Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Obetz initiated a mandamus and prohibition action against Franklin County Auditor Michael Stinziano and Franklin County Treasurer Cheryl Brooks Sullivan. The dispute arose from a tax-increment-financing (TIF) arrangement established by Obetz in 1997. Obetz erroneously received TIF proceeds in 2015, 2016, and 2017. To correct this, Obetz returned some funds to the county, but the county also withheld Obetz's real-property-tax distribution for the first half of 2022 and reallocated it to other taxing jurisdictions.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas initially reviewed the case, where Obetz sought to compel the county to return the funds it had tendered and to pay future settlement distributions without setoff. The lower court's decision led to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court held that Obetz was not entitled to the return of the $212,963.01 it had voluntarily paid to the county. Additionally, the court denied Obetz's request for the county to pay $194,944.32, which had been withheld and reallocated to other jurisdictions. However, the court granted a limited writ of mandamus, compelling the county to pay future settlement distributions to Obetz without setoff. The court found that the county did not have the authority under R.C. 319.44, R.C. 323.133(B), R.C. 5713.08, or R.C. 5715.22 to withhold future settlement funds from Obetz. The court also denied Obetz's request for a writ of prohibition, as the county's actions did not constitute the exercise of judicial power. View "State ex rel. Obetz v. Stinziano" on Justia Law

Christopher R. Hicks submitted a public-records request to the Union Township, Clermont County Board of Trustees, seeking email- and mail-distribution lists for the township's newsletter. The township denied the request, claiming the lists did not document the township's activities and were not public records. Hicks filed a complaint in the Court of Claims, arguing that the lists were public records documenting the township's functions and activities.The Court of Claims appointed a special master who found that the lists were used for administrative convenience and did not meet the definition of a public record. The Court of Claims adopted this recommendation and denied Hicks's request. Hicks appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the lists were used solely for convenience and did not document the township's functions or activities.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the email- and mail-distribution lists are public records under R.C. 149.011(G) because they document the township's functions and activities by showing how the newsletter is distributed to constituents. The court emphasized that the Public Records Act should be construed liberally in favor of broad access and that the lists are central to the township's communication with its constituents. The court ordered that the requested records be made available to Hicks. View "Hicks v. Union Twp. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a police chief, Erica Barga, by the Village Council of St. Paris. Barga was placed on administrative leave by the mayor, who filed charges against her for insubordination and neglect of duty. Barga requested a public hearing to address these charges. The village council conducted the hearing in public but deliberated in executive session before voting to terminate Barga's employment.The Champaign County Court of Common Pleas upheld the village council's decision, concluding that Barga did not have a substantive or procedural right to have the entire disciplinary hearing open to the public. The court also found that the village council's decision was presumed valid and that Barga had not overcome this presumption.The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the Open Meetings Act, relying on a federal district court decision that exempted quasi-judicial proceedings from the Act. However, it found that the common pleas court had applied the wrong standard of review and remanded the case for a de novo review.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the village council violated the Open Meetings Act by deliberating in executive session after Barga requested a public hearing. The court emphasized that the plain terms of the Act required the council to consider the charges in a public hearing. The court remanded the case to the village council for a public hearing in compliance with the Open Meetings Act. View "Barga v. St. Paris Village Council" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking to place a proposed constitutional amendment titled "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" before Ohio voters. The relators submitted the text and a summary of their proposed amendment to the Ohio Attorney General, Dave Yost, for certification. The Attorney General refused to certify the summary, arguing that the title "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" was not a fair and truthful statement of the proposed amendment.Previously, the relators had submitted their petition with a different title, "Secure and Fair Elections," which the Attorney General also rejected for similar reasons. The relators revised their petition and resubmitted it with the new title, but the Attorney General again refused to certify it, focusing solely on the title's perceived inaccuracy.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court determined that the Attorney General's authority under R.C. 3519.01(A) is limited to examining the summary of a proposed constitutional amendment, not its title. The court found that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority by rejecting the petition based on the title. The court noted that the statutory scheme differentiates between a "summary" and a "title," and the Attorney General's duty is to review only the summary.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Attorney General to examine the summary of the relators' proposed amendment within ten days, determine whether it is a fair and truthful statement, and, if so, certify and forward the petition to the Ohio Ballot Board. The court emphasized that the Attorney General must perform his statutory duty without considering the title of the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. Dudley v. Yost" on Justia Law

A property developer settled claims with the U.S. Department of Justice for alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sought to assert a state-law claim for contribution against other companies involved in developing the properties. The developer, Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C., alleged that the franchisees, including Wilcox Development Group, L.L.C., failed to comply with the FHA in their construction and design of certain properties.The trial court dismissed the case, not on the grounds argued by Wilcox, but on the theory that if a state-law cause of action for contribution existed, it was preempted by federal law. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and Epcon appealed the preemption issue to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in deciding the case on the basis of federal preemption. The court emphasized principles of judicial restraint, noting that no party had argued for federal preemption and that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions unless necessary. The court also highlighted that the preemption issue was hypothetical and should not have been addressed without first determining whether a state-law contribution claim was available.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the facts alleged present a claim for relief under Ohio law. The court did not address the preemption issue, as it was not properly presented by the parties and was unnecessary to resolve at this stage. View "Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Democratic Party and two voters, Norman Wernet and Eric Duffy, who filed a mandamus action against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. They sought to compel LaRose to rescind Directive 2024-21, which requires individuals delivering absentee ballots for family members or disabled voters to complete an attestation at the board of elections and prohibits returning such ballots to a drop box. The directive aims to prevent "ballot harvesting" and ensure the integrity and security of absentee ballot delivery.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose that certain Ohio laws limiting who can return absentee ballots for disabled voters were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. Following this, LaRose issued Directive 2024-21 and later Directive 2024-24 and Advisory 2024-03, which provided additional guidance but did not substantially alter the original directive.The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the relators' claims were barred by laches due to their unreasonable delay in filing the complaint. The court noted that the directive was issued on August 31, but the complaint was not filed until September 27, a 24-day delay. This delay was deemed unreasonable, especially given the time-sensitive nature of election-related matters. The court also found that the delay caused material prejudice to the Secretary of State and county boards of elections, as absentee voting had already begun, and changing the procedures at this stage would lead to voter confusion and administrative burdens.The Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus based on laches and did not address the merits of the relators' claims. The court also denied the motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Republican Party but accepted their brief as an amici curiae brief. View "State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for approval to construct a 3.7-mile natural-gas-distribution pipeline in Maumee, Ohio. The application was submitted under an accelerated review process for pipelines less than five miles long. Yorktown Management, L.L.C., which owns property adjacent to the proposed pipeline route, raised concerns about the safety and environmental impact of the pipeline, particularly its proximity to their commercial office building.The Ohio Power Siting Board approved Columbia's application under the accelerated review process, finding that the project met the necessary criteria. Yorktown filed a motion to intervene and later a motion to suspend the review, arguing that the board had not adequately addressed their safety concerns. The board denied Yorktown's motion to suspend and subsequently denied their application for rehearing, leading Yorktown to appeal the decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court found that Columbia's application did not require a 50-foot-wide permanent easement along the entire pipeline route, as Yorktown claimed. The court also determined that Yorktown had waived its right to challenge the board's rejection of testimony from a different pipeline project. Additionally, the court held that the board did not err in refusing to suspend its review of the accelerated application, as Yorktown failed to demonstrate good cause for suspension. The court concluded that the board did not improperly defer to Columbia and had appropriately conditioned the approval on compliance with relevant safety regulations. View "In re Letter of Notification Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. for the Ford Street Pipeline Project" on Justia Law

A group of landowners challenged the Ohio Tax Commissioner’s decision to set a woodland-clearing-cost rate of $1,000 per acre for the purpose of calculating the current agricultural use valuation (CAUV) of their properties for tax years 2015 through 2020. The landowners argued that the rate was too low and not based on reliable evidence, causing their woodlands to be overvalued and resulting in higher property taxes.The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the Tax Commissioner’s decision, finding that the Commissioner did not abuse her discretion in setting the $1,000 rate. The BTA concluded that the rate was within the Commissioner’s discretion and based on input from the agricultural advisory committee. The BTA also rejected the Tax Commissioner’s argument that some landowners lacked standing to challenge the CAUV entries for certain years.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the Tax Commissioner abused her discretion by adopting the $1,000 rate without reliable evidence or a sound reasoning process. The court noted that the decision was arbitrary and not supported by any fixed rules or standards. The court also found that the Tax Commissioner failed to comply with Ohio Administrative Code 5703-25-33, which requires obtaining information from reliable sources and ensuring that CAUV tables are accurate, reliable, and practical.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the BTA’s decision and remanded the case to the Tax Commissioner with instructions to adopt a woodland-clearing-cost rate that complies with the administrative code. The court emphasized that the Tax Commissioner must base the rate on reliable evidence and follow the prescribed standards. View "Adams v. Harris" on Justia Law

Imposters, Ltd., a performing-arts theater in Cleveland, sought to place a local liquor option on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The theater holds D-1 and D-2 permits allowing the sale of beer and mixed beverages but not wine or spirituous liquor. Imposters submitted a petition to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections to allow the sale of wine and spirituous liquor at its location. The board rejected the petition, stating it did not comply with statutory requirements because it did not include "mixed beverages" alongside "wine."The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections reviewed the petition and found it invalid. The board's manager of candidate and petition services informed Imposters that the petition should have included "wine and mixed beverages and spirituous liquor" to be valid. Imposters argued that it did not need to include "mixed beverages" because it already had a permit for mixed beverages. The board unanimously voted to reject the petition and not certify the local liquor option for the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and denied the writ of mandamus sought by Imposters. The court held that the board did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law. The court found that the petition did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, specifically R.C. 4301.333(B)(3)(a) and R.C. 4301.355(B)(1), which require the inclusion of "wine and mixed beverages" together. The court concluded that the statutory language did not allow for the separation of "wine" from "mixed beverages" in the petition, and thus, the board's decision to reject the petition was justified. View "State ex rel. Imposters, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A proposed constitutional amendment in Ohio seeks to repeal Articles XI and XIX of the Ohio Constitution and add Article XX, changing the standards and procedures for drawing electoral districts. The amendment would create a 15-member redistricting commission responsible for adopting redistricting plans. Citizens Not Politicians, a coalition aiming to end gerrymandering, and other relators challenged the ballot language and title adopted by the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State Frank LaRose, arguing they were misleading.The Ohio Ballot Board approved the ballot language by a three-to-two vote. Relators filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to adopt new language and title. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ballot language and title would mislead, deceive, or defraud voters. The court found that sections five and eight of the ballot language were misleading. Section five inaccurately limited judicial review to a "proportionality standard," and section eight failed to mention the public's right to participate in the redistricting process through public meetings and hearings.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State to reconvene and adopt revised ballot language addressing these defects. The court denied the writ in all other respects, finding the remaining sections of the ballot language and the ballot title to be factually accurate and not misleading. The motion for leave to withdraw the answer was granted, and the motion to strike was denied as moot. View "State ex rel. Citizens Not Politicians v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law