Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Missouri
by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding that Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) was entitled to manufacturing exemptions with respect to its 2011 and 2012 purchases of replacement equipment used to provide telecommunications service, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the AHC did not err in (1) finding CCE I's provision of telecommunications service qualified as "manufacturing" for purposes of the sales and use tax exemptions in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(4) and 144.054.2; and (2) finding that CCE I was not required to establish that its replacement equipment was "substantially used" in manufacturing in addition to proving that the equipment satisfied the integrated plant doctrine and was "used directly" in manufacturing. View "Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court denying Appellants' petitions for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry, holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellants Brock Smith and Gary Ford separately appealed two circuit court judgments denying their separately-filed petitions for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry. Smith argued that because he was a tier I sex offender, Mo. Rev. Stat. 589.400.1(7) did not mandate that he remain on the registry for his lifetime. Ford argued that the lower court misstated and misapplied the law in denying his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Appellants were not entitled to removal from the Missouri sex offender registry. View "Smith v. St. Louis County Police" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirming and adopting the ALJ's final award denying Appellant's claim for benefits from the Second Injury Fund, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in affirming the ALJ's denial of Appellant's post-hearing motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence.Before the ALJ issued her final award, the Supreme Court decided Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019), which reached a different interpretation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.3 than that reached by the court of appeals in Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. App. 2017). Before the ALJ's final award, Appellant filed a motion to reopen the record for a supplemental hearing based on Cosby. The ALJ overruled the motion and issued her award. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence. View "Weibrecht v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission overruling James Swafford's claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund, holding that Swafford was not entitled to reversal as to his claims on appeal.In denying benefits, the Commission determined that Swafford failed to show that his preexisting disabilities" directly and significantly aggravated or accelerated" his primary injury pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.3(2)(a)a(iii). On appeal, Swafford argued that the Commission improperly disregarded the expert testimony he proffered to establish a causal relationship between his primary injury and his preexisting disabilities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence and that Swafford failed to establish that his primary injury and preexisting disabilities entitled him to PTD benefits from the Fund. View "Swafford v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission that Saddle and Sirloin Club of Kansas City was not entitled to a refund of sales tax on monthly membership dues paid by Club members because the dues were fees paid to a place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.021.1, holding that the Club was not owed a refund.On appeal, the Club argued that the monthly membership dues were not subject to sales tax because, in addition to recreation services, Club members received the right to participate in the operation and control of the Club and an increase in the value of their equitable interests in the Club. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the Club failed to meet its burden of proving that members receive more than recreational services in exchange for monthly membership dues; and (2) therefore, the monthly membership dues were subject to sales tax pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020.1(2). View "Saddle & Sirloin Club of Kansas City v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) denying the complaint brought by Plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of James Townsend, that the director of the department of revenue was not authorized to assess unpaid sales tax owed by Green Duck Lounge, Inc. against Townsend as a responsible party under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.157.3, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law.On appeal, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that a prior judgment denying the department's attempt to collect the company's unpaid sales tax from Townsend's estate was res judicata, barring the director's assessment of the unpaid sales tax against Townsend personally. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the AHC did not err in finding that res judicata did not bar the director's assessment against Townsend, personally, as a responsible party; and (2) neither Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.220.3 nor section 144.157.3 required the director to mail notice of his intent to make an assessment against Townsend, as a responsible party, within years after the company's returns were filed. View "LaBlanche v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that the purchases by Carfax, Inc. of certain equipment used to create vehicle history reports (VHRs) were exempt from sales and use taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(5) and 144.054.2 because Carfax used such equipment to "manufacture" VHRs, holding that Carfax did not use the equipment in the "manufacturing" of its VHRs.After an audit, the Director of Revenue determined that Carfax did not use the disputed equipment to manufacture VHRs, and therefore, its purchase of that equipment was not exempt from sales and use taxes. On appeal, the AHC found that Carfax's purchases of the equipment were exempt from sales and use taxes under both sections 144.303.2(5) and 144.054(2) because Carfax used that equipment directly in manufacturing VHRs. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding that, for purposes of these statutes, Carfax did not use the disputed equipment to manufacture VHRs. View "Carfax, Inc. v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court issuing a permanent writ of mandamus in favor of Jim Swoboda, holding that the circuit court's decision was erroneous because Swoboda failed to establish that he was entitled to mandamus relief.Swoboda filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against his employer and Armstrong Teasdale, LLP (the Law Firm), alleging retaliation, disability, and aiding and abetting as types of discrimination he faced in retaliation for participating in a discrimination case brought by another officer. The Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because there was no employer-employee relationship between Swoboda and the Law Firm. The circuit court issued a writ of mandamus finding that the Commission erred in dismissing the charge without first taking certain steps. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issuance of mandamus relief was foreclosed where, rather than seeking to enforce a previously delineated right, Swoboda attempted to adjudicate whether his claim was permissible under applicable statutes. View "State ex rel. Swoboda v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying Claimant's claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund, holding that the Commission appropriately found that Claimant was not permanently and totally disabled.Claimant filed an amended workers' compensation claim against Employer, alleging that his primary work-related injuries were "bilateral upper extremities" and asserting a claim against the Fund for PTD benefits due to a prior injury to his bilateral lower extremities. An administrative law judge denied PTD benefits, and the Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant failed to carry his burden of persuasion in demonstrating that he was entitled to PTD benefits. View "March v. Treasurer of Missouri" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission reversing the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of permanent and total disability (PTD) benefits against the Second Injury Fund, holding that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence.Christopher Klecka suffered a compensable work-related injury to his left shoulder. After settling the primary claim with his employer Klecka brought a claim against the Fund, alleging that his primary injury combined with his prior injuries rendered him permanently and totally disabled (PTD). An ALJ issued an award against the fund for PTD benefits. The Commission reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Klecka failed to establish that his primary injury and sole qualifying preexisting disability entitled him to PTD benefits from the Fund under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.3. View "Klecka v. Treasurer of Missouri" on Justia Law