Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on family-owned farm land when he wrecked the ATV and was injured. At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Respondent’s blood alcohol content was 0.17 percent. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked Respondent’s privilege to drive for forty-five days. Respondent appealed, arguing that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The Office of Administrative Hearings upheld the Commissioner’s revocation order. The circuit court reversed, concluding that because Respondent’s actions occurred solely upon private land, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Respondent’s driving privileges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person may lose his or her driver’s license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of the state while under the influence of alcohol, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. View "Reed v. Beckett" on Justia Law

University Park at Evansdale, LLC (UPE) was the lessor of certain property owned by the West Virginia University Board of Governors commonly known as “University Park.” The Monongalia County Assessor assessed UPE’s leasehold interest in University Park at just over $9 million for the tax year 2015. UPE challenged the assessment, arguing that its leasehold interest was $0 because the leasehold was neither freely assignable nor a bargain lease. The Board of Equalization and Review (BER) affirmed, determining that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability, rather than valuation, reviewable only by the Tax Commissioner. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that UPE advanced a challenge that the BER had no jurisdiction to review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability. Remanded. View "University Park at Evansdale, LLC v. Musick" on Justia Law

The State Tax Commissioner and the Berkeley County Assessor denied an ad valorem property tax exemption to University Healthcare Foundation, Inc. for its property known as the Dorothy McCormack Cancer Treatment & Rehabilitation Center. The circuit court overruled the denial, concluding that the healthcare and recreational services provided in the Center were primarily and immediately related to the joint charitable purposes of the Center and the Berkeley Medical Center. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Center was being used exclusively for charitable purposes. View "Matkovich v. Univ. Healthcare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Stephen Swain filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits for his occupational hearing loss. An administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges identified Pioneer Pipe, Inc. and two other employers as being potentially chargeable for Swain’s claim. The ALJ then ruled that Pioneer Pipe was the sole chargeable employer responsible for paying Swain’s hearing loss claim under W.Va. Code 23-4-6b(g). The Workers Compensation Board of Review affirmed. Pioneer Pipe appealed, contending, inter alia, that the language of W. Va. Code 23-4-6b(g) requires the Insurance Commissioner to allocate and divide the charges for a hearing loss claim if the claimant was injured while employed by multiple employers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by using the term “may” in the statute, the Legislature afforded the Insurance Commissioner discretion in deciding whether to allocate and divide charges for a hearing loss claim between various employers or to charge only one employer; and (2) the statute does not require sixty days of exposure to hazardous noise before the Insurance Commissioner may hold an employer solely responsible for a hearing loss claim. View "Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of D.M. D.M. was removed from Mother and Father and placed in the custody of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (the DHHR). After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court entered a final order finding D.M. to be an abused and neglected child and terminating the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The court denied Mother’s and Father’s motions for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and ordered that custody of D.M. will remain with the DHHR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in determining that D.M. was an abused and neglected child and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future; and (2) properly determined that neither Mother nor Father established a likelihood of full participation in a post-adjudicatory improvement period. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

In 2004, Edward Birch received a workplace injury. In 2011, a claims administrator granted Birch and eight percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) granted an additional five percent PPD award for a total of thirteen percent PPD. The West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was the correct methodology for apportioning the level of impairment in workers’ compensation cases involving preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BOR and reinstated the claims administrator’s order granting Birch an eight percent PPD award, holding that the BOR’s affirmation of the OOJ’s decision was clearly the result of an erroneous conclusion of law. View "SWVA, Inc. v. Birch" on Justia Law

Hardy County emergency ambulance services were provided by a mix of paid and volunteer crews. In 2011, there were three crews, one of which sought funding from the County Commission to remain solvent. Although the Commission provided $300,000, the squad closed suddenly in 2012. Its members provided emergency ambulance services on a volunteer basis for several months. Meanwhile, the Commission voted to hire a county medic and to create an Emergency Ambulance Authority. The Commission ultimately purchased a building and imposed an Ambulance Fee. Both actions were challenged by residents. The court found both the building purchase and the Ambulance Fee invalid for violation of the Open Governmental Proceedings Act, W. Va. Code 6-9A-1., and, alternatively, because the Commission failed to provide proper notice of special meetings under W. Va. Code 7-1-2. The court prohibited the Commission from voting, in a properly noticed open meeting, to validate its purchase of the building and from instituting an Ambulance Fee “until ambulance service is not otherwise available to all residents,” directed the Commission to pay $112,000 for attorney fees, and rendered judgment against individual commissioners, for the building purchase price, $1,130,000. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed. Acting under the Emergency Ambulance Service Act, W. Va. Code 7-15-18, the Commission was not required to comply with the Open Governmental Proceedings Act or W. Va. Code 7-1­ 2. View "Teets v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Judicial Investigation Commission (JIC) requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus against the Putnam County Board of Ballot Commissioners (Board) to remove Troy Sexton from the May 2016 ballot as a candidate for the office of magistrate in Putnam County. The JIC based is request upon its determination that Sexton had been convicted of a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude". The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus and directed the Board to remove Sexton as a magisterial candidate from the election ballot, holding that Sexton’s misdemeanor conviction of reporting a false emergency constituted a conviction of a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” such that he was not qualified to serve as a magistrate pursuant to the requirements for that office set forth in W. Va. Code 50-1-4. View "State ex rel. Judicial Investigation Comm’n v. Board of Ballot Comm’rs" on Justia Law

William Gill, a firefighter with the City of Charleston, had injured his back before being hired by the City. During his employment, he again injured his back. This injury was ruled compensable and diagnosed as lumbar and thoracic sprain. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (the OOJ) later added four new diagnoses to Gill’s initial compensable claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that the additional four diagnoses were noncompensable preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no evidence supported the OOJ’s determination that Gill’s compensable injury aggravated his preexisting injuries; and (2) a noncompensable preexisting injury may not be added as a compensable component of a claim for workers’ compensation medical benefits merely because it may have been aggravated by a compensable injury. View "Gill v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a police officer with the Department of Natural Resources, lost his right eye as a result of a workplace injury. Petitioner was awarded thirty-three percent permanent partial disability for the “total and irrevocable loss of sight in one eye” under W. Va. Code 23-5-6(f) but was awarded nothing for the permanent impairment caused by his continuing problems with infections and related conditions in his eye socket or for the permanent disfigurement caused by his eye injury. The Office of Judges affirmed the Claims Administrator’s award of no additional permanent partial disability above and beyond the statutory thirty-three percent disability award. The West Virginia Worker Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred as a matter of law in its application of section 23-5-6(f). Remanded for further development of medical evidence related to what, if any, additional award Petitioner should receive for permanent disability caused by the physical removal of his right eye beyond the loss of vision in that eye. View "Goff v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law