Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Jackson was unable to serve notice to Willie Jordan by certified mail that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition. The City tried notice by publication, and set a hearing for twelve days after the first publication date. The applicable statute required two weeks’ notice. Jordan did not appear at the condemnation hearing. The property was declared condemned, and the house on the property was ordered demolished. After the house was demolished, Jordan filed a notice of tort claim with the city. When he filed his complaint, he alternatively asserted a constitutional claim for deprivation of property without due process. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Jordan $12,513.53. The city appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Jackson v. Jordan" on Justia Law

While visiting the DeSoto County Civic Center, Cynthia Crider stepped in a hole that was obscured by grass. She was attending a high-school graduation at the Civic Center, operated by the DeSoto County Convention and Visitors Bureau. At the ceremony’s conclusion, Crider exited the Civic Center and proceeded across a grassy area to her car. As she crossed, Crider stepped in a hole obscured by overgrown grass. She fell and broke her ankle. Crider sued the Bureau, alleging that it failed to maintain the grassy area in a safe condition. The Bureau moved for summary judgment, claiming it enjoyed Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(v)’s immunity from certain premises-liability claims. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge reasoned that the Bureau enjoyed discretionary-function immunity because no statute mandated that it operate a civic center and because Crider failed to show any “laws or regulations . . . which would remove the Defendants’ particular acts (or inaction) from the ‘umbrella of discretionary function immunity.’” Crider appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crider v. DeSoto County Convention & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law

The property of Riverboat Corporation, an ad valorem taxpayer, was subject to assessment by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (“the Board”) because Riverboat owned certain personal and real property in Harrison County. The Mississippi Supreme Court was asked "to abandon the common law of this state, pronouncements of this Court, and customs and practices of trial courts across this state, all dating back to the nineteenth century, under the guise that today’s issue has not yet been squarely before" it and to "overrule a learned trial judge who, [. . .] determined a jury trial should be had in an appeal of a county’s ad valorem tax assessment." When Riverboat appealed its tax assessment, the Board requested a jury trial. Riverboat then moved for a bench trial, averring that there was no right to a jury trial in tax appeals. The trial court denied Riverboat's motion. The Supreme Court declined to rule against Mississippi precedent, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Riverboat's motion. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Bay Point Properties Inc. filed inverse condemnation proceedings against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC), claiming the easement MTC had across Bay Point’s property had terminated and that MTC was required to pay Bay Point the unencumbered value of the property. A jury determined the easement, for which the Commission had paid $50,000, continued to encumber the property, but that the use by MTC was not a highway purpose. The jury awarded Bay Point the encumbered value of $500. Bay Point appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that trial court failed to follow Section 43-37-9’s mandate to “determine and award or allow . . . such sum as will, in the opinion of the court[,] . . . reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.” Thus, the Court remanded with instructions to the trial court to hold a hearing in compliance with Section 43-37-9. View "Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Arrowood Indemnity Company, a member of the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (“the Windpool”), submitted its premium data as required for a post-Katrina data-correction process. Arrowood failed to claim the appropriate credits available to it by statute which, it alleged, resulted in a nearly five-million-dollar overpayment. Arrowood had based its data submission on incorrect information provided by the Windpool, so it requested an opportunity to submit the correct information. The Windpool denied its request because the deadline for corrections had passed. The Mississippi Insurance Commissioner and the Chancery Court affirmed the Windpool’s decision. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Windpool’s deadline was tolled under the facts of this case because its incorrect representation precipitated Arrowood’s incorrect data submission. The Court reversed the decisions of the Insurance Commissioner and the Hinds County Chancery Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Arrowood Indemnity Company v. Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendants the Mississippi Transportation Commission (“MTC”) and the Mississippi Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case against them on immunity grounds under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). Christopher Adams died from injuries he sustained when his motorcycle wrecked on Interstate 10 in Jackson County. After traveling north on Interstate 110 in Harrison County, Adams merged onto an eastbound lane of I-10, where he entered a construction zone. According to the complaint, Adams inadvertently drove into a closed lane and then, when he tried to navigate back into an open lane, his motorcycle hit an uneven surface between lanes and “rotated.” Adams was thrown from his motorcycle and into traffic, where two other vehicles hit him, causing injuries from which he later died. Adams' estate raised a number of claims against defendants all sounding in negligence and relating to the condition of the road, failure to place proper warnings, and creating hazardous driving conditions. The trial judge rejected the defendants’ argument that, notwithstanding certain narrower regulations requiring specific actions, they were immune from liability because the broader function of traffic-control-device placement was discretionary. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 2006, Dr. Terry McMillin and his wife Leslie purchased a new home in Tupelo. Unhappy with contractor Jamie Ewing’s failure to respond to their repair requests, plus their discovery of a document (a blue card, noting a failed home inspection) listing the name of a different contractor as the contractor responsible for their home’s construction, the McMillins began the process of unraveling just who was responsible for building their new home. Ultimately, this case stemmed from an error by the City of Tupelo’s Permit Manager Marilyn Vail in handling the withdrawal of one licensed contractor and mistakenly substituting the name of another licensed contractor, when in actuality, a licensed contractor was not working on the home. The circuit court held a bench trial and awarded $9,319.23 in damages to repair the home and $105,894.39 in legal fees related to another case involving the construction but denied the McMillins’ request for attorneys’ fees in this case. The City appealed, and the McMillins cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in finding that the City was not immune from liability. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the City. View "City of Tupelo v. McMillin" on Justia Law

When the Humphreys County Board of Supervisors notified the public of its intention to issue a $1.2 million tax anticipation note, taxpayers filed a petition containing signatures of qualified electors requesting that the matter be submitted to the public for an election. The Board determined that the number of qualified electors who had signed the petition was insufficient to require an election. The Board, therefore, authorized the note’s issuance. The matter then was submitted to the Humphreys County Chancery Court for validation. The day before the hearing, Glenn Russell filed a written objection. At the hearing, Russell appeared pro se to oppose validation. Nevertheless, the chancellor entered a judgment validating the tax anticipation note. Russell appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Humphreys County Board of Supervisors did not exceed statutory limits in obtaining the tax anticipation note. However, the chancellor’s refusal at the validation hearing to consider the sufficiency of signatures of qualified electors, who signed a petition protesting the tax anticipation note, constituted error. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Humphreys County Chancery Court and remanded this case to the chancellor for further proceedings. View "In Re: Validation of Tax Anticipation Note, Series 2014, by Humphreys County v. Humphreys County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law