Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a Victoryland ("MCGP"), appealed trial court orders denying its motions to compel arbitration in the actions filed against it by plaintiffs Marie Hoffman, Sandra R. Howard, and Dianne Slayton. In 2008, Hoffman hit a $110,000 jackpot on an electronic bingo machine at Victoryland. A technician cleared the machine and told her the jackpot had been caused by a malfunction in the machine. She kept playing, hit another $110,000 jackpot, only to be told again that the jackpot was due to machine error. Hoffman sued. Howard did not win any jackpots when she visited “Quincy’s 777.” She noted that MCGP employees escorted the Birmingham mayor to specific electronic-bingo machines, and that he hit several jackpots while patronizing “Quincy’s 777.” In Slayton’s suit, she alleged she won a $50,000 jackpot playing an electronic bingo machine, but shortly after MCGP employees inspected her identity documents (her Social Security Card and other identification), the machine was found to have malfunctioned. In each of these three cases, MCGP filed motions to compel binding arbitration and to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that each case involved a contract involving interstate commerce that included a written arbitration agreement. Because the "contracts" containing the arbitration provisions in these cases were based on gambling consideration, they were based solely on criminal conduct, and were therefore void. Consequently, the provisions of those "contracts," including the arbitration provisions, were void and unenforceable. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly denied the motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss these cases. View "Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

Kathy Torbert petitioned the Alabama Department of Public Health ("the Department") for a declaratory ruling with respect to a proposed garbage-transfer station to be built near Torbert's home. Among other relief requested, Torbert sought a declaratory ruling under Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-11(b), regarding the meaning of the administrative regulations defining the minimum required buffer zones around a solid-waste-transfer station. Pertinent here was the starting point for measuring the required buffer zones. The Department rejected Torbert's proposed interpretation of the buffer-zone regulations. Torbert appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the case to the Department for additional factual findings, including the preparation of a revised land survey. On remand, the survey was prepared and the Department made the necessary findings and reaffirmed its previous ruling. The circuit court subsequently affirmed the Department's decision. Torbert appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and found that the Department's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly, reversed and remanded. "The Department could have adopted regulations specifically defining the area of transfer activities as the tipping floor or regulations measuring the buffer zones from the tipping floor. It did neither but, instead, attempted to circumvent the regulations in this case by using an unreasonable definition of the phrase 'area of transfer activities.'" View "Ex parte Kathy Torbert" on Justia Law

Southern States Police Benevolent Association, Inc. ("SSPBA"), and three of its members, all of whom were employed as police officers by the City of Auburn (collectively, "plaintiffs"), sued Alabama Governor Robert Bentley and the other members of the Board of Control of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"); David Bronner, the chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") and the ERSA; and Thomas White, Jr., the State comptroller (referred to collectively as "the State defendants"), in their representative capacities. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a judgment declaring that participants in the pension plan the ERSA operated could make retirement contributions and receive increased retirement benefits based upon their "earnable compensation," which term, the police plaintiffs argued, rightly included payments received for overtime worked. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the State defendants, and the police plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, because "earnable compensation" as defined in code section 36-27-1(14), was compensation received for working "the full normal work-time." The Court agreed with the State defendants that, before the amendment of 36- 27-1(14) in 2012, earnable compensation did not properly include overtime payments, regardless of the past practice of the ERSA. "Moreover, although the 2012 amendment to 36-27-1(14) allows overtime payments to be included within earnable compensation to a limited extent . . . we find no support in the language of the statute for the police plaintiffs' argument that the legislature intended to differentiate between mandatory overtime and voluntary overtime and to make mandatory overtime part of a member's annual base compensation and thus not subject to the 120 percent limit." View "Southern States Police Benevolent Association, Inc., et al. v. Govenor Robert H. Bentley et al." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

John Boman appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Gadsden. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. Following his retirement, Boman elected to pay for retiree health coverage through a group plan offered by Gadsden to retired employees. This retired-employee-benefit plan was also administered by Blue Cross and provided substantially similar benefits to those Boman received as an active employee. In 2000, however, Gadsden elected to join an employee-health-insurance-benefit plan ("the plan") administered by the State Employees' Insurance Board ("the SEIB"). When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and severe osteoarthritis of the spine. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a "record of the Medicare payment." However, Boman had no Medicare credits. Boman was hired before March 31, 1986, and, although Gadsden did begin participation in the Medicare program in 2006, Boman's employee group had not opted to obtain Medicare coverage before Boman retired. Consequently, Boman never paid Medicare taxes and did not claim to have Medicare coverage. The SEIB ultimately determined that the plan was the secondary payer to Medicare. Boman sued Gadsden, asserting that it had broken an agreement, made upon his employment, to provide him with lifetime health benefits upon his retirement. Boman also sued the members of the SEIB charged with administering the plan, challenging the SEIB's interpretation of the plan. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment to Gadsden, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boman v. City of Gadsden" on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board") and Lester Turk, in his official capacity as a member of the Board (collectively, "defendants"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its March 21, 2016, order denying their motion to dismiss Eli Mack's complaint and to enter an order granting that motion. Mack, a resident of Wilcox County, filed a "complaint for declaratory judgment" against the Board and Turk in his official capacity as a member of the Board. An election contest was filed against Darryl Perryman after a general election, which resulted in his being removed from office because he was not a resident within the jurisdictional boundaries for Wilcox County. The State Board of Education requested that the Board (while Turk was serving as president) permit it to intervene in the election contest. The request failed because of a tied vote. After the failed vote, three members of the Board, without the approval of a majority of the members, asked the State Board to intervene in the election contest. Given those facts, Mack alleged that an "actual and substantial controversy exists as to whether [the] [d]efendants had the authority to intervene in the election contest ... or to invite the intervention of the State Board ... where there are no facts that would justify such intervention, and no valid vote granting such action was taken." Because the Board was immune from suit, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Board was entitled to dismissal from the case. In addition, Turk was also entitled to sovereign immunity (and thus dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) because Mack's claim for injunctive relief failed to invoke an "exception" to sovereign immunity. Because Mack lacked standing to bring a claim for the recovery of an expenditure of public funds, the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim as well. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the trial court to enter an order granting the Board and Turk's motion to dismiss. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Sabrina Jackson, as the administratrix of the estate of Tony Lewis, Jr., deceased, filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from defendants the City of Montgomery ("the City") and QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care ("Quality"). Lewis was being held in the Montgomery municipal jail when he died unexpectedly on the night of January 12, 2015, or the early morning hours of January 13, 2015. Petitioner believed jail authorities and health care personnel were negligent and deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Lewis, and thereby denied him treatment needed to save his life, if said treatment had been administered promptly. The petition also alleged that Lewis was given some medication by the health care personnel, which may have caused him to stop breathing, and that this act "may have amounted to negligent malpractice and/or deliberate indifference." The circuit court granted the preaction discovery petition, but the defendants applied for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted the petitions and issued the writs, finding that Jackson could not establish that she was unable to bring an action or that preaction discovery was necessary to preserve evidence in her case. View "Ex parte QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care." on Justia Law

Petitioners Town of Summerdale, the City of Robertsdale, and Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC ("BCSS") independently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of a Court of Civil Appeals' decision. In it, the appellate court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing to file actions against the East Central Baldwin County Water, Sewer and Fire Protection Authority ("ECBC") and the Baldwin County Commission ("the county commission") seeking a judgment declaring that two amendments to the articles of incorporation of ECBC approved by the county commission (one in 2002 and the other in 2008) were void. The Supreme Court granted review except for Summerdale's challenge to the 2008 amendment. The Court concluded that petitioners had standing, and accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Ex parte Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC." on Justia Law