Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Officer J.C. Clifton and Officer Jason Davis, law enforcement officers for the City of Homewood, and the City of Homewood petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the ground of immunity. In 2013, the officers were dispatched to the Babies "R" Us retail store in the Wildwood Shopping Center in response to a shoplifting incident involving Bristinia Fuller and Bria Mines. When the officers arrived, they learned that Fuller and Mines were leaving the parking lot of the store in a vehicle being driven by Fuller. Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, driving separate patrol cars, attempted to stop the vehicle. Instead of stopping, Fuller eluded the officers by speeding through the parking area and onto Lakeshore Drive. The officers pursued. Fuller continued speeding and ran through multiple red traffic lights before losing control of her vehicle. The vehicle struck a light pole and a stopped vehicleat the intersection. Fuller was killed and Mines was seriously injured. 2015, Mines sued Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, both in their official and individual capacities, Homewood, and others alleging she was injured as a result of the negligent, reckless, and/or wanton conduct of the officers and Homewood during the officers' pursuit of Fuller's vehicle. She also alleged that Homewood was vicariously liable for the officers' conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising the officers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the officers established they were entitled to immunity as to Mines' claims against them in both their official and individual capacities. Moreover, because the officers were entitled to immunity, Homewood was also entitled to immunity. The Court therefore granted their petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for Officer Clifton, Officer Davis, and Homewood. View "Ex parte City of Homewood" on Justia Law

Kevin McGough, then a firefighter employed by the City of Birmingham ("the city"), alleges that he sustained an injury to his left knee on April 30, 2011, during the course of his employment. For approximately one year after he injured his left knee, McGough received medical treatment from numerous doctors and continued to work as much as he was able. In 2012, McGough filed a claim with the Retirement System for extraordinary-disability benefits and ordinary-disability benefit to be paid out of the City Retirement and Relief System. The Retirement System denied McGough's request for extraordinary-disability benefits and granted McGough's request for ordinary-disability benefits. It was undisputed that the Retirement System did not notify McGough by certified mail of its decision. More than one year after the Retirement System's final decision denying McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits, the Retirement System sent McGough a certified letter. The parties submitted to the circuit court two different certified letters sent by the Retirement System to McGough, both dated December 3, 2013. One notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to approve McGough's application for ordinary-disability benefits; the other notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to deny McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The latter certified letter was delivered to McGough on December 5, 2013. In 2014, McGough filed a mandamus petition in an effort to challenge the Retirement System's decision denying his application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The circuit court denied the Retirement System’s motion to dismiss. The System thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to grant its motion. After review, the Supreme Court found that McGough’s mandamus petition was untimely, and as such, reversed the circuit court’s judgment. View "City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System v. McGough" on Justia Law

Teachers Becky Ingram and Nancy Wilkinson petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them in an action filed by a female student, L.L., by and through her mother, and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. At the time of the incident at issue, L.L. was an 11-year-old eighth-grade student, suffering from spina bifida, and paralyzed from the waist down. She is confined to a wheelchair; she does not have full use of her arms and hands; she requires a urinary catheter; and she wears a diaper. L.L. also has significant mental impairment. The other eighth-grade student involved in the incident was described as having mental retardation. In 2007 when the incident underlying this case occurred, Ingram was the eighth-grade science teacher and Wilkinson was a teacher's aide assigned to Ingram's class. M.M. had a history of aggressive behavior toward teachers and other students. The incident in question happened when the teachers assisted L.L. in going to the bathroom. In a moment after lunch when students returned to classes, a moment passed when M.M. was unaccounted for, and L.L. was in the bathroom by herself. L.L. was discovered partially undressed and exposed, because M.M. had “messed with her.” L.L., by and through her mother, originally filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, Sterling, and Ingram, alleging violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983; Title IX; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought several Alabama state-law claims. The federal district court entered a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on L.L.'s federal claims. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that by the written policy requiring that students be escorted back to their classrooms by teachers, Ingram reportedly did escort the students back to their classroom, and the Court found no basis for holding Wilkinson, who served merely as an aide to the classroom teacher, liable to the same degree as Ingram. Therefore the Court overturned the circuit court’s judgment with respect to Wilkinson, but declined to overturn the circuit court's decision to deny with respect to Ingram. View "Ex parte Ingram" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Alabama High School Athletic Association ("the Association") and its executive director, Steven Savarese, filed petitions for a writ of mandamus challenging certain conflicting circuit court orders, issued by the Geneva and the Washington Circuit Courts. The Alabama Supreme Court issued an order granting the petitions and issuing the writs. In that order, the Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Association and declared the orders of the two circuit courts to be void. A.J.K. was a student at Washington County High School, and he played high-school football for the school during the 2016-2017 school year. During the high-school football playoffs, the Association determined that A.J.K. was ineligible to participate on the football team, and, because A.J.K. had participated for the school as an ineligible player, the Association removed the school from the playoffs. At the request of interested persons and entities, the Association's decision was reviewed by both the Geneva and Washington Circuit Courts. The Geneva Court issued an order directing that the Association's decision be enforced, but the Washington Circuit Court issued an order reversing the Association's decision and prohibiting the Association from removing Washington County High School from the playoffs. The Association and Savarese then filed petitions for writs of mandamus arguing that both the Circuit Courts improperly asserted jurisdiction, and asked the Supreme Court to void the orders. In this case, the requirements needed for the Circuit Courts to properly exercise jurisdiction were not present. The Supreme Court therefore granted mandamus relief, and the playoffs proceeded accordingly. View "Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Assn." on Justia Law

Melvin Hasting appealed a trial court's order dismissing his claim seeking injunctive relief against Christopher Roberts, individually and in his official capacity as the director of the Office of Indigent Defense Services ("OIDS"). For the fiscal years 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015, the advisory board in Cullman County chose the contract counsel system as its method of providing indigent defense in that county and submitted recommendations to the director of OIDS of the attorneys it had determined should receive the contracts to provide indigent defense. Hasting was one of the attorneys recommended by the advisory board to receive a felony indigent-defense contract for a shortened term in 2013 and for the fiscal years 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. OIDS accepted the advisory board’s recommendations and awarded Hasting an indigent-defense contract in each of those fiscal years. The advisory board did not recommend Hasting as one of those attorneys who should receive an indigent-defense contract for fiscal year 2015-2016. On September 1, 2015, Hasting sued Roberts, individually and in his official capacity, seeking among other things, that Roberts, as the director of OIDS, was required to develop standards governing the provision of indigent-defense services in Cullman County and that Roberts had failed to develop those standards; that the advisory board was in violation of the law because, Hasting said, its membership was not composed as mandated by statute; that the advisory board operated without "guidelines and criteria" for how it chose contract counsel; and that the advisory board recommends giving indigent-defense contracts to attorneys who have obvious conflicts of interest, including members of the advisory board themselves. Because a new fiscal year began October 1, 2016, Hasting's claim seeking to enjoin Roberts from accepting and approving the advisory board's recommendations for the indigent-defense-service contracts for the fiscal year 2015-2016 was rendered moot, and there was no longer an actual controversy to be decided by the Supreme Court. As such, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed. View "Hasting v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("the Department") appealed a judgment declaring that section 9-11-88(b), Ala. Code 1975, was void because it is a local law and was not properly advertised as such. The Supreme Court found that the complaint against the Department was not properly before the trial court. The trial court thus lacked jurisdiction, so the judgment against the Department was void. View "Alabama Dept. of Conservation & Natural Resources v. Kellar" on Justia Law

The Water Works Board of the City of Arab ("the Board") appealed a circuit court’s denial of the Board's motion to dismiss and the entry of a preliminary injunction requested by the City of Arab ("the City"). The Board had fluoridated the water it supplied to the City since 1972. In 2015, the Board, citing studies indicating negative health consequences resulting from fluoride, stopped fluoridating the water it supplies to the City. The City disagreed with the Board's decision. The City, citing studies indicating negative health consequences of not fluoridating the water, passed a resolution ordering the Board to keep fluoridating the water. The Board notified the City it did not intend to comply. The City sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Board from removing the fluoridation, and maintain the status quo. The injunction was ultimately granted, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that City did not have a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its case. View "Water Works Board of the City of Arab v. City of Arab" on Justia Law

Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland ("MCGP"), appealed trial court orders denying its motions to compel arbitration in the actions filed against it by plaintiffs Marie Hoffman, Sandra R. Howard, and Dianne Slayton. In 2008, Hoffman hit a $110,000 jackpot on an electronic bingo machine at Victoryland. A technician cleared the machine and told her the jackpot had been caused by a malfunction in the machine. She kept playing, hit another $110,000 jackpot, only to be told again that the jackpot was due to machine error. Hoffman sued. Howard did not win any jackpots when she visited “Quincy’s 777.” She noted that MCGP employees escorted the Birmingham mayor to specific electronic-bingo machines, and that he hit several jackpots while patronizing “Quincy’s 777.” In Slayton’s suit, she alleged she won a $50,000 jackpot playing an electronic bingo machine, but shortly after MCGP employees inspected her identity documents (her Social Security Card and other identification), the machine was found to have malfunctioned. In each of these three cases, MCGP filed motions to compel binding arbitration and to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that each case involved a contract involving interstate commerce that included a written arbitration agreement. Because the "contracts" containing the arbitration provisions in these cases were based on gambling consideration, they were based solely on criminal conduct, and were therefore void. Consequently, the provisions of those "contracts," including the arbitration provisions, were void and unenforceable. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly denied the motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss these cases. View "Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

Kathy Torbert petitioned the Alabama Department of Public Health ("the Department") for a declaratory ruling with respect to a proposed garbage-transfer station to be built near Torbert's home. Among other relief requested, Torbert sought a declaratory ruling under Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-11(b), regarding the meaning of the administrative regulations defining the minimum required buffer zones around a solid-waste-transfer station. Pertinent here was the starting point for measuring the required buffer zones. The Department rejected Torbert's proposed interpretation of the buffer-zone regulations. Torbert appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the case to the Department for additional factual findings, including the preparation of a revised land survey. On remand, the survey was prepared and the Department made the necessary findings and reaffirmed its previous ruling. The circuit court subsequently affirmed the Department's decision. Torbert appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and found that the Department's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly, reversed and remanded. "The Department could have adopted regulations specifically defining the area of transfer activities as the tipping floor or regulations measuring the buffer zones from the tipping floor. It did neither but, instead, attempted to circumvent the regulations in this case by using an unreasonable definition of the phrase 'area of transfer activities.'" View "Ex parte Kathy Torbert" on Justia Law