Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Mississippi
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Article 4, Section 59 of the Mississippi Constitution provided that in the Mississippi Legislature “every bill shall be read in full immediately before the vote on its final passage upon the demand of any member.” When Representative J. P. Hughes Jr. requested that certain bills be read as required by that article, Speaker Philip Gunn had the bills read by a machine at a speed that Rep.Hughes claims was incomprehensible and therefore a constitutional violation, leading him to file suit to stop the practice. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and held that it was without constitutional authority to resolve this dispute. The Court therefore remanded this case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Gunn v. Hughes" on Justia Law

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Under Mississippi law, a person wishing to appeal the adoption of a city’s ordinance must do so within ten days. The primary question presented for the Supreme Court’s review here was whether, as the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Pearl (the “City”) argued, the appeal period began to run from the day of the ordinance’s adoption, or as the appellants argued, from its effective date. The Supreme Court found the appeal period for city ordinances began on the date an ordinance is adopted, and because the appellants’ bill of exceptions was presented to the City outside the ten-day period following the date of adoption, the circuit judge in this case properly dismissed the complaint for writ of mandamus. View "Pemberton Properties, LTD v. City of Pearl" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC) adopted a rule requiring utilities to waive utility deposits for certified domestic violence victims for a period of sixty days. The rule also required the utilities to keep the information regarding the domestic violence victims confidential and established penalties for violating that confidentiality. The Mississippi Rural Water Association, Inc. (“Water Association”) objected to the promulgation of the new rule, but the chancery court affirmed the MPSC’s decision. The Supreme Court found that the MPSC lacked statutory authority to adopt any rule regulating the rates of nonprofit water utility associations and corporations. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment vacating the MPSC’s order adopting the new rule. View "Mississippi Rural Water Association, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Carolyn McAdams, mayor of the City of Greenwood, appealed a decision of the Leflore County Circuit Court, which held that the Greenwood City Council’s decision to hire legal counsel to represent the city’s interest in an election contest exceeded its power and violated the Mississippi Constitution. Finding error in the trial judge’s interpretation of Mississippi Code Sections 25-1-47 and 21-17-5, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "McAdams v. Perkins" on Justia Law

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In 2007, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General’s office, filed suit against Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company (Fair Oil) for violating Mississippi’s price-gouging statute. Fair Oil filed a successful motion for summary judgment on the basis that the price-gouging statute was unconstitutional as written; however, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the Chancery Court to examine Fair Oil’s conduct in light of the statute’s language. After remand, several years passed without activity in the case, and in July 2015, the Chancery Court granted Fair Oil’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The State appealed that decision. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc." on Justia Law

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The State of Mississippi entered into a Public Trust Tidelands lease with the City of Bay St. Louis to build a municipal harbor on beachfront property. After the City began construction of the harbor, brothers Kenneth, Ray, and Audie Murphy filed an inverse condemnation action, claiming that the State and the City had taken and damaged their property without compensation. The case was tried and a jury ultimately found the State liable to the Murphys for $644,000 in damages. The State appealed. The State claimed true ownership of the property under the authority of the Tidelands Act, or alternatively, its sovereign power of eminent domain. There was no evidence in the record indicating that the City could have constructed the harbor without the State first exercising a claim of ownership over the property. Because the State’s claim of ownership ultimately converted private property to public use, the Supreme Court found that the jury acted reasonably in assessing the full amount of damages to the State. Therefore, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. View "Mississippi v. Murphy" on Justia Law

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Floyd McKee contested the election after he was defeated by Joe Chandler in the Democratic primary run-off election for District 5 Supervisor of Clay County. After the Clay County Democratic Executive Committee (CCDEC) ruled in favor of Chandler, McKee filed a petition for judicial review with the Clay County Circuit Court. Chandler filed a motion to dismiss McKee’s petition, arguing that it was not timely filed. This interlocutory appeal stems from the circuit court’s denial of Chandler’s motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court erred in failing to grant Chandler’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded this case back to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss McKee’s petition for judicial review. View "Chandler v. McKee" on Justia Law

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The Pascagoula-Gautier School District and the City of Pascagoula took issue with the Jackson County Board of Supervisors’ approval of the Tax Assessor’s methodology in assessing taxes on Chevron’s leasehold interest in property it leased from Jackson County. After several years of litigation, and after the trial court had denied two motions to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court sua sponte reversed course and granted the second motion to dismiss for lack of standing, reasoning that the School District and City lacked standing because Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77 did not specifically grant them standing. Because the School District and the City did not need to show a specific statute authorizing standing, and because they otherwise demonstrated standing, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court judgment on this issue. View "Pascagoula-Gautier Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Jackson County" on Justia Law

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After suffering a fall at work, Linda Mitchell returned to the same position she had before her injury, and continued to work for more than seven months until she was terminated for a cause unrelated to the injury. She then sought and was awarded disability benefits from the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. But because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Commission both failed to recognize that Mitchell’s return to work created a rebuttable presumption that she suffered no loss of earning capacity, the Supreme Court reversed the award of disability benefits and remanded this case to the Commission to apply the correct legal standard. View "Hudspeth Regional Center v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

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H&G Land Company, L.P. entered into a lease agreement with APAC-Mississippi, Inc. (“APAC”), whereby APAC would operate an asphalt plant and mining operation on H&G’s land for a period of twenty years. H&G then filed an application for a special exception to extract sand and gravel on its property. The application included documentation concerning property, including ownership, government permits, insurance, a bond for reclamation of the property, and site proposals. Thereafter, the Panola County Land Development Commission held a series of hearings to consider H&G’s application. At the last hearing, the Commission denied the application and informed H&G that it could appeal to the Board, which reversed the Commission. At its next regularly scheduled meeting, the Board held a hearing to consider H&G’s request. Several local businesses and residents attended the meeting to oppose H&G’s request, so the Board permitted each side time to present their arguments. Following the presentations, the Board voted to approve H&G's application. The businesses and residents appealed. But finding no reversible error in the Board's approval, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Como Steak House, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Panola County" on Justia Law