Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Hotel and Restaurant Supply (Hotel) and concluded that Hotel owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in underpaid sales tax. Hotel appealed the assessment to MDOR’s Board of Review, which upheld the assessment but reduced the amount owed. Hotel appealed to the Mississippi Board of Tax Appeals (MBTA), and MBTA abated the assessment in full. MDOR appealed MBTA’s decision; both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the chancery court granted Hotel’s motion. MDOR appealed the chancery court’s decision to grant Hotel’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the chancery court’s grant of Hotel’s motion for summary judgment. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Hotel & Restaurant Supply" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from the Mississippi Public Service Commission’s grant of a rate increase to Mississippi River Gas, LLC (MRG). The cities of Tchula and Port Gibson challenged the Commission’s authority to regulate municipally owned systems which had not expanded service beyond the area originally certificated prior to passage of the Public Utilities Act. The Commission determined the relevant statutory language exempting municipally “owned or operated” public utilities was ambiguous and that the Legislature intended to exempt only municipally “owned and operated” public utilities. The Commission also determined the relevant statutory language “extension of utilities,” which was an exception to the exemption, ambiguous, meaning “the total range [of coverage]” rather than an “enlargement in scope.” The Commission granted MRG’s requested rate increase. The cities appealed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the Commission’s reading of two key components of the applicable statute was in error; the Commission erred in assuming rate-setting jurisdiction over Tchula’s and Port Gibson’s municipally owned, but not operated, public-utility systems. Further, the Commission erred in assuming jurisdiction over rates charged to customers beyond one mile of the cities’ limits when these cities had not extended their gas-distribution services beyond one mile of their city limits since passage of the Public Utilities Act. The Court reversed the Commission’s order on this narrow, specific basis and remanded this case back to the Commission for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. View "City of Tchula v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

Alesa Dawn Crum’s home in Corinth, Mississippi, was flooded with backflowed sewage, twice. Crum filed suit against the City of Corinth, alleging damages as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The Circuit Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Crum’s complaint, finding that the City was immune under the discretionary-function exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Crum appealed, arguing that the City was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dismissing Crum’s complaint, it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crum v. City of Corinth" on Justia Law

John Doe initiated this action on behalf of his daughter, Jane Doe, after she was sexually assaulted on a Rankin County School District (RCSD) school bus, parked on the campus of Richland High School (RHS). After nineteen months of discovery, the circuit court granted RCSD’s motion for summary judgment against Doe based on governmental immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Doe moved for reconsideration, arguing RCSD had waived immunity through active participation in the litigation. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals (COA) reversed the circuit court’s ruling. Applying the then-applicable, two-part, public-function test, the COA found that RCSD was entitled to discretionary-function immunity because: (1) RCSD’s duty to oversee student conduct and school safety involved an element of choice and/or judgment and (2) RCSD’s actions regarding implementation of school-safety measures and student discipline involved social and economic policy considerations. The COA, however, found that RCSD had waived immunity in this instance by actively participating in the litigation process and unreasonably delaying pursuit of its immunity defense for sixteen months. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted RCSD’s request certiorari review. Based on its recent decision in “Brantley v. City of Horn Lake,” (152 So.3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), which established a new test for determining the application of discretionary-function immunity, the Supreme Court reversed both the COA’s and the trial court’s decisions and remanded to the trial court for the parties to present evidence in light of the new standard. View "Doe v. Rankin County School District" on Justia Law

The State of Mississippi brought a civil action against generic pharmaceutical provider Sandoz, Inc., alleging that Sandoz impermissibly exploited Mississippi’s Medicaid reimbursement program by routinely and exponentially reporting fictitious “Average Wholesale Prices,” a key data factor in the federally supervised formula used by the Mississippi Division of Medicaid to reimburse pharmacies serviced by Sandoz. The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, found Sandoz in violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act and liable for common-law fraud. Sandoz appealed, and the State cross-appealed. On a deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in full. View "Sandoz, Inc. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Union County Election Commission disqualified Roger Browning from running for Union County Superintendent of Education, finding that he was not a qualified elector of the Union County School District. The Circuit Court overturned the Commission’s decision and issued an injunction requiring Browning’s name to be placed on the ballot for the general election. James Basil, the incumbent Union County Superintendent of Education appealed the circuit court’s decision, arguing that Browning did not meet the residency requirement to serve as county superintendent. After review, the Supreme Court held that Browning, a resident of the New Albany Municipal Separate School District, was not eligible to run for Union County Superintendent of Education. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Circuit Court and rendered judgment in Basil’s favor. View "Basil v. Browning" on Justia Law

When the Mississippi State Highway Commission (MHC) sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to fill wetlands in the roadbed of a proposed limited-access road, it pledged approximately 1,300 acres of Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P.’s and T. Jerard Gulfport, L.L.C.’s (collectively, “Ward”) property as wetlands mitigation. ACE issued the permit to MHC in 2009. Ward filed suit in state court against MHC, seeking damages from an unlawful taking, and in federal court against ACE, seeking to have the permit invalidated. The federal court vacated the permit. MHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that no taking had occurred and that the federal court had determined ACE, not MHC, had caused Ward’s losses. The trial court granted MHC’s motion. Ward appealed. Finding the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of MHC, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission" on Justia Law