Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of hospitals in New Jersey, which serve a high number of low-income patients, challenged the state's charity care program. This program mandates that hospitals cannot refuse patients based on their inability to pay and prohibits billing qualified patients. The hospitals argued that this program constitutes an unlawful taking of private property without just compensation, violating both federal and state constitutional protections.The trial court dismissed some of the hospitals' claims for not exhausting administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the state on the remaining claims, finding no per se or regulatory takings. The Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that the charity care program does not effect a taking.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the charity care program does not constitute an unconstitutional per se physical taking. The program does not grant an affirmative right of access to hospital property, does not physically set aside hospital property for the government or third parties, and does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Additionally, the court found that the program does not amount to a regulatory taking due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the significant public interest served by the charity care program.The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, as modified, and noted that hospitals can challenge their subsidy allocations through administrative channels and lobby the Legislature for policy changes. The court emphasized that the charity care program does not violate the Takings Clause. View "Englewood Hospital & Medical Center v. State" on Justia Law

Residents of South Seaside Park filed a petition to deannex their community from Berkeley Township and annex it to the Borough of Seaside Park. South Seaside Park is geographically isolated from the mainland section of Berkeley Township, requiring residents to drive 13-16 miles through seven other municipalities to reach the mainland. The community has limited municipal facilities and relies more on Seaside Park for services. The petitioners argued that deannexation would benefit them economically and socially, while not significantly harming Berkeley Township.The Township Council referred the petition to the Planning Board, which conducted 38 hearings over four years. The Planning Board's professional planner, who was supposed to be impartial, instead assisted the Township in opposing the deannexation. Additionally, some Planning Board members made public comments against the petition. The Planning Board ultimately recommended denying the petition, and the Township Council followed this recommendation.Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Council's decision. The trial court found that the Planning Board's process was biased and that the Township's denial of the petition was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court also found that the denial was detrimental to the economic and social well-being of South Seaside Park residents and that deannexation would not significantly harm Berkeley Township. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Planning Board failed to conduct an impartial review and that plaintiffs met their burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. The Court affirmed the trial court's order for deannexation, allowing South Seaside Park to seek annexation by Seaside Park. View "Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the ward map adopted by the Jersey City Ward Commission following the 2020 federal census. The Commission found a 59% population deviation between the most and least populous wards, which exceeded the maximum allowed by the Municipal Ward Law (MWL). The Commission created a new map with a 1.8% deviation and revised the boundaries of all six wards. Plaintiffs, including individuals and community organizations, argued that the new map failed to meet the MWL’s compactness requirement and violated equal protection principles under the New Jersey Constitution. They also claimed a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA).The trial court concluded that the Commission’s map created sufficiently compact wards under the MWL and dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of the MWL claims, remanding for factfinding on whether the Commission’s determination of compactness had a rational basis. It affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the MWL, equal protection, and NJCRA claims. The Court held that the Commission’s map was a proper exercise of its discretion under the MWL. It found that the Commission was not required to use mathematical measures of compactness or consider communities of interest in its determination. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s remand for additional factfinding, reinstating the trial court’s judgment on the MWL claim. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims, concluding that the Commission’s compliance with the MWL negated the equal protection claim and that no statutory or constitutional violation occurred to support the NJCRA claim. View "Jersey City United Against the New Ward Map v. Jersey City Ward Commission" on Justia Law

The Borough of Englewood Cliffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint against its former attorneys and a builder, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The Borough's actions followed a previous affordable housing litigation where the Borough did not prevail and subsequently settled with the builder. The Borough's new council, elected after a municipal election, pursued the litigation despite warnings from the defendants that the claims were frivolous.The trial court dismissed the Borough's complaints with prejudice, finding that the Borough acted in bad faith to harass, delay, and cause malicious injury. The court awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute (FLS), totaling $216,484.45. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that a public entity is not immune from sanctions under the FLS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that municipalities and municipal corporations that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Court found that the FLS does not provide immunity to municipalities and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from liability under the FLS. The Court emphasized that the FLS aims to deter frivolous litigation and compensate the victims of such actions. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed as modified, holding the Borough liable for the sanctions imposed. View "Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner" on Justia Law

Clarios, LLC (Clarios) purchased an industrial site in 2006, for which the seller had executed a remediation plan under the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and placed funds in trust for future remediation. In 2007, Clarios ceased operations and sought a Remediation in Progress Waiver (RIP Waiver) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which was granted with the condition that the DEP reserved the right to enforce ISRA obligations in the future. Clarios sold the site in 2011, and the new owner, DeNovo, assumed remediation responsibilities. By 2021, the remediation trust was depleted, and the site was out of compliance. In April 2022, the DEP rescinded Clarios’s RIP Waiver due to non-compliance and depletion of funds.Clarios requested an adjudicatory hearing, arguing that the rescission without notice or a hearing violated its due process rights. The DEP denied the request, stating that rescission did not entitle Clarios to a hearing under the relevant regulations. Clarios appealed, and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the DEP, holding that Clarios did not have a protected property interest in the RIP Waiver. The court found that Clarios’s expectation of continued suspension of remediation obligations was not based on any statutory or regulatory provisions but rather on a unilateral expectation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that the DEP’s initial grant of the RIP Waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. The Court found that neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver. The governing laws and agency materials anticipated the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future, and thus, rescission of the RIP Waiver without a hearing did not violate Clarios’s due process rights. View "In re Appeal of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's September 6, 2022 Denial of Request for Adjudicatory Hearing" on Justia Law

Rosalyn Musker worked in sales for Suuchi, Inc., which sells software subscriptions to apparel manufacturers. In addition to her base salary, Musker was eligible for commissions under Suuchi’s Sales Commission Plan (SCP). In March 2020, Suuchi decided to sell Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on a commission basis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Musker generated approximately $34,448,900 in gross revenue by selling PPE. The parties disputed whether her 4% commission was based on gross or net revenue and whether these commissions were considered "wages" under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) or excluded as "supplementary incentives."The trial judge dismissed Musker’s WPL claims, holding that her PPE commissions were not "wages" under the WPL. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the commissions were "supplementary incentives" and not "wages" under the WPL. Musker appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that under the WPL, "wages" are defined as "direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis." The Court concluded that compensating an employee by paying a "commission" for "labor or services" always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a "commission" cannot be excluded from the definition of "wages" as a "supplementary incentive."The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the trial judge’s order dismissing Musker’s WPL claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that Musker’s PPE commissions are "wages" under the WPL, regardless of whether they are based on gross or net revenue, and that receiving a base salary does not turn "commissions" into "supplementary incentives." View "Musker v. Suuchi, Inc." on Justia Law

Antonio Fuster went to the Chatham Township Police Department to report that his special needs child had accused an adult male relative of sexual misconduct. His interview with police was recorded on a body worn camera. Fuster and his wife, Brianna Devine, sought access to that video under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. They alleged inaccuracies in the initial police report and wanted the video to potentially file an internal affairs complaint.The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that the body worn camera footage was a government record under OPRA but exempt from disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), which protects the confidentiality of information regarding individuals not arrested or charged. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the video was exempt from disclosure under judicial case law protecting uncharged individuals' law enforcement records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k) did not permit plaintiffs to review the video because Fuster had already requested the video be retained for three years, and Devine was not entitled to review it under the specified provisions. The Court also held that subsection (l) of the Body Worn Camera Law did not abrogate OPRA’s exemptions, but there was no OPRA exemption supporting the refusal to release the video. The Court found that OPRA does not contain an explicit exemption for information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged, and New Jersey case law had not established such an automatic grant of confidentiality.The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and ordered the release of the body worn camera footage to the plaintiffs, without reaching the common law claims. View "Fuster v. Township of Chatham" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the Sussex County Division of Social Services, Office of Adult Protective Services (APS), filed a complaint seeking a plenary guardianship for "Hank," an alleged incapacitated person. Steven J. Kossup was appointed as Hank's attorney, and Brian C. Lundquist was appointed as his temporary guardian. They ensured Hank had stable housing, financial assistance, and medical care. Despite APS's recommendation for a plenary guardian, Kossup and Lundquist argued for a limited guardianship based on Hank's improved circumstances and an expert psychologist's report.The trial court denied the fee applications submitted by Kossup and Lundquist, who sought compensation for their services from APS. The court found no basis for such awards in the Adult Protective Services Act (APS Act) or Rule 4:86-4(e). The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that the APS Act and relevant statutes only authorize fee awards from the estate of the alleged incapacitated person, not from APS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that there is no support in the governing statutes, court rules, or case law for fee awards against APS. The American Rule, which requires litigants to bear their own legal costs, applies, and exceptions in Rule 4:42-9(a) and Rule 4:86-4(e) do not authorize fee awards against APS. The Court emphasized the importance of pro bono service in guardianship matters and suggested that attorneys should be informed if they are expected to serve pro bono. The Court also acknowledged the significant contributions of Kossup and Lundquist in securing necessary services for Hank. View "In re A.D." on Justia Law

Tennessee Gas proposed constructing a new compressor station (Compressor Station 327) in West Milford Township as part of its East 300 Upgrade Project. The site is within the Highlands Preservation Area, which has stringent environmental standards. Tennessee applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD), claiming an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11) of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act. The DEP issued the HAD, determining that the project qualified for Exemption 11.Food & Water Watch appealed the DEP’s decision, arguing that Exemption 11 should be narrowly construed so that the term “routine” modifies “upgrade.” The Appellate Division agreed, vacating the HAD and remanding the matter to determine if Compressor Station 327 qualifies as a “routine upgrade.” The court emphasized that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed to protect environmental interests and found that “routine” should modify all activities listed in Exemption 11.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the other activities listed in Exemption 11, such as “upgrade.” The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute, its grammatical structure, and the context within the law. The case was remanded to determine if the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, considering factors such as the project's location on already disturbed lands. View "In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station" on Justia Law

The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (Commission), a bi-state entity created by an interstate compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, sought to replace the I-95 Scudder Falls Bridge. The Commission decided to use a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) for the project, which required contractors to hire at least 75% of their workforce from specified local unions. George Harms Construction Company, Inc. (Harms), which had a collective bargaining agreement with a different union, challenged the PLA, arguing it was unlawful because it excluded their union.The trial court denied Harms' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed Harms' counterclaims, ruling that New Jersey’s competitive bidding laws did not apply to the Commission. However, it also dismissed the Commission’s complaint, stating the lawsuit was not properly authorized by the Commission as a whole. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Commission’s complaint but reversed the dismissal of certain counterclaims, concluding that the Commission lacked authority to use a PLA because New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not have complementary or parallel laws on PLAs.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Court found that the Commission’s broad powers under the Compact include the authority to use PLAs, even though the Compact does not explicitly mention them. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division erred in looking beyond the Compact to state laws that do not mention the Commission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law