Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Aster Zeru Gebrekidan filed an application for discretionary appeal to challenge her conviction and fine for violating a City of Clarkston ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing on their premises any form of electronic or mechanical game machine or coin-operated device that may be used for entertainment or amusement purposes. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gebrekidan’s application to decide whether the State’s detailed statutory scheme regulating coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) and COAM businesses in Georgia, preempted the City’s ordinance under the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State’s COAM Laws preempted the City’s ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. The Court therefore reversed Gebrekidan’s conviction and fine. View "Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law

In 2014, appellant Iziah Smith applied to appellee Harry James, III, Judge of the Probate Court of Richmond County, for a renewal Georgia weapons carry license; he requested the issuance of a temporary renewal license as well. At that time, Smith had fewer than 90 days remaining before his carry license expired. Although Smith initially was refused a temporary renewal license, he was issued a weapons carry license within 30 days of the filing of his application for a license, and before his previously issued license expired. Several weeks later, Smith and appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. (“GCO”) brought this mandamus action against James in the Superior Court of Richmond County, alleging James was wrongly refusing to issue temporary renewal licenses. James answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint. Appellants then filed a motion for recusal, asserting that a Richmond County Superior Court Judge should not be presiding over a case in which the Richmond County Probate Court Judge was named as the defendant. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. Recognizing that, at some point, James had begun issuing temporary renewal licenses to other applicants, appellants acknowledged they were no longer entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. They asserted, nevertheless, that they were entitled to costs and attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” in the lawsuit. The trial court granted James’ summary judgment motion and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court found that It follows that GCO lacked standing to recover costs and attorney fees pursuant to Georgia law. Because Smith’s claim was moot and GCO lacked standing, it was incumbent upon the trial court to enter an order dismissing appellants’ claims. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the trial court with direction that it vacate the grant of summary judgment to James and enter an order of dismissal. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Georgiacarry.org v. James" on Justia Law

The Department of Driver Services issued a driver’s license to Gambian national Abdou Barrow. In April 2010, the Department canceled that license, finding that Barrow was not lawfully present in the United States and was not, therefore, eligible to have a driver’s license. More than three-and-a-half years later, Barrow applied for a new license, claiming that his immigration status had changed since the cancellation of his earlier license. The Department denied his application. Barrow then filed a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County, seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for a new license. The trial court dismissed his petition as untimely, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department canceled, but did not revoke, Barrow's license. Barrow was entitled by the plain terms of the applicable statute to make an application for a new license at any time after the cancellation. He did so, and the Department denied his application. He petitioned for judicial review of that denial, and he filed his petition within thirty days of the denial. His petition was timely, and the trial court and Court of Appeals erred when they concluded otherwise. View "Barrow v. Mikell" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of college students, including Miguel Olvera, who were not United States citizens and who were grant beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) filed a declaratory judgment action against the University System of Georgia’s Board of Regents and its members in their official capacities seeking a declaration that they were entitled to in-state tuition at schools in the University System of Georgia. The trial court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity barred the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olvera v. University System of Georgia's Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review came from a class action challenging a 2011 City of Atlanta ordinance and the subsequent amendment by the City of its three defined benefit pension plans. The Ordinance and Amendment increased the percentage of salary required as the annual contributions of the members of the Plans. The action filed against the City, the Mayor, and members of the Atlanta City Council (collectively “Defendants”), was on behalf of City employees who participated in the Plans prior to November 1, 2011, and had not retired prior to that date, which was the start date for the increase, and were otherwise subject to the Amendment. The complaint alleged that Defendants breached Plaintiffs’ employment contracts and violated the impairment clause of the State Constitution when Defendants passed the portions of the Ordinance which increased the amounts that the Plaintiffs were required to contribute to the Plans, even though Plaintiffs would receive the same amount of retirement benefits to which they were already entitled prior to passage of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the subject portions of the Ordinance violated the Impairment Clause and that Plaintiffs were not required to continue to make the increased contributions to the Plans, and an order enjoining and restraining Defendants from collecting or attempting to collect the increased contributions. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract and their consequent requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Borders v. Atlanta" on Justia Law

This case returned to the Georgia Supreme Court for a second time. The central issue to this case involved a long-running boundary line dispute between Monroe County and Bibb County. In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand, the trial court entered an order directing Secretary of State Brian Kemp to consider certain evidence and to preclude him from the consideration of other evidence in determining the true boundary line between the counties. Both the Secretary and Bibb County appealed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded, after review, that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's mandate, and accordingly, reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Kemp v. Monroe Cty." on Justia Law