Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the Alabama Legislature and the citizens of Greene County voted to allow nonprofit organizations in that county to operate bingo games for fundraising purposes. Greenetrack, Inc. ("Greenetrack"), which was not a nonprofit organization, almost immediately began offering live and electronic bingo games at its gambling facility. From 2004 to 2008, Greenetrack reaped vast profits under the guise that its whole casino-style bingo operation was constantly being leased and operated by a revolving slate of local nonprofit organizations, whose nominal role earned them a tiny fraction of the bingo proceeds. Eventually, the Alabama Department of Revenue ("the Department") audited Greenetrack, found that its bingo activities were illegal, and concluded that it owed over $76 million in unpaid taxes and interest. Following a decade of litigation, the Alabama Tax Tribunal voided the assessed taxes on the threshold ground that Greenetrack's bingo business (regardless of its legality) was tax-immune under a statute governing Greenetrack's status as a licensed operator of dog races. The Department appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the statutory analysis offered by the Tax Tribunal and circuit court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the Department. View "Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc." on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board") and individual Board members were defendants in a lawsuit filed by Jane Doe. Defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court to grant their motion for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to immunity. On November 11, 2010, Doe, at that time, was a 12th-grade student at Wilcox County Central High School, was sexually assaulted by the principal of the school, James Thomas. According to Doe, Thomas made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to her while she was serving as an aide in the school office and later called her into his private office, closed the door, and began kissing her and touching her. Doe reported the incident, and, as a result, Thomas was arrested the following day by the Wilcox County Sheriff's Department. After his arrest, Thomas was suspended from his duties as school principal and placed on administrative leave. He was ultimately convicted of having sexual contact with a student under the age of 19 years. In 2012, Doe initiated an action against Thomas, the Board, the individual members of the Board, and other individuals identified as former Wilcox County school-system superintendents. Doe asserted negligence and wantonness claims against the Board and the Board members, contending that those defendants had had knowledge of previous instances of similar misconduct by Thomas that they had allegedly failed to properly investigate or report. Doe also asserted claims of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and/or retention of Thomas against the Board and the Board members. The Supreme Court concluded the Board and the Board members, insofar as the Board members were sued in their official capacities, are entitled to immunity from the claims asserted against them but that the Board members were not entitled to State-agent immunity from the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Lisa Mestas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying her motion for a summary judgment in this wrongful-death/medical-negligence action brought by David Lee Autrey, as the personal representative of the estate of his wife, Bridgette Ann Moore, and to enter a summary judgment in Mestas's favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. In May 2017, Autrey's wife, Moore, went to the University of South Alabama Medical Center to undergo a surgery required by the prior amputation of her right leg. The surgery was performed without incident, and Moore was transferred to a hospital room for recovery. At approximately 9:30 p.m. that night, nurses found Moore unresponsive. Attempts to revive her were unsuccessful, and Moore was pronounced deceased. It was later determined that Moore died as a result of opioid-induced respiratory depression ("OIRD"). Mestas argued that, at all times relevant to Autrey's lawsuit, she was an employee of the University of South Alabama ("USA") and served as the Chief Nursing Officer ("CNO") for USA Health System, which included USA Medical Center, various clinics, and a children's hospital. According to Mestas, as the CNO, her primary responsibilities were administrative in nature and she had not provided any direct patient care since 2010. Mestas argued that because Autrey's claims against her arose from the line and scope of her employment with a State agency,2 and because she did not treat Moore, she was entitled to, among other things, State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court concluded Mestas demonstrated she was entitled to state-agent immunity, and that she had a clear right to the relief sought. The Court therefore granted her petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to grant her summary judgment. View "Ex parte Lisa Mestas." on Justia Law

The City of Trussville ("the City") appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County ("the Board") in the City's action seeking a judgment declaring that it had the authority to create and operate its own civil-service system. In 2018, the City requested that the Alabama attorney general issue an opinion regarding whether, once it had annexed land in St. Clair County, it was subject to being governed by the Board or could form its own civil- service system. The attorney general concluded that the City was not subject to the Board's civil-service system and, therefore, had the authority to establish its own civil-service system. However, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the attorney general did not consider what effect the settlement agreement, and the consent judgment ratifying that settlement agreement, entered in a 1991 action had on the question presented by the City for consideration. On April 23, 2019, the City passed Ordinance No. 2019-020-ADM, creating a civil-service system for City employees. The Board took the position that the City lacks the authority to form its own civil-service system and that the City is bound to continue under the jurisdiction of the Board. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the legal grounds the City presented to support its appeal. The Court found the same cause of action was presented in both the 1991 action and here, and that the theory upon which the City sought to litigate the present action could have been litigated in the 1991 action, but was not. Accordingly, the City's present action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "City of Trussville v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County" on Justia Law

In response to economic conditions related to the spread of COVID-19, Congress established several programs that made additional federal funds available to the states for providing enhanced unemployment-compensation benefits to eligible individuals. Alabama elected to participate in the programs, and Shentel Hawkins, Ashlee Lindsey, Jimmie George, and Christina Fox, were among the Alabamians who received the enhanced benefits. As the spread of COVID-19 waned, Governor Kay Ivey announced that Alabama would be ending its participation in the programs. When Alabama did so, the claimants received reduced unemployment-compensation benefits or, depending on their particular circumstances, no benefits at all. Two months later, the claimants sued Governor Ivey and Secretary of the Alabama Department of Labor Fitzgerald Washington in their official capacities, alleging that Alabama law did not permit them to opt Alabama out of the programs. After a circuit court dismissed the claimants' lawsuit based on the doctrine of State immunity, the claimants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Hawkins, et al. v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law

Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc., Cahaba River Society, David Butler, and Bradford McLane ("the conservation parties") appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") and the State of Alabama, on the relation of Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall. At the heart of this case was a settlement agreement executed by the Board and a former attorney general executed in 2001. In 1998, the City of Birmingham ("the City") and its then-mayor began exploring ways to increase funding for its school system, and ultimately sold the assets of the system, including land, reservoirs, and filtration systems, to a private investor to retire debts and to establish an education trust fund. In 2000, the City's newly elected mayor sought to establish a new arrangement in which the Board would operate as a City department. Members of the city council opposed that plan, wishing to keep the Board independent and have it buy back the system assets. In July 2000, the city council approved an ordinance to transfer the assets back to the Board. The mayor later filed suit against the Board and city council in an attempt to prevent the Board from repurchasing the assets. The State Attorney General intervened and counterclaimed against the mayor and city council, all of which ended in the settlement agreement. In their complaint here, the conservation parties alleged that, in 2016, a parcel of land "subject to the settlement agreement was sold for a gas station after unanimous approval by the Board." In 2021, the conservation parties contended the Conservation Easement Agreement ("the CEA") did not establish a valid conservation easement that fulfilled the requirements dictated in paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court found that based on paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement, the conservation parties had a third-party right to seek enforcement of the terms of paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement. The Court also concluded the conservation parties stated a viable justiciable controversy with respect to whether the Board fulfilled its obligation in paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement "to place a conservation easement on the System's real estate described in paragraph 7 of the Acquisition Agreement ...." Therefore, the circuit court's judgment dismissing the conservation parties' claims against the Board is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. View "Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. v. Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appellate proceedings arose from a quo warranto action filed by the State of Alabama, on the relation of Charles Driggars, challenging Governor Kay Ivey's appointment of James Naftel II to the office of Judge of Probate of Jefferson County, place no. 1. In case no. 1200755, Judge Naftel, individually and in his official capacity, and Governor Ivey appealed a circuit court order denying their motion for a summary judgment. After review, a majority of the Alabama Supreme Court reversed that order and the case remanded for the circuit court to enter summary judgment in Judge Naftel and the Governor's favor. The Court's resolution of the appeal in favor of Judge Naftel and Governor Ivey made the relief sought in their petition for a writ of mandamus moot; the petition was therefore dismissed. View "Naftel v. Alabama ex rel. Driggars" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Alabama Supreme Court on whether state law permitted WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. ("WM Mobile"), a judgment creditor, to execute on certain real property owned by the City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority ("the Authority"), a public solid-waste-disposal authority established pursuant to the Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authorities Act ("the Act"). WM Mobile sued the Authority, alleging that the Authority breached various provisions of a contract between WM Mobile and the Authority for the operation of a landfill (the 'Landfill') owned by the Authority. After a jury trial, WM Mobile obtained a judgment against the Authority totaling $6,034,045.50. To partially satisfy its judgment, WM Mobile asought a writ of execution against a 104-acre parcel of land (the 'West Tract') owned by the Authority that sat adjacent to the Landfill. The Authority purchased the West Tract in 1994 for the future potential expansion of the Chastang Landfill. At the time of the lawsuit, the expansion had not been needed. The Authority moved to quash WM Mobile's request for a writ of execution, asserting, among other things, that Alabama law prohibited execution on the West Tract because that land was owned by the Authority for public use. The district court agreed with the Authority and granted its motion to quash. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) property owned by a solid waste disposal authority did not belong to a county or municipality pursuant to section 6-10-10 Ala. Code 1975; (2) a creditor of such a corporation [like the Authority] cannot subject to attachment, execution or other legal process such of its property as it needs in the performance of its corporate functions and in carrying out of its franchise obligations towards the public; and (3) with regard to what standards were to be used in applying the common-law exemption to attaching a public corporation's property, the Supreme Court noted that the key inquiry was whether the property at issue was owned or used for public purposes. In its responses, the Supreme Court answered the federal district court's first, fourth and fifth questions; the second and third questions were declined. View "WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority" on Justia Law

David Bronner, secretary-treasurer of the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), and individual members of the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), the remaining defendants in this action (collectively, "defendants"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs and members of a purported class, who were all active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants married to other active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants and who had dependent children. Before October 1, 2010, all public-education employees participating in PEEHIP earned a monthly "allocation" or benefit, which could be used to obtain certain coverage alternatives under PEEHIP. In May 2010, the PEEHIP Board voted to eliminate "the combining allocation program" and to phase in a new premium rate structure ("the 2010 policy"), which required a public-education employee married to another public-education employee to gradually begin paying the same monthly premiums for family hospital-medical coverage that other PEEHIP participants were required to pay. In May 2014, the original named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, filed a purported class action against the defendants, among others, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In their complaint, the original named plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the 2010 policy was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, they claimed, the 2010 policy denied them and the members of the purported class a benefit for the payment of insurance accorded every other PEEHIP participant. The original named plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendants from denying them and the members of the purported class the use of that benefit, which, they claimed, would permit them and the members of the purported class to obtain family coverage at no cost. The defendants thereafter moved for a summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing to indicate that the defendants intended to single out the public-education plaintiffs for disparate treatment under the 2010 policy. Accordingly, the Court concluded the 2010 policy was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and that it did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Bronner, et al. v. Barlow et al." on Justia Law

Tom Young, Jr., a former circuit judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit; Ray Martin, a circuit judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit; Chris May, the Randolph Circuit Clerk; and Marlene Lindley, a former employee in May's office, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss a complaint filed by Danny Foster, an inmate at the Ventress Correctional Facility, on grounds that they were immune from suit, that Foster lacked standing to sue, and that Foster's claims were precluded by the applicable statute of limitations. The Alabama Supreme Court found May and Lindley make no argument that, based on the face of Foster's complaint, they had a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations barred Foster's claim against them. Moreover, Foster's complaint was devoid of any information from which the Supreme Court could determine that his claim against May and Lindley was untimely. He did not provide the dates on which he submitted his records requests. May and Lindley, therefore, "have not demonstrated that this case falls within the exception recognized in Hodge to the general rule against review by mandamus of the applicability of a statute-of-limitations defense." The Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition insofar as it sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Judge Young and Judge Martin on grounds that all the claims asserted against them by Foster were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court denied the petition, however, insofar as it sought a writ of mandamus instructing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of May and Lindley regarding Foster's claim against them under the Open Records Act. View "Ex parte Young, Jr.; Martin; Lindley; and May." on Justia Law