselves. Because a new fiscal year began October 1, 2016, Hasting's claim seeking to enjoin Roberts from accepting and approving the advisory board's recommendations for the indigent-defense-service contracts for the fiscal year 2015-2016 was rendered moot, and there was no longer an actual controversy to be decided by the Supreme Court. As such, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed. View "Hasting v. Roberts" on Justia Law
Alabama Dept. of Conservation & Natural Resources v. Kellar
The Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("the Department") appealed a judgment declaring that section 9-11-88(b), Ala. Code 1975, was void because it is a local law and was not properly advertised as such. The Supreme Court found that the complaint against the Department was not properly before the trial court. The trial court thus lacked jurisdiction, so the judgment against the Department was void. View "Alabama Dept. of Conservation & Natural Resources v. Kellar" on Justia Law
Water Works Board of the City of Arab v. City of Arab
The Water Works Board of the City of Arab ("the Board") appealed a circuit court’s denial of the Board's motion to dismiss and the entry of a preliminary injunction requested by the City of Arab ("the City"). The Board had fluoridated the water it supplied to the City since 1972. In 2015, the Board, citing studies indicating negative health consequences resulting from fluoride, stopped fluoridating the water it supplies to the City. The City disagreed with the Board's decision. The City, citing studies indicating negative health consequences of not fluoridating the water, passed a resolution ordering the Board to keep fluoridating the water. The Board notified the City it did not intend to comply. The City sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Board from removing the fluoridation, and maintain the status quo. The injunction was ultimately granted, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that City did not have a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its case. View "Water Works Board of the City of Arab v. City of Arab" on Justia Law