Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Judicial Investigation Commission (JIC) requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus against the Putnam County Board of Ballot Commissioners (Board) to remove Troy Sexton from the May 2016 ballot as a candidate for the office of magistrate in Putnam County. The JIC based is request upon its determination that Sexton had been convicted of a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude". The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus and directed the Board to remove Sexton as a magisterial candidate from the election ballot, holding that Sexton’s misdemeanor conviction of reporting a false emergency constituted a conviction of a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” such that he was not qualified to serve as a magistrate pursuant to the requirements for that office set forth in W. Va. Code 50-1-4. View "State ex rel. Judicial Investigation Comm’n v. Board of Ballot Comm’rs" on Justia Law

William Gill, a firefighter with the City of Charleston, had injured his back before being hired by the City. During his employment, he again injured his back. This injury was ruled compensable and diagnosed as lumbar and thoracic sprain. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (the OOJ) later added four new diagnoses to Gill’s initial compensable claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that the additional four diagnoses were noncompensable preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no evidence supported the OOJ’s determination that Gill’s compensable injury aggravated his preexisting injuries; and (2) a noncompensable preexisting injury may not be added as a compensable component of a claim for workers’ compensation medical benefits merely because it may have been aggravated by a compensable injury. View "Gill v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a police officer with the Department of Natural Resources, lost his right eye as a result of a workplace injury. Petitioner was awarded thirty-three percent permanent partial disability for the “total and irrevocable loss of sight in one eye” under W. Va. Code 23-5-6(f) but was awarded nothing for the permanent impairment caused by his continuing problems with infections and related conditions in his eye socket or for the permanent disfigurement caused by his eye injury. The Office of Judges affirmed the Claims Administrator’s award of no additional permanent partial disability above and beyond the statutory thirty-three percent disability award. The West Virginia Worker Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred as a matter of law in its application of section 23-5-6(f). Remanded for further development of medical evidence related to what, if any, additional award Petitioner should receive for permanent disability caused by the physical removal of his right eye beyond the loss of vision in that eye. View "Goff v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission suspended the occupational permits of each of seven jockeys for thirty days and imposed a $1,000 fine on each of the jockeys for certain rules governing horse racing. The circuit court reversed and vacated the Commission’s order, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission’s factual findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fact that the circuit court’s review of the evidence resulted in the circuit court reaching an alternative conclusion based on substantial evidence was not a valid reason to reverse the Commission’s findings; and (2) the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. View "W. Va. Racing Comm’n v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company submitted to the Virginia Insurance Commissioner a rate, form, and product filing seeking approval for a new product endorsement entitled Rate Protection Endorsement (RPE). The Commissioner approved the Erie filing, as amended. Respondent, an Erie insured, filed an administrative complaint against Erie seeking a determination as to whether the Commissioner’s approval of Erie’s RPE should be withdrawn. The Commissioner denied Respondent relief. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Commissioner was statutorily required to withdraw approval of Erie’s RPE. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court engaged in an improper re-examination of Erie’s rate and form policy filing for its RPE that was approved by the Commissioner, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the Commissioner. View "Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. King" on Justia Law

After DUI and hit and run charges were filed against Robert Conniff, the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) notified Conniff that his driver’s license was being revoked for DUI. After a fifth and final hearing, the DMV revoked Conniff’s driving privileges. The circuit court reversed the final order of the DMV and reinstated Conniff’s driver’s license, concluding that the DMV had no authority to continue the initial revocation hearing in view of the fact that the DMV erred in securing the attendance of the investigating officer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that the continuance of the original hearing was lacking in good cause and therefore violated Conniff’s due process rights; but (2) the cumulative effect of multiple continuances and overall delay in this matter warranted an award of attorney fees and costs. View "Reed v. Conniff" on Justia Law

Morgan County Emergency Medical Services Board, Inc. is authorized by the County Commission of Morgan County to collect delinquent ambulance service fees. The Board brought an action against Petitioner, the owner of a mobile home park, alleging that Petitioner owned delinquent special emergency ambulance service fees on rental units in Petitioner’s mobile home park. The circuit court granted the Board all of the relief it requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that (1) the Board may bring an action to collect delinquent special emergency ambulance service fees; (2) an owner and a renter may be jointly and severally liable for paying the emergency ambulance service fee; and (3) the county ordinance does not violate W. Va. Code 7-15-17 by assessing Petitioner ambulance service fees for units that were vacant on the date of assessment. View "Waugh v. Morgan County Emergency Med. Servs. Bd., Inc." on Justia Law