Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Elmer Branch brought a putative class action against his employer, defendant Cream-O-Land Dairy, on behalf of himself and similarly situated truck drivers employed by defendant, for payment of overtime wages pursuant to the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (WHL). The WHL created an exemption from an overtime compensation requirement for employees of a “trucking industry employer.” In response to plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to pay truck drivers as mandated by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4(b)(1), defendant argued that it was exempt from that provision as a trucking industry employer under N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4(f). Defendant also asserted that it was entitled to invoke the absolute defense set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2 because it had relied in good faith on three matters in which the Department had investigated its operations and concluded that it was a “trucking industry employer.” The trial court viewed those decisions to satisfy N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2’s standard for the good-faith defense and granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that none of the determinations on which defendant relied met the requirements of the good-faith defense under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. The Appellate Division also rejected defendant’s invocation of a 2006 Opinion Letter by the Director of the Division that for certain employees of trucking industry employers, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4 “establishes their overtime rate at 1 1/2 times the minimum wage” because defendant did not represent that it had relied on that letter when it determined its overtime compensation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that none of the decisions identified by defendant satisfied the requirements of the good-faith defense under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. The Court acknowledged, however, the dilemma faced by an employer such as defendant, which repeatedly prevailed in overtime disputes before subordinate Department employees but was unable to seek a ruling from the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (Commissioner) because each of those disputes was resolved without further review. This matter was remanded to the trial court for consideration of defendant’s argument that it was a trucking-industry employer within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4(f), and for determination of whether defendant complied with the applicable WHL overtime standards in compensating its employees. View "Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy" on Justia Law

In August 2017, the State filed a petition to civilly commit P.D., relying on P.D.’s conviction for an offense that qualified as a “sexually violent offense” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26, and other offenses. The State submitted two clinical certificates from psychiatrists who opined that P.D. suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that made him “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility for control, care and treatment.” The trial court entered an order temporarily civilly committing P.D. to the Special Treatment Unit. P.D. waived his right under the SVPA to a court hearing within twenty days of the court’s temporary commitment order. P.D. thereafter filed a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court denied. The court found no support for P.D.’s contention that a person facing an SVPA commitment hearing could seek discovery under the general civil discovery rule, Rule 4:10-1, or other rules governing civil cases. The Appellate Division denied P.D.’s motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision. Finding no reversible error in the trial or appellate court orders, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of P.D." on Justia Law

To make up for the tax revenue shortfall COVID-19 created and to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law a bill that authorized the State to borrow up to $9.9 billion. Under the new law, the “New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (Bond Act or Act), the State could issue bonds for private sale or borrow funds from the federal government. Up to $2.7 billion in borrowing could be used for the period from July 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020, and up to $7.2 billion for the period from October 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. Before the Bond Act was enacted, the Assembly Minority Leader asked the Office of Legislative Services (OLS) to offer an opinion on “whether or not the State may issue general obligation bonds without voter approval to meet the needs of the State arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.” OLS issued an opinion letter on May 7, 2020, answering in the affirmative: “the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster contemplated by the [Emergency Exception], and the State therefore may issue bonds, without the usual requirement for voter approval, to meet COVID-19 related emergency needs.” The opinion letter drew a distinction between “borrowing to supplement revenue for future fiscal year budgets,” which OLS believed would violate the Constitution, and “borrowing money where the anticipated revenue certified in accordance with . . . the Constitution becomes insufficient due to an unexpected event” -- a reference to FY2020 -- which OLS found permissible. The New Jersey Republican State Committee filed a complaint contending the asserted legislation violated the Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution, and sought to restrain the Governor from signing or enforcing the bill. After review, the Supreme Court determined the Bond Act did not violate the Constitution, subject to limits imposed by the Court in this opinion. View "New Jersey Republican State Committee v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Ridgefield Park Board of Education (Board) and the Ridgefield Park Education Association (Association) negotiated a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) covering 2011-2014 that went into effect three days after the New Jersey Legislature enacted Chapter 78. The 2011-2014 CNA expired before the employees achieved full implementation of the premium share set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). After the 2011-2014 CNA expired, the Board and the Association negotiated a CNA covering 2014-2018, which, like its predecessor, stated that employees would contribute 1.5% of their salary towards health insurance or the minimum set forth by statute, regulation, or code. During the 2014-2015 school year, the employees contributed to the cost of their health care at the full premium share required by Tier 4. The Board and the Association disputed Chapter 78’s impact on employee contributions for the CNA’s remaining three years. The Board contended that Chapter 78 preempted any negotiated term for those contributions and that the Association’s members were required to contribute to their health benefits at the Tier 4 level for the duration of the CNA. The Association contended that Chapter 78 did not preempt the 1.5% contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA. PERC held that the health insurance premium contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA was preempted by Chapter 78 and granted the Board’s request for a restraint of binding arbitration as to that issue. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that adherence to Chapter 78’s plain language would bring about an “absurd result” contravening legislative intent, and required the employees to contribute only 1.5% of their salaries for the three contested years. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the health insurance premium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were preempted by statute and therefore non-negotiable. PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 comported with the statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis. View "In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a challenge to the City of Newark’s authority to create by ordinance a civilian oversight board to provide a greater role for civilian participation in the review of police internal investigations and in the resolution of civilian complaints. The Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 (FOP) filed a complaint claiming that the Ordinance was unlawful. Based on the record and arguments presented on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held the Ordinance invalid and enjoined its operation in virtually all respects. The court left intact, however, the Ordinance’s grant of authority to the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) to conduct general oversight functions, including aiding in the development of a disciplinary matrix for use by the police force. The Appellate Division invalidated the Ordinance’s required treatment of the CCRB’s investigatory findings, determining that the binding nature of the CCRB’s findings, absent clear error, impermissibly “makes the CCRB’s factual findings paramount to the findings of the IA department.” The New Jersey Supreme Court modified the Appellate Division's judgment, concluding: (1) state law permitted the creation by ordinance of this civilian board with its overall beneficial oversight purpose; (2) the board’s powers must comply with current legislative enactments unless the Legislature refines the law to specifically authorize certain functions that Newark intends to confer on its review board; (3) board can investigate citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, and those investigations may result in recommendations to the Public Safety Director for the pursuit of discipline against a police officer; (4) the board cannot exercise its investigatory powers when a concurrent investigation is conducted by the Newark Police Department’s Internal Affairs (IA) unit; and (5) where there is no existing IA investigation, the review board may conduct investigations in its own right. In addition, the review board could conduct its oversight function by reviewing the overall operation of the police force, including the performance of its IA function in its totality or its pattern of conduct, and provide the called-for periodic reports to the officials and entities as prescribed by municipal ordinance. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a high-end restaurant operated by a for-profit entity, but housed in a building on the Kean University campus, qualified for a local property tax exemption. Gourmet Dining, LLC, owned and operated a fine dining restaurant named Ursino in a Kean University building. In October 2011, the Kean University Foundation, Inc., and Gourmet Dining entered into a Management Subcontract Agreement (MSA), which conferred on Gourmet Dining the exclusive right to operate, manage, and control Ursino. Gourmet Dining agreed to pay the Foundation an annual “management fee” and a percentage of Ursino’s gross revenue. The Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Township. Concluding that Gourmet Dining had not established that the subject property is used for a public purpose pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3, or that its actual use of the property was for “colleges, schools, academies or seminaries” as required by N.J.S.A 54:4-3.6, the court held that Gourmet Dining was not entitled to tax exemption under either provision. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on a holistic view: the restaurant is located on-campus; University students and their parents regularly dined there; Gourmet Dining’s annual management fees were used for scholarships; many of the restaurant’s employees are students; and the restaurant used produce grown on theUniversity grounds and provides the University with compostable waste. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the arrangement by which Gourmet Dining operates Ursino was taxable as a lease or lease-like interest. The public-benefit-oriented exemption provisions in issue were not intended to exempt the for-profit operator of a high-end, regionally renowned restaurant situated on a college campus, when the overriding purpose of the endeavor was focused on profitmaking. "Gourmet Dining, as the exclusive operator and manager of this restaurant establishment, must bear its fair share of the local real property tax burden." View "Gourmet Dining, LLC v. Union Township" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The matter before the federal court involved a dispute between a workers' compensation insurance carrier and its insured, a public employer. Both plaintiff, the City of Asbury Park (the City), and its insurance carrier, defendant Star Insurance Company (Star), sought reimbursement of monies paid toward an injured firefighter’s workers’ compensation claim from funds he recouped through settlement with a third-party tortfeasor. The funds available for reimbursement will not cover the full amount paid collectively by the City and Star. The question was whether, under the equitable “made-whole” or “make-whole” doctrine, the City had priority to recover what it paid before Star could recover any of its losses. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative. Under equitable principles of New Jersey law, the made-whole doctrine did not apply to first-dollar risk, such as a self-insured retention or deductible, that is allocated to an insured under an insurance policy. View "City of Asbury Park v. Star Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Township of Manalapan challenged the condemnation award in favor of defendants entered after a jury trial. The issue was whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the condemned property’s highest and best use would require a variance without first determining whether there was a reasonable probability the variance would be granted. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded evidence that risks misleading the jury into assuming a zoning variance for purposes of calculating a property’s value must not be admitted absent a judicial finding it was reasonably probable that the variance will be obtained. Therefore, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider testimony that the highest and best use of the subject property would require a variance without first confirming the probability of securing that variance. View "Township of Manalapan v. Gentile" on Justia Law

A complaint issued by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) alleged four counts of misconduct against a superior court judge, Respondent John Russo, Jr. The charges and findings related to four discrete instances of misconduct. Count I, the most serious matter, concerns Respondent’s conduct at a hearing on an application for a final restraining order. The misconduct charged related to his questioning of an alleged victim of domestic violence who testified that she had been sexually assaulted, as well as his comments to staff members in open court after the hearing. Count II addressed a personal guardianship matter in which Respondent allegedly asked a Judiciary employee to contact her counterpart in another vicinage and request that a hearing be rescheduled to accommodate Respondent. Count III asserted Respondent created the appearance of a conflict of interest when he presided over a matter in the Family Division in which he knew both parties since high school. Count IV related to Respondent’s ex parte communication with an unrepresented litigant. After it conducted a hearing, the ACJC found clear and convincing evidence to support all the charges. A panel of three Judges designated by the Supreme Court then conducted a separate, additional hearing and concluded that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent violated the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules cited in all four counts. The panel recommended that Respondent be removed from office. Based on its review of the extensive record, the New Jersey Supreme Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was cause for Respondent’s removal, and ordered such removal. View "In the Matter of John F. Russo, Jr." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the investigation into a claim that a mother, S.C., abused her seven-year-old son by corporal punishment. The New Jersey Department of Children and Families (Department) concluded, after its investigation, that the claim of abuse was “not established.” Because the abuse allegation was deemed “not established” rather than “unfounded,” it was not eligible to be expunged. S.C. appealed the Department’s action, claiming: (1) a deprivation of her due process rights because she was not afforded a hearing; and (2) that the Department’s “not established” finding was arbitrary and capricious because the record was insufficient to support a finding that her son was harmed. S.C. did not raise a direct challenge to the validity of having a “not established” finding category in the Department’s regulations, although amici urged that the category be declared illegitimate and eliminated. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded: (1) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found credible evidence to support the allegation of harm; and (2) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Supreme Court rejected that due process considerations required the Department to conduct an adjudicative contested case proceeding either internally or at the Office of Administrative Law for a “not established” finding. That said, on the basis of the present record, the Supreme Court could not assess whether the “not established” finding in this instance was arbitrary or capricious. "It would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a 'not established' finding as well as its processes related to such findings. Our review of this matter brings to light shortcomings in fairness for parents and guardians involved in investigations that lead to such findings and which may require appellate review." View "S.C. v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families" on Justia Law