Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Reagan Outdoor Advertising in this appeal from the determination that Reagan's billboard had lost its legal nonconforming status, holding that the trial court correctly entered judgment for Reagan.An ordinance of the city of Noblesville bans pole signs, which are signs affixed to poles or other uprights installed in the ground. Reagan, whose billboards the city classifies as pole signs, was allowed signs to remain that pre-dated the ordinance if they were kept in good repair and not relocated. When Reagan repaired damage to one of the billboard's support posts the city issued a stop-work order before Reagan could reattach the sign's display, concluding that Reagan had relocated the sign, which therefore lost its legal nonconforming status. The zoning board of appeals affirmed, but the trial court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance's use of the word "relocate" was ambiguous and, consistent with this Court's interpretative canons, must be resolved in Reagan's favor. View "Noblesville Indiana Board of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approving Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company's (Vectren) petition for approval of its new instantaneous netting method determining the amount of credit its customers receive for their excess distributed generation of electricity, holding that there was no error.Acting within its expertise and authority, the Commission approved Vectren's petition seeking approval of a tariff (Rider EDG) rate for the procurement of excess distributed generation. The Commission approved the Rider EDG, finding that the instantaneous netting method was consistent with Ind. Code 8-1-40-5. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly held that Vectren's instantaneous netting method was not contrary to law and satisfied the requirements in Ind. Code Ann. 8-1-40-5. View "Ind. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying ResCare Health Service's request for a declaratory judgment, holding that ResCare sufficiently pleaded its declaratory judgment request.ResCare, which operates intermediate care facilities in Indiana for individuals with intellectual disabilities, petitioned for administrative reconsideration after an auditor with the Indiana Family & Social Services Administration’s Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning (FSSA) adjusted cost reports to prevent ResCare from recovering costs for over-the-counter medicines under Medicaid. An ALJ granted summary judgment for ResCare. The trial court affirmed the agency's final decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ResCare did not need to file a separate complaint for a declaratory judgment; (2) ResCare sufficiently pleaded its declaratory judgment claim; and (3) ResCare's patients did not have to be joined to the litigation before the declaratory judgment request could be considered. View "ResCare Health Services Inc. v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed a portion of the utility regulatory commission's order that approved in part Duke Energy's request to increase its rates for retail consumers, holding that, absent specific statutory authorization, a utility cannot recoup its past costs adjudicated under a prior rate case by treating the costs as a capitalized asset.In 2020, the commission granted Duke's petition for a rate increase in part permitting Duke to recover about $212 million for coal-ash site closures, remediation, and financing costs, with the bulk of the costs having been incurred from 2015 to 2018. At issue was whether the commission could approve reimbursement for a deferred asset without violating the statutory bar against retroactive ratemaking. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the commission acted without statutory authority in re-adjudicating expenses already governed by a prior rate order. View "Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Solarize Indiana, Inc. seeking judicial review of the administration decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approving two filings submitted by Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana, Inc. under an expedited process known as the "Thirty-Day Rule," holding that Solarize lacked standing to bring this appeal.In objecting to Vectren's filings, Solarize, an organization that promotes the use of solar power in Indiana, asserted that the filings were not compliant with federal law. The IURC approved the filings, after which Solarize requested judicial review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Solarize lacked standing because it failed to show that it was "adversely affected" by the IURC's order. View "Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a petition for judicial review of the finding of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board that four Teachers Associations and their respective school corporations violated Indiana law when they collectively bargained over various ancillary duties, holding that there was no error.The Board found the parties bargained over impermissible subjects and curtailed the school's unfettered authority to direct teachers' performance of these various ancillary duties, such as supervising detention, in violation of Ind. Code 20-29-6-4. The trial court found the Board's interpretation of section 20-29-6-4 to be reasonable and denied the Teachers Associations' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly denied judicial review. View "Culver Community Teachers Ass'n v. Indiana Education Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this property valuation matter for further proceedings, holding that the use of a now-defunct tax appeal form challenging assessments to certain homeowners' association lands for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 was proper.Petitioners, homeowners' associations located in Marion County, filed petitions for correction of an error (Form 133) alleging that property tax assessments from the years 2001 through 2003 were illegal because certain common areas of the properties were so encumbered by restrictions that the land had no value. The Marion County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals denied the forms. The Tax Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding in part that the HOAs' claim was not proper for a Form 133. The Supreme Court reversed in part and summarily affirmed in part, holding that Form 133 was a proper avenue to challenge the application of a discount to common land within the HOAs' property. View "Muir Woods Section One Ass'n Inc. v. Marion County Assessor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of an appellate panel finding that the City of Marion's claims alleging corruption in the old City administration were time barred, holding that, under the adverse domination adopted today, summary judgment was inappropriate for all the City's claims.The City sued London Witte Group, LLC, an advisor to the City's former mayor, Wayne Seybold, alleging that the former administration was corrupt, a corruption that was aided and abetted by London Witte. After London Witte moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations the City responded that the doctrine of adverse domination tolled the statute of limitations until Mayor Seybold left office. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for London Witte. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on the first two counts and reversed the denial of summary judgment for the third count, concluding that the third count was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court adopts the equitable tolling doctrine of adverse domination as a logical corollary of Indiana's discovery rule; and (2) summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mayor Seybold adversely dominated the City and whether London Witte contributed to it. View "City of Marion v. London Witte Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the court of appeals opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the summary judgment granted by the State Employees' Appeals Commission (SEAC) against Appellant on his claim that his alleged protected activity was related to his termination, holding that the court of appeals reached too broad a conclusion to resolve the issue in this case.Appellant appealed his termination, claiming he was a protected whistleblower. SEAC dismissed the complaint, but the superior court reversed. On remand, SEAC granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant's employer. Appellant sought judicial review, claiming that most of his employer's arguments were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply but going further to find that the law-of-the-case doctrine "is applicable only when an appellate court determines a legal issue, not a trial court." The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the court of appeals' opinion and otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals need not have reached so broad a conclusion to resolve the issue. View "Brown v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management" on Justia Law

In this mandate-of-funds action in which the only remaining dispute was over what attorney's fees and expenses the Judges of Lake Superior Court should recover, the Supreme Court affirmed the Special Judge's ruling that the Judges were entitled to recover $176,467.17, holding that the Special Judge did not abuse his discretion.In 2017, fourteen Judges of the Lake Superior Court issued an order of mandate of funds requiring the Lake County Council and the Lake County Auditor (collectively, the Council) to provide funding, including raises, for court employees. A Special Judge heard the case, and the parties subsequently agreed to settle the dispute. The Judges requested $223,234.17 in legal fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the mandate action. The Special Judge ordered the Council to pay the Judges $176,467.17 for their fees and expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the award to the Judges. View "Lake County Council v. Honorable John R. Pera" on Justia Law