Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board") and Lester Turk, in his official capacity as a member of the Board (collectively, "defendants"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its March 21, 2016, order denying their motion to dismiss Eli Mack's complaint and to enter an order granting that motion. Mack, a resident of Wilcox County, filed a "complaint for declaratory judgment" against the Board and Turk in his official capacity as a member of the Board. An election contest was filed against Darryl Perryman after a general election, which resulted in his being removed from office because he was not a resident within the jurisdictional boundaries for Wilcox County. The State Board of Education requested that the Board (while Turk was serving as president) permit it to intervene in the election contest. The request failed because of a tied vote. After the failed vote, three members of the Board, without the approval of a majority of the members, asked the State Board to intervene in the election contest. Given those facts, Mack alleged that an "actual and substantial controversy exists as to whether [the] [d]efendants had the authority to intervene in the election contest ... or to invite the intervention of the State Board ... where there are no facts that would justify such intervention, and no valid vote granting such action was taken." Because the Board was immune from suit, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Board was entitled to dismissal from the case. In addition, Turk was also entitled to sovereign immunity (and thus dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) because Mack's claim for injunctive relief failed to invoke an "exception" to sovereign immunity. Because Mack lacked standing to bring a claim for the recovery of an expenditure of public funds, the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim as well. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the trial court to enter an order granting the Board and Turk's motion to dismiss. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Sabrina Jackson, as the administratrix of the estate of Tony Lewis, Jr., deceased, filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from defendants the City of Montgomery ("the City") and QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care ("Quality"). Lewis was being held in the Montgomery municipal jail when he died unexpectedly on the night of January 12, 2015, or the early morning hours of January 13, 2015. Petitioner believed jail authorities and health care personnel were negligent and deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Lewis, and thereby denied him treatment needed to save his life, if said treatment had been administered promptly. The petition also alleged that Lewis was given some medication by the health care personnel, which may have caused him to stop breathing, and that this act "may have amounted to negligent malpractice and/or deliberate indifference." The circuit court granted the preaction discovery petition, but the defendants applied for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted the petitions and issued the writs, finding that Jackson could not establish that she was unable to bring an action or that preaction discovery was necessary to preserve evidence in her case. View "Ex parte QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care." on Justia Law

Petitioners Town of Summerdale, the City of Robertsdale, and Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC ("BCSS") independently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of a Court of Civil Appeals' decision. In it, the appellate court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing to file actions against the East Central Baldwin County Water, Sewer and Fire Protection Authority ("ECBC") and the Baldwin County Commission ("the county commission") seeking a judgment declaring that two amendments to the articles of incorporation of ECBC approved by the county commission (one in 2002 and the other in 2008) were void. The Supreme Court granted review except for Summerdale's challenge to the 2008 amendment. The Court concluded that petitioners had standing, and accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Ex parte Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC." on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

The Alabama State Health Planning and Development Agency ("SHPDA") granted HealthSouth of Alabama, LLC ("HealthSouth") a certificate of need ("CON") allowing HealthSouth to operate 17 inpatient physical-rehabilitation beds in Shelby County. In a separate proceeding, SHPDA granted another CON to HealthSouth allowing it to operate an additional 17 inpatient physical-rehabilitation beds in Shelby County. Shelby Ridge Acquisition Corporation d/b/a Shelby Ridge Rehabilitation Hospital ("Shelby Ridge") opposed HealthSouth's CON applications, and, after SHPDA issued the CONs to HealthSouth, Shelby Ridge appealed SHPDA's decision. The circuit court reversed one of SHPDA's decisions but affirmed the other. HealthSouth, SHPDA, and Shelby Ridge appealed separately to the Court of Civil Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and concluded that SHPDA had erred by granting the CONs to HealthSouth. HealthSouth and SHPDA separately petitioned the Supreme Court for review, which was granted. While the appeals were pending, the parties resolved their disputes; the parties agreed that HealthSouth should have been allowed to build the planned 34-bed physical-rehabilitation hospital in Shelby County. The parties also agreed that the Court of Civil Appeals wrongly decided the appeals before it insofar as HealthSouth's CON applications were concerned. The Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Civil Appeals erred. "It is sufficient to note that the pivotal error of that court's opinion is the characterization as 'key' and determinative two of the many considerations to be evaluated and balanced by SHPDA in considering CON applications." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and rendered judgment in favor of HealthSouth and SHPDA. The Supreme Court also remanded the cases to the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions that that court remand the cases to the circuit court so the parties could implement the resolution they reached. View "Ex parte Alabama State Health Planning and Development Agency." on Justia Law

Chad Bostick petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing a circuit court judgment that reversed the administrative order issued by the Alabama Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects ("the Board") suspending Bostick's license for one year and imposing a $250 fine against him. Bostick had been employed by GRC Design Group, Inc. (GRC), a landscaping business owned and operated by Greg Curl. A dispute between Bostick and GRC arose, and Bostick resigned from GRC in 2010. Bostick started his own landscaping firm. In February 2010, Curl filed a written complaint with the Board alleging that Bostick had, while employed with GRC, "misrepresented himself to clients as part owner in [GRC] and as a result had clients write checks payable to him which he cashed for his own personal use." Curl claimed that Bostick "admitted to stealing these design fees and eventually to several more acts of fraud." Bostick denied these accusations. Bostick argued on appeal of the circuit court's adoption of the Board's findings, among other things, that the Board's decision was not supported by evidence presented and that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction and authority in suspending his license to practice landscape architecture and in imposing a fine. After review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ex parte Chad Bostick." on Justia Law

In case no. 1130359, Mobile County, the Mobile County Commission ("the Commission"), and the individual members of the Commission (collectively, "the County"), appealed a circuit court's judgment ordering the County to provide certain funding to the District Attorney's Office for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. In case no. 1130404, Ashley Rich, who was the district attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, cross-appealed. Rich alleged that, under Act No. 82-675, Ala. Acts 1982 ("the 82 Act"), as amended by Act No. 88-423, Ala. Acts 1988 ("the 88 Act"), the County was obligated to provide certain funding to the District Attorney's Office for the 2011-2012 fiscal year and it had failed to do so. Rich contended that the 82 Act required the County to provide funds sufficient to compensate eight "legal stenographers" and to purchase certain equipment and supplies for the investigative unit of the District Attorney's Office. Although the County had appropriated money for the District Attorney's Office for the 2011- 2012 fiscal year, Rich contended that significantly more funds were due to be appropriated under the Acts. The complaint was later amended to add similar claims for later fiscal years. The County contended, among other things, that it had complied with the funding requirements of the Acts. All the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit recused themselves from the action. A Judge from the Monroe District Court was appointed to preside over the action. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the trial court's judgment holding that the 82 Act did not require the County to provide funding for the salaries of certain individuals working in the investigation unit of the District Attorney's Office. The portion of the judgment holding that raises subsequently effected by the County and the State did not impact the salary-funding amounts found in the local acts was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rich v. Mobile County" on Justia Law

Cathy Trimble and Ida Longmire petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Crystal Lewis, individually and by and through her mother and next friend, Mary Lewis. In October 2012, Crystal was a 12th-grade student at Francis Marion High School. The school system was covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which generally required a school district to provide reasonable accommodations to assist any child deemed to have a "disability" as that term is defined by the Act. Crystal had a medical condition that required the Perry County public school system to provide her with certain special accommodations. Longmire was an English teacher at Francis Marion High School and also served as committee-member secretary for the school's Section 504 special-accommodations meetings. Longmire prepared an updated report of the special accommodations required by Section 504 intended to inform particular teachers of the 504 accommodations for specific students. Longmire placed a copy of the report in sealed envelopes, which were to be hand delivered to the teachers. Longmire asked Trimble, acting principal of the school, about distributing the envelopes. Trimble assigned a student office aide the task of delivering the envelopes to the teachers. Rather than delivering the envelopes as instructed, the student office aide opened one of the sealed envelopes and read about Crystal's medical condition. She shared that information about Crystal's medical condition with other students. Crystal commenced this action against Longmire, Trimble, the student office aide, the Perry County Board of Education, "Francis Marion High School," and other school administrators. In her complaint, Crystal alleged that she has faced ridicule, harassment, and bullying as a result of the dissemination of her confidential medical information. She asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, nuisance, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy against each defendant and claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against all the defendants except the student office aide and Longmire. Longmire and Trimble moved for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them by Crystal. The Supreme Court determined that Longmire and Trimble were entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Longmire and Trimble and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Trimble & Longmire" on Justia Law

Richard and Betty B. Chesnut petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion affirming the Madison Circuit Court's summary judgments in favor of the City of Huntsville, the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Huntsville, Denton-Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building and Remodeling, LLC. In 1983, the Chesnuts purchased a house and the adjacent lot to the east of their house, which was in a Huntsville neighborhood that had been established in 1908. The neighborhood was zoned as a 'Resident 1-B' district. In October 2012, Denton-Niemitz purchased the house on the west side of the Chesnuts' house. Subsequently, Denton-Niemitz obtained a permit to raze the house it purchased. Denton-Niemitz hired Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC to demolish the Denton-Niemitz house. The city issued the permits and construction began on the new house. Richard Chesnut was concerned the new house did not comply with the applicable set-back line requirement, and requested the zoning code be enforced. When no action was taken, the Chesnuts filed suit. The Chesnuts argued that the Circuit Court erred in entering a summary judgment in the civil action because, they said, Jim McGuffey (the zoning-enforcement coordinator for the City) incorrectly interpreted Articles 12.2.4 and 73.7.4 of the City's zoning code; that, when McGuffey issued the permits, he used an "extralegal dictionary definition" of "developed" and "undeveloped"; that McGuffey ignored a mandate of the Huntsville City Council that he did not have the power to permit construction that did not conform with the zoning code; and that McGuffey and the City ignored well established rules of statutory construction and ignored their statutory mandate to administer ordinances according to their literal terms. After review, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals because the zoning enforcement coordinator's interpretation of the zoning ordinance was unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed in part the appellate court's judgment because the summary judgment and the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of that judgment was appropriate, not because the Chesnuts' appeal was untimely but because the Chesnuts' administrative appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Richard and Betty Chesnut." on Justia Law