Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a petition for judicial review of the finding of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board that four Teachers Associations and their respective school corporations violated Indiana law when they collectively bargained over various ancillary duties, holding that there was no error.The Board found the parties bargained over impermissible subjects and curtailed the school's unfettered authority to direct teachers' performance of these various ancillary duties, such as supervising detention, in violation of Ind. Code 20-29-6-4. The trial court found the Board's interpretation of section 20-29-6-4 to be reasonable and denied the Teachers Associations' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly denied judicial review. View "Culver Community Teachers Ass'n v. Indiana Education Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this property valuation matter for further proceedings, holding that the use of a now-defunct tax appeal form challenging assessments to certain homeowners' association lands for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 was proper.Petitioners, homeowners' associations located in Marion County, filed petitions for correction of an error (Form 133) alleging that property tax assessments from the years 2001 through 2003 were illegal because certain common areas of the properties were so encumbered by restrictions that the land had no value. The Marion County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals denied the forms. The Tax Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding in part that the HOAs' claim was not proper for a Form 133. The Supreme Court reversed in part and summarily affirmed in part, holding that Form 133 was a proper avenue to challenge the application of a discount to common land within the HOAs' property. View "Muir Woods Section One Ass'n Inc. v. Marion County Assessor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of an appellate panel finding that the City of Marion's claims alleging corruption in the old City administration were time barred, holding that, under the adverse domination adopted today, summary judgment was inappropriate for all the City's claims.The City sued London Witte Group, LLC, an advisor to the City's former mayor, Wayne Seybold, alleging that the former administration was corrupt, a corruption that was aided and abetted by London Witte. After London Witte moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations the City responded that the doctrine of adverse domination tolled the statute of limitations until Mayor Seybold left office. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for London Witte. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on the first two counts and reversed the denial of summary judgment for the third count, concluding that the third count was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court adopts the equitable tolling doctrine of adverse domination as a logical corollary of Indiana's discovery rule; and (2) summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mayor Seybold adversely dominated the City and whether London Witte contributed to it. View "City of Marion v. London Witte Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the court of appeals opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the summary judgment granted by the State Employees' Appeals Commission (SEAC) against Appellant on his claim that his alleged protected activity was related to his termination, holding that the court of appeals reached too broad a conclusion to resolve the issue in this case.Appellant appealed his termination, claiming he was a protected whistleblower. SEAC dismissed the complaint, but the superior court reversed. On remand, SEAC granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant's employer. Appellant sought judicial review, claiming that most of his employer's arguments were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply but going further to find that the law-of-the-case doctrine "is applicable only when an appellate court determines a legal issue, not a trial court." The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the court of appeals' opinion and otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals need not have reached so broad a conclusion to resolve the issue. View "Brown v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management" on Justia Law

In this mandate-of-funds action in which the only remaining dispute was over what attorney's fees and expenses the Judges of Lake Superior Court should recover, the Supreme Court affirmed the Special Judge's ruling that the Judges were entitled to recover $176,467.17, holding that the Special Judge did not abuse his discretion.In 2017, fourteen Judges of the Lake Superior Court issued an order of mandate of funds requiring the Lake County Council and the Lake County Auditor (collectively, the Council) to provide funding, including raises, for court employees. A Special Judge heard the case, and the parties subsequently agreed to settle the dispute. The Judges requested $223,234.17 in legal fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the mandate action. The Special Judge ordered the Council to pay the Judges $176,467.17 for their fees and expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the award to the Judges. View "Lake County Council v. Honorable John R. Pera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Town of Yorktown’s Clerk-Treasurer, Beth Neff, holding that the State’s request to remove Neff did not fall within the exceptionally rare category of cases that warranted removal.Relying on Indiana Code 5-8-1-35, the Removal Statute, the State sought Neff’s removal for her alleged refusal or neglect to perform the official duties pertaining to her office. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Neff, concluding that Neff had not completely failed to carry out her duties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a public official to be removed pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of the Removal Statute, the State must show that the official has generally failed to perform his or her official duties; and (2) Neff’s failures and errors did not result in such a general failure, and therefore, the removal statute did not apply. View "State v. Neff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Liability Administrative Law Judge (LALJ) concluding that Driver was Q.D.-A.’s employee under the Unemployment Compensation Act, holding that because Q.D.-A. proved the Act’s three part test, Driver was an independent contractor.Q.D.-A., which matches drivers with customers who need large vehicles driven to them, classified its drivers as independent contractors and did not pay unemployment taxes for them under the Act. The Act presumes a worker is an employee unless the employer proves three factors. Driver in this case filed for unemployment benefits under the Act, and the Department of Workforce Development classified Driver as an employee. The LALJ affirmed the Department’s classification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the LAJL unreasonably concluded that Driver was Q.D.-A.’s employee when Driver was not under Q.D.-A.’s control or direction, performed a service outside Q.D.-A.’s usual course of business, and ran an independently established business. View "Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court affirming the order of the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) finding that the Indiana Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) use of a dam on Appellants’ property was proper, holding that the trial court properly enforced the order but that Appellants could, in the course of complying with the trial court’s order, modify their dam to remove it from the DNR’s jurisdiction under the Dam Safety Act, Ind. Code 14-27-7.5.Appellants had a large pond and related dam on their property. Since the early 2000s, the DNR attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the dam on the grounds that the dam was located in, on, or along a stream. Appellants contested DNR’s findings, largely without success, in administrative tribunals and the courts below. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DNR’s definition of the word “stream” was reasonable, and Appellants had adequate notice of what constitutes a stream for purposes of the Dam Safety Act; (2) the DNR presented substantial evidence supporting its classification of Appellants’ dam as a high-hazard dam; and (3) Appellants could modify their dam to remove it from DNR’s future jurisdiction. View "Moriarity v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court retained Indiana’s common-law rule prohibiting the unilateral relocation of fixed easements and affirmed the trial court’s entry of judgment for Joseph DeSpirito on his petition for judicial review and against Richland Convenience Store Partners, LLC (Richland) and the Town of Ellettsville, Indiana Plan Commission (Commission).Despite the opposition of DeSpirito, who owned an adjacent lot, the Commission approved Richland’s request to relocate a utility easement on its lot. On judicial review, the trial court granted summary judgment against Richland and the Commission, finding that DeSpirito had a fixed utility easement through Richland’s lot and that the easement’s fixed location meant it could not be changed by either party without consent of the other. At issue on appeal was whether the Court should adhere to Indiana’s longstanding common-law rule requiring all affected estate-holders to consent to the relocation of a fixed easement or to adopt the position of the Third Restatement of Property (Servitudes), which permits the unilateral relocation of easements if a court finds the proposed relocation is reasonable, consistent with the normal use and development of the servant estate, and does not adversely affect the dominant estate. The Supreme Court rejected the minority approach reflected in the Third Restatement and affirmed. View "Town of Ellettsville, Indiana Plan Commission v. DeSpirito" on Justia Law

Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute bars railroads from blocking railroad-highway grade crossings for more than 10 minutes, except in circumstances outside the railroads’ control. Ind. Code 8-6-7.5-1. Violations are Class C infractions and carry a minimum $200 fine. In one year, Norfolk Southern collected 23 blocked-crossing citations for violations near its Allen County trainyard. Norfolk argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) expressly preempt Indiana’s statute. The trial court found that train-switching maneuvers, track congestion, and mechanical defects can all cause traffic blockages lasting more than 10 minutes, and that, to shorten blockages, Norfolk would have to run trains faster, run shorter trains, or “cut” trains into segments—an onerous process that requires more than 10 minutes of reassembly and brake tests. The court granted Norfolk summary judgment on all 23 citations. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Indiana Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute is a remedy that directly regulates rail operations, so the ICCTA categorically preempts it. View "State of Indiana v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law