Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Indiana
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The Hoagland Family Limited Partnership and its partners have been involved in a legal dispute with the Town of Clear Lake regarding a sewage hookup since 2010. This ongoing litigation is under case number 76C01-1006-PL-425 in the Steuben Circuit Court. In 2023, Hoagland filed a new complaint in the Steuben Superior Court (case number 76D01-2305-PL-237) against the Town and various associated parties. The claims in this new case were based on the same facts and circumstances as the ongoing case. Consequently, the superior court dismissed the new complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(8), which addresses the issue of the same action pending in another state court.The Steuben Superior Court dismissed the new case with prejudice, meaning that Hoagland would be precluded from bringing the same claims again. Hoagland did not contest the dismissal itself but argued against the dismissal being with prejudice. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the superior court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court noted that a dismissal with prejudice is akin to a judgment on the merits and precludes relitigation of the claims. The court emphasized that Hoagland should not be prematurely denied the opportunity to litigate its claims. Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. This allows Hoagland the possibility to pursue its claims in the ongoing litigation in the Steuben Circuit Court. View "Hoagland Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Clear Lake" on Justia Law

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Christopher Nardi submitted an APRA request to the Indiana Election Division for documents related to Indiana’s voter-registration system. He requested three specific documents: the latest standard operating procedures, build notes, and the latest contract with third-party vendors. The Division denied the requests, citing security concerns, but directed Nardi to an online portal for the contract, which he accessed but failed to save. Nardi then filed a complaint with Indiana’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), which recommended partial disclosure. The Division refused, leading Nardi to file a lawsuit in Marion Superior Court.The Marion Superior Court conducted an in-camera review and ordered the Division to provide a redacted version of the contract but denied the other requests. Nardi petitioned for attorney’s fees, claiming he substantially prevailed. The trial court awarded him one-third of the requested fees, reasoning he prevailed on one of three requests. Both parties appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the partial summary judgment but reversed the fee award, concluding Nardi did not substantially prevail.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case, holding that Nardi substantially prevailed by obtaining a wrongfully withheld public record. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this determination. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s mechanical reduction of attorney’s fees to one-third. The case was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the fees, considering the time spent on the successful claim and whether the time spent on unsuccessful claims was indivisible from the successful claim. The Indiana Supreme Court emphasized that APRA should be liberally construed to promote transparency and accountability in government. View "Nardi v. King" on Justia Law

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R.L., a sheriff’s deputy, was charged with driving while intoxicated, but the charges were later dropped. The Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board initiated proceedings to revoke R.L.'s basic-training certificate, which is necessary for his employment as an officer. R.L. sought and obtained a court declaration and injunction preventing the board from disciplining him before the board issued a final decision.The Martin Circuit Court granted R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief, barring the board from using facts from R.L.'s expunged arrest to revoke his certificate. The board intervened and moved to vacate the order, arguing procedural errors and lack of merit. The trial court vacated its initial order but issued a second similar order. The board appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, allowing the board to consider independent evidence of the facts underlying the expunged arrest records.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in granting R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court emphasized that R.L. must follow the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) to challenge the board's decisions and that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss R.L.'s declaratory-judgment action, reinforcing the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board v. R L" on Justia Law

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Duke Energy Indiana, a regulated electric utility, planned to build new facilities in Noblesville, Indiana, to meet increased customer demand. The project involved demolishing an abandoned house and garage and constructing a new substation, transmission lines, and a garage. The City of Noblesville insisted that Duke comply with its unified development ordinance before proceeding with the demolition, requiring Duke to obtain multiple permits. Duke declined, arguing that the city had no power to regulate a public utility's service-related projects through local permitting requirements. Despite not obtaining the permits, Duke began demolition.In response, Noblesville issued a stop-work order and sued Duke in the Hamilton Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its ordinance. Duke counterclaimed, arguing that Noblesville lacked jurisdiction and authority to regulate its activities. The trial court found in favor of Noblesville, ordering Duke to comply with the ordinance and obtain the permits. The court also imposed a $150,000 penalty against Duke for starting demolition without the required permits and awarded Noblesville $115,679.10 in attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that while the trial court had jurisdiction over Noblesville’s enforcement action against Duke, only the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission could decide whether Noblesville’s ordinance interfered unreasonably with Duke’s utility functions. The court reasoned that the commission had both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus necessary to balance the competing interests of public utilities and municipalities in deciding such disputes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Duke Energy Indiana LLC v. City of Noblesville" on Justia Law

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The City of Carmel, Indiana, enacted two ordinances in 2019, one prohibiting the construction of above-ground utility lines unless authorized by the city, and another outlining procedures for relocating utility facilities due to city projects. The ordinances placed all costs on the utilities unless the city agreed otherwise. When the city began two improvement projects requiring Duke Energy to relocate its facilities underground, a dispute arose over who should bear the costs, estimated to exceed $500,000. The city filed a complaint with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, asking it to uphold the ordinances as reasonable and order Duke to pay the relocation costs.The Commission, after a hearing, found the ordinances unreasonable and void. The city appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's order, dismissing the Commission as a party to the appeal. Both the Commission and Duke sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission was a proper party on appeal and that its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the ordinances were unreasonable because they threatened to impose unreasonable expenses on Duke, which would in turn impact all Duke customers throughout Indiana. The court also found that the Commission's order declaring the ordinances void was within its statutory power. View "City of Carmel v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the theft convictions of Jennifer Teising, a former township trustee. Teising had been convicted on 21 counts of theft after she moved out of the township she represented and continued to collect her salary while working remotely. The court held that the state did not present sufficient evidence that Teising had the required criminal intent for theft, specifically that she believed she was not supposed to continue collecting her salary. Therefore, the court ruled that without criminal intent, the only available remedies were civil, such as a quo warranto action to remove Teising from office or a conversion claim to recover allegedly misappropriated money. View "Teising v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

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This case before the Indiana Supreme Court involved the intersection of a successful Section 1983 federal action and Indiana’s public-employee indemnification statute. The plaintiff, Kailee Leonard, hit and killed a dog belonging to a state conservation officer, Scott Johnson. In response, Officer Johnson pursued misdemeanor charges against Leonard for leaving the scene of the accident. Leonard was subsequently charged but never arrested, and the charges were later dropped at Officer Johnson's request. Leonard then filed a federal lawsuit against Officer Johnson, claiming false arrest. The jury found in Leonard's favor, awarding her $10,000 in damages and $52,462 in attorney’s fees and costs. Unable to pay the full amount, Officer Johnson assigned his indemnification rights against the State to Leonard and her attorney. Leonard subsequently sued the State for a declaratory judgment that the State had a duty to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the judgment. The trial court found in Leonard's favor, but the State appealed, arguing that Officer Johnson's actions constituted a criminal act.The Indiana Supreme Court held that Leonard had shown that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State did not rebut that showing. The Court clarified that a party seeking indemnification under the Indiana public-employee indemnification statute must initially show that the loss occurred because of a noncriminal act or omission. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut that showing by producing evidence establishing a prima facie case of criminal conduct. In this case, Leonard met her burden of producing evidence that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State failed to establish a prima facie case that he had committed the crime of false informing. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the State to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the federal judgment. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Reagan Outdoor Advertising in this appeal from the determination that Reagan's billboard had lost its legal nonconforming status, holding that the trial court correctly entered judgment for Reagan.An ordinance of the city of Noblesville bans pole signs, which are signs affixed to poles or other uprights installed in the ground. Reagan, whose billboards the city classifies as pole signs, was allowed signs to remain that pre-dated the ordinance if they were kept in good repair and not relocated. When Reagan repaired damage to one of the billboard's support posts the city issued a stop-work order before Reagan could reattach the sign's display, concluding that Reagan had relocated the sign, which therefore lost its legal nonconforming status. The zoning board of appeals affirmed, but the trial court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance's use of the word "relocate" was ambiguous and, consistent with this Court's interpretative canons, must be resolved in Reagan's favor. View "Noblesville Indiana Board of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approving Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company's (Vectren) petition for approval of its new instantaneous netting method determining the amount of credit its customers receive for their excess distributed generation of electricity, holding that there was no error.Acting within its expertise and authority, the Commission approved Vectren's petition seeking approval of a tariff (Rider EDG) rate for the procurement of excess distributed generation. The Commission approved the Rider EDG, finding that the instantaneous netting method was consistent with Ind. Code 8-1-40-5. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly held that Vectren's instantaneous netting method was not contrary to law and satisfied the requirements in Ind. Code Ann. 8-1-40-5. View "Ind. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying ResCare Health Service's request for a declaratory judgment, holding that ResCare sufficiently pleaded its declaratory judgment request.ResCare, which operates intermediate care facilities in Indiana for individuals with intellectual disabilities, petitioned for administrative reconsideration after an auditor with the Indiana Family & Social Services Administration’s Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning (FSSA) adjusted cost reports to prevent ResCare from recovering costs for over-the-counter medicines under Medicaid. An ALJ granted summary judgment for ResCare. The trial court affirmed the agency's final decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ResCare did not need to file a separate complaint for a declaratory judgment; (2) ResCare sufficiently pleaded its declaratory judgment claim; and (3) ResCare's patients did not have to be joined to the litigation before the declaratory judgment request could be considered. View "ResCare Health Services Inc. v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration" on Justia Law