Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Gate Gourmet, Inc. owns and operates a facility near the Lambert-St. Louis International airport from which it sells frozen meals to various commercial airlines. Gate Gourmet filed sales tax returns for the tax years 2008-2010 in which it reported sales of frozen meals to its airline customers at the reduced sales tax rate of one percent as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. After an audit, the Director of Revenue issued sales tax assessments to Gate Gourmet totaling $296,357, concluding that the sale of airline meals should have been taxed at four percent under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020. The Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the Director’s determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s decision was based upon a proper construction of the law and was supported by competent and substantial evidence. View "Gate Gourmet, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant, who was employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections as a corrections officer, was involved in a workplace accident. Appellant filed a claim for workers’ compensation seeking reimbursement from the Department for medical expenses. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, finding that Appellant was involved in a workplace accident but that Appellant did not prove that the accident was the “prevailing factor” causing his medical condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant proved by substantial and competent evidence that his workplace accident was the prevailing factor causing his medical condition. View "Malam v. State, Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

The Missouri Real Estate Appraisers Commission denied Funk’s application for certification as a state-certified appraiser. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) granted the application and, after judicial review, awarded Funk attorney fees (RSMo 536.0871) based on its determination that the Commission’s appeal was not substantially justified because a court is required to defer to the AHC’s factual and credibility findings. The circuit court reversed that award; the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. A prevailing party in an agency proceeding normally must apply for attorney’s fees from that agency within 30 days of its decision; the request is held in abeyance until final disposition of the case. Because Funk represented himself before the AHC, he did not incur attorney’s fees at the agency level, however, and that requirement had no application. He should have applied for fees with the court of appeals, the first forum in which he prevailed while represented by an attorney. Because Funk wrongly submitted his application to the AHC within 30 days of the final decision by the court of appeals, and only requested attorney’s fees from the court of appeals after the deadline for seeking fees from that court had expired, his request was untimely. The court further stated thatCommission’s position in the original proceeding was reasonably based on fact and law and was substantially justified. The AHC erred in considering evidence that was not before the Commission when it made the decision to deny Funk’s application. View "Mo. Real Estate Appraisers Comm'n v. Funk" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs believed that Arnold police department employees had accessed their confidential records in the “Regional Justice Information System” database and filed a complaint. The department completed an internal affairs investigation. Pursuant to Missouri’s Sunshine Law, RSMo 610.010, plaintiffs sought parts of the report “for the purpose of investigating civil claims.” The city’s attorney replied that there had been no criminal investigation, but only an internal affairs investigation, and that the resulting report and other requested documents were closed because they contain personnel information. Plaintiffs again demanded the documents, citing section 610.100.4, which refers to obtaining records "for purposes of investigating a civil claim.” Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that, whatever the original motivation for the investigation, someone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains … information from any protected computer” commits a crime, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2). On remand, the trial court ordered disclosure of the report with redaction of employees’ timesheets. Plaintiffs moved, under RSMo 610.027, for attorney’s fees and a fine for a purposeful or knowing violation. The court denied the motion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. To prove a “knowing” violation, a party must do more than show that the city knew that it was not producing the report; section 610.027.2 requires proof that the public entity knew that its failure to produce the report violated the Sunshine Law. The court upheld a finding that the city’s failure to disclose the investigative internal affairs report was neither knowing nor purposeful. View "Laut v. City of Arnold" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the Missouri Municipal League, the City of Springfield, and Richard Sheets appealed a circuit court's judgment for the State on plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutional validity of two bills passed by the General Assembly. In 2013, the General Assembly passed House Bill 331 and House Bill 345, which repealed and enacted in lieu thereof numerous sections dealing with local government control over telecommunications infrastructure permitting and public right-of-way. Later that year, a circuit court ruled H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 were enacted in violation of procedural requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The State appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Missouri Supreme Court. With the State's appeal still pending, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 649 and Senate Bill 650 in early 2014. S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 repealed and enacted in lieu thereof some of the same sections as had H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 and, in doing so, set forth the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 as the then-existing law for the relevant sections with proposed changes noted. Two days before S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 became effective (and two days before the Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal in the H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 case), plaintiffs brought suit challenging S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 under the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming: (1) the contents of the bills violated article I, section 13's prohibition against retrospective laws; article III, section 40(28)'s prohibition on special laws, and article X, section 21's prohibition on unfunded mandates; and (2) the bills were enacted in violation of article III, section 28. The State moved to dismiss the substantive claims, and both sides moved for a judgment on the pleadings for the enactment claims. The circuit court sustained the State's motions, and plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State was entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this claim. View "Missouri Municipal League v. Missouri" on Justia Law

Rachel Johns sought the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76. She filed a declaration of candidacy with the Missouri Secretary of State, in which she stated under oath, that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representative pursuant to the Missouri Constitution’s requirements for that office. Respondent Joshua Peters, another candidate for the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76, filed a petition pursuant to section 115.526, RSMo 2000, seeking to disqualify Johns as a candidate and have her name removed from any official election ballot. Peters argued that Johns could not meet the two-year durational voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution because she did not register to vote until February 4, 2015, which was less than two years before the general election date of November 8, 2016. Although Johns agreed that she did not meet the two-year voter registration requirement, she argued that such requirement is constitutionally invalid as applied to her. The circuit court determined that the voter registration requirement did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Johns appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The State’s justification for the durational voter registration requirement’s burden on voting rights is the same as the justification it offers for the burden on Johns herself. The State’s interests in regulating the fairness of its elections and ensuring that candidates for state representative demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and civic engagement are legitimate. The two-year durational voter registration requirement is rationally related to those interests and a reasonable method of furthering them. Accordingly, article III, section 4 does not violate the First Amendment voting rights of the voters of District 76." View "Peters v. Johns" on Justia Law

Krispy Kreme sought a refund for sales tax it had remitted on retail sales of donuts and non-hot beverages between April 2003 and December 2005, arguing that not more than eighty percent of its food products were sold for immediate consumption on or off the premises of the establishment, and therefore, the lower tax rate authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014 applied to its food sales. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) ruled that Krispy Kreme was not entitled to a refund, determining that the lower tax rate did not apply to Krispy Kreme’s food sales. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Krispy Kreme failed to prove that sales of food prepared for immediate consumption did not constitute more than eighty percent of its total gross receipts and failed to show it was entitled to a lower tax rate under section 144.014. View "Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Director of Revenue assessed use tax on the service charges Bartlett International Inc. and Bartlett Grain Co., LP (collectively, Bartlett) paid to install a grain conveyor at one of its grain elevators in Missouri. The Administrative Hearing Commission determined that the Director improperly assessed tax on the disputed charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the service charges were subject to use tax because they were part of the sale of tangible personal property under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.605(8); and (2) Bartlett failed to show that the disputed charges were subject to a statutory exemption or exclusion. Remanded. View "Bartlett Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2012, IBM Corp. filed a use tax return for its sales of hardware and software to MasterCard International, LLC for MasterCard’s use in processing credit and debt card transactions, claiming that the equipment it sold to MasterCard was exempt from use tax because MasterCard’s activities qualify as “manufacturing” under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2. The Administrative Hearing Commission granted IBM a refund, finding that MasterCard’s use of the hardware and software qualified as “manufacturing a product” as that term is used in the tax exemption set out in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MasterCard’s use of the hardware and software does not qualify as the “manufacturing of any product” under section 144.054.2, and therefore, IBM is not entitled to an exemption from use tax. View "IBM Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Macon County Emergency Services Board (Board) filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Macon County Commission (Commission) seeking a judgment that it was entitled to receive a share of Mason County’s use tax revenue proportionate to its share of the county sales tax revenue. The circuit court denied the Board’s request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.757 does not direct third-class counties as to the disbursement of county use tax revenue, it is within the discretion of the Commission whether to share that revenue with the Board. View "Macon County Emergency Servs. Bd v. Macon County Comm’n" on Justia Law