Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of New Jersey
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In June 2020, the Sussex County Division of Social Services, Office of Adult Protective Services (APS), filed a complaint seeking a plenary guardianship for "Hank," an alleged incapacitated person. Steven J. Kossup was appointed as Hank's attorney, and Brian C. Lundquist was appointed as his temporary guardian. They ensured Hank had stable housing, financial assistance, and medical care. Despite APS's recommendation for a plenary guardian, Kossup and Lundquist argued for a limited guardianship based on Hank's improved circumstances and an expert psychologist's report.The trial court denied the fee applications submitted by Kossup and Lundquist, who sought compensation for their services from APS. The court found no basis for such awards in the Adult Protective Services Act (APS Act) or Rule 4:86-4(e). The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that the APS Act and relevant statutes only authorize fee awards from the estate of the alleged incapacitated person, not from APS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that there is no support in the governing statutes, court rules, or case law for fee awards against APS. The American Rule, which requires litigants to bear their own legal costs, applies, and exceptions in Rule 4:42-9(a) and Rule 4:86-4(e) do not authorize fee awards against APS. The Court emphasized the importance of pro bono service in guardianship matters and suggested that attorneys should be informed if they are expected to serve pro bono. The Court also acknowledged the significant contributions of Kossup and Lundquist in securing necessary services for Hank. View "In re A.D." on Justia Law

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Tennessee Gas proposed constructing a new compressor station (Compressor Station 327) in West Milford Township as part of its East 300 Upgrade Project. The site is within the Highlands Preservation Area, which has stringent environmental standards. Tennessee applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD), claiming an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11) of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act. The DEP issued the HAD, determining that the project qualified for Exemption 11.Food & Water Watch appealed the DEP’s decision, arguing that Exemption 11 should be narrowly construed so that the term “routine” modifies “upgrade.” The Appellate Division agreed, vacating the HAD and remanding the matter to determine if Compressor Station 327 qualifies as a “routine upgrade.” The court emphasized that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed to protect environmental interests and found that “routine” should modify all activities listed in Exemption 11.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the other activities listed in Exemption 11, such as “upgrade.” The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute, its grammatical structure, and the context within the law. The case was remanded to determine if the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, considering factors such as the project's location on already disturbed lands. View "In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station" on Justia Law

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The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (Commission), a bi-state entity created by an interstate compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, sought to replace the I-95 Scudder Falls Bridge. The Commission decided to use a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) for the project, which required contractors to hire at least 75% of their workforce from specified local unions. George Harms Construction Company, Inc. (Harms), which had a collective bargaining agreement with a different union, challenged the PLA, arguing it was unlawful because it excluded their union.The trial court denied Harms' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed Harms' counterclaims, ruling that New Jersey’s competitive bidding laws did not apply to the Commission. However, it also dismissed the Commission’s complaint, stating the lawsuit was not properly authorized by the Commission as a whole. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Commission’s complaint but reversed the dismissal of certain counterclaims, concluding that the Commission lacked authority to use a PLA because New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not have complementary or parallel laws on PLAs.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Court found that the Commission’s broad powers under the Compact include the authority to use PLAs, even though the Compact does not explicitly mention them. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division erred in looking beyond the Compact to state laws that do not mention the Commission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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Brian Ambroise, a Senior Correctional Police Officer at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women, faced disciplinary charges from the Department of Corrections (DOC) in December 2020. The charges included conduct unbecoming a public employee and undue familiarity with inmates, stemming from allegations that Ambroise had a sexual relationship with an inmate, J.O., and performed favors for her, such as bringing in contraband and passing messages. Ambroise admitted to kissing J.O. and failing to report it, as well as passing a message between inmates.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) modified the DOC’s penalty from removal to a twenty-day suspension, sustaining only the charge of failing to report the kiss and dismissing the others. The DOC appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the ALJ’s finding on the failure to report but reversed the dismissal of the undue familiarity charge. The Commission imposed a six-month suspension, considering Ambroise’s previously unblemished record and the seriousness of his conduct.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the Commission’s decision to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court held that the Commission failed to adequately consider the DOC’s expertise in maintaining prison security and the seriousness of Ambroise’s offenses. The Court emphasized that Ambroise’s failure to report the kiss and his undue familiarity with inmates compromised prison security and discipline. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the DOC’s recommended sanction of removal, remanding the case to the Commission to redetermine the penalty in accordance with the Court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Brian Ambroise" on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, J.C. (Jan), who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features. The New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) became involved with Jan and her family in 2018 when she was involuntarily hospitalized for manic and paranoid behavior. The Division implemented a safety plan that mandated temporary supervision of Jan’s contact with her children. After a series of referrals and investigations, the Division filed a complaint in 2020, and the Family Part granted the Division care and supervision of the children. In 2021, the Law Guardian sought to dismiss the Title 30 action due to Jan’s lack of cooperation with the Division. The court discontinued the Division’s care and supervision of the children but dismissed the litigation with restraints, considering Jan's mental health issues.The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. The Appellate Division held that the family court could dismiss a Title 30 action while maintaining restraints on a parent’s conduct. The court reasoned that the family court did not enter permanent restraints but continued the restraints that existed during the litigation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the family court does not have the authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 to dismiss a Title 30 action and continue restraints on a parent’s conduct. If the family court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to continue the restraints on a parent’s conduct, it must keep the case open to facilitate judicial oversight of the Division’s continued involvement, while safeguarding a parent’s right to counsel. The case was remanded to the Family Part to reinstate the Title 30 action or dismiss the case without restraints. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.C. and K.C." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the University Hospital's decision to award a contract for the design, construction, and operation of an on-site pharmacy to a bidder other than Sumukha LLC. Sumukha challenged the decision, but the hospital's hearing officer denied the protest. Sumukha then appealed to the Appellate Division. While the appeal was pending, Sumukha filed a second protest challenging the decision to change the pharmacy's planned location. When the hospital failed to respond, Sumukha filed a second appeal in the Appellate Division.The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal from Sumukha’s first protest, concluding that University Hospital’s determination was not directly appealable to the Appellate Division. It later dismissed Sumukha’s second appeal. Both dismissals were without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file an action in the Law Division. The Court granted certification and consolidated the appeals.The Supreme Court of New Jersey found no evidence in University Hospital’s enabling statute that the Legislature intended the Hospital to be a “state administrative agency” under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The court held that University Hospital’s decisions and actions may not be directly appealed to the Appellate Division. The court affirmed the dismissal of the appeals, without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file actions in the Law Division. View "In re Protest of Contract for Retail Pharmacy Design, Construction, Start-Up and Operation, Request for Proposal No. UH-P20-006" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Susan Seago, a former paraprofessional who became a teacher in 2017. As a paraprofessional, she was a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS), but upon becoming a teacher, she was required to join the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF). Seago attempted to transfer her PERS credits and contributions to her new TPAF account by filling out an "Application for Interfund Transfer" and sending it to her employer, the Edison Township Board of Education (Edison BOE), for completion. However, the Edison BOE failed to complete its portion of the application and submit it on time, resulting in the expiration of Seago's PERS account.The Edison BOE challenged the denial of Seago's interfund transfer application, admitting its mistake in not submitting the application on time. However, the TPAF Board denied the interfund transfer request, and the Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the TPAF Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably when it denied Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court found that Seago had acted in good faith and had taken reasonable steps to ensure that her interfund transfer application was filed. The court also noted that Seago would suffer significant harm from the denial of her interfund transfer application, as she would lose her "Tier 1" membership status and would have to wait an additional five years to retire, ultimately receiving a lower monthly pension allowance. The court concluded that under the unique facts of this case, equity required that the TPAF Board grant Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and instructed the TPAF Board to grant Seago's application for an interfund transfer as if her application had initially been timely filed. View "Seago v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund" on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, Beth, who gave birth to a child, Mia, in June 2020. Both mother and child tested positive for marijuana at the hospital. Beth was discharged from the hospital two days after delivery, but Mia remained. Beth never returned to the hospital, and the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) was unable to contact or locate her because Beth provided incorrect contact information. Mia stayed in the hospital two days longer than she would have if Beth returned to take custody of her. The Division took custody of Mia and placed her in a resource home. The Division filed an action against Beth, arguing that she abused and neglected Mia because she failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying Mia with food, clothing, and shelter. The trial court concluded that the Division met its burden in proving that Beth abused and neglected Mia. The Appellate Division affirmed.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that although Beth left the hospital and did not return, she left Mia in a hospital where she was undoubtedly well taken care of and her needs were met. Nothing in the facts suggested that Beth’s actions impaired Mia or put Mia in imminent danger of being impaired while she remained in the safety of the hospital’s care. The Division therefore failed to meet its burden of establishing abuse or neglect. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and vacated the trial court’s finding of abuse and neglect. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.P." on Justia Law

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The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) sought to obtain records from the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ), a nonprofit association whose members are the twenty-one county prosecutors. The ACLU claimed that CPANJ is a public agency required to disclose records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and a public entity subject to the common law right of access. CPANJ denied the request, asserting that it is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA and is not a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The ACLU filed a lawsuit, but the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that CPANJ is not a public agency within the meaning of OPRA and that CPANJ’s records do not constitute public records for purposes of the common law right of access. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with the lower courts, holding that CPANJ is neither a public agency under OPRA nor a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The court found that the ACLU’s factual allegations did not support a claim against CPANJ under OPRA or the common law. The court concluded that a county prosecutor, who is a constitutional officer, is not the alter ego of the county itself, and does not constitute a “political subdivision” as that term is used in OPRA. Therefore, CPANJ, an organization in which the county prosecutors are members, is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA. The court also found that the ACLU did not allege facts suggesting that CPANJ is an entity upon which a common law right of access request for documents may properly be served. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division in a case concerning the New Jersey State Health Benefits Program Act. The case was brought by James Meyers, a retired state police officer, who challenged the State Health Benefits Commission's (SHBC) decision that he was not exempt from health benefits premium-sharing obligations imposed by the Act. The Act requires public employees to contribute towards the cost of their healthcare benefits upon retirement, with an exemption for employees who had 20 or more years of creditable service in a state or locally administered retirement system as of June 28, 2011. Meyers had 17 years and 9 months of creditable service at that time. Upon his retirement in 2015, he was erroneously offered retiree health benefits at no premium cost. This mistake was discovered in 2017, and the state began deducting premium-sharing contributions from his pension payments.The Court held that Meyers was not eligible for the exemption under the Act, and correcting the erroneous exemption was proper. The court found that neither Meyers' subsequent service nor his purchase of four years of military service credit could change the fact that he did not meet the Act's requirement as of June 28, 2011. The court also agreed with the Appellate Division's determination that it was not necessary to reach the issue of equitable estoppel. The court noted that a governmental entity cannot be estopped from refusing to take an action that it was never authorized to take under the law, even if it had mistakenly agreed to that action. In this case, the SHBC was never authorized to offer Meyers free healthcare benefits, an act beyond the jurisdiction of the SHBC and therefore ultra vires in the primary sense. Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Meyers v. State Health Benefits Commission" on Justia Law