Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal of a decision of the Ohio State Board of Education, holding that the state board's final determination that a charter school must repay approximately $60 million in excess funding could not be appealed under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119.In 2016, the Ohio Department of Education determined that the state had overpaid the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), formerly Ohio's largest charter school, approximately $60 million based on a review of the school's enrollment data. ECOT appealed under Ohio Rev. Code 3314.08(K)(2)(b), which allows a charter school to appeal such a decision to the board of education for an informal hearing. The state board confirmed the department of education's determination. At issue was whether ECOT could appeal the board of education's "final" decision where section 3314.08(K)(2)(d) provides that any decision made by the board on such an appeal is final. The Supreme Court concluded that ECOT had no right to appeal the decision under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119. View "Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot the writ of mandamus sought by Malcolm and Mary Wood seeking to compel Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals and its members (collectively, the zoning board) to stay their approval of a development plan and hear their appeals, holding that subsequent events had rendered the case moot.After the planning commission approved a proposed real estate development in Rocky River the Woods, who lived next to the site, filed an appeal. The zoning board declared the notice of appeal void on the grounds that the appeal was not completed or perfected within a timely fashion. The Woods subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the construction of the project was substantially underway. View "State ex rel. Wood v. Rocky River" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board granting Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to construct, operate, and maintain a natural-gas pipeline, holding that the Board's decision was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show a mistake or willful disregard of duty.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) assuming without deciding that the Board misapplied its filing requirements, the error was harmless; (2) the Board did not err in determining that Duke's proposal met the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A)(1); (3) the Board properly accounted for the interest of safety in evaluating Duke's proposal; (4) the Board did not err by not requiring Duke to evaluate the pipeline's impact against the City of Blue Ash's most recent comprehensive plan; (5) the Board did not err in evaluating the pipeline's estimated tax benefits; and (6) the Board did not deprive Blue Ash of due process of law. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allowing a gas company to charge its customers higher rates, holding that the PUCO erred by approving the rate increase.At issue was whether Suburban Natural Gas Company's customers must pay for a 4.9-mile extension of the company's pipeline. The PUCO determined that the pipeline extension met the "used-and-useful" test as of a specified date and approved the rate increase. See Ohio Rev. Code 4909.15(A)(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the PUCO looked beyond whether the entire 4.9-mile extension was used and useful on the applicable date and considered whether it was a prudent investment because it might prove useful in the future; and (2) therefore, the PUCO erred in evaluating the rate increase. View "In re Application of Suburban Natural Gas Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relators in this expedited election case to bar the Clark County Board of Elections from placing a referendum on the November 2021 election ballot, holding that Relators were not entitled to the writ.Hillside Creek Farms filed an application to rezone its forty-two-acre parcel of real property from agricultural and rural residential to a Planned District-Residential classification. After the Clark County Board of County Commissioners approved the amended rezoning application a petition was filed requesting a ballot referendum on the Hillside rezoning resolution. Relators, including Hillside, filed a protest against the zoning-referendum petition. The denied the protest and placed the referendum on the November ballot. The Supreme Court denied Relators' requested writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections' decision to approve the zoning referendum for placement on the ballot was authorized by law. View "Hillside Creek Farms v. Clark County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus sought by Relators, four City of Cincinnati electors, to compel changes to ballot language for a proposed amendment to the Cincinnati City Charter, holding that Relators showed that they were entitled to the writ in part.At issue was an initiative petition proposing amendments to the Cincinnati City Charter. The Hamilton County Board of Elections certified ballot language to which Relators objected. Relators filed this original action against the Board and its members alleging that the certified ballot language misrepresented the proposed amendment and omitted material information. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part and denied it in all other respects, holding that Relators showed that the Board abused its discretion in preparing and certifying only certain ballot language for the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. Rhoads v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus seeking to place a referendum on the November 2021 ballot asking voters to approve or disapprove an amendment to the Liberty Township Zoning Resolution, holding that the Delaware County Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or disregard clearly applicable law in sustaining a protest to the referendum petition.The board of elections sustained the protest to the referendum petition because the petition did not include an adequate summary of the zoning amendment as required by Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). Relator, Scott Donaldson, sought this writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to place the referendum on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the board of elections abused its discretion or disregarded clearly applicable law in sustaining the protest to the referendum petition. View "State ex rel. Donaldson v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and, alternatively, a writ of procedendo ordering Respondents to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his appeal of the mayor's appointment of another detective sergeant to the position of lieutenant with the City of Youngstown Police Department, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writs.Relator, a detective sergeant with the Youngstown Police Department, brought this action against Respondents, the Youngstown Civil Service Commission and its president, Vice President, and secretary, challenging the decision of the City's mayor to appoint to the position of lieutenant the examinee who ranked first on the eligibility list. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to issue a decision determining his appeal was moot; (2) this Court declines to address Relator's constitutional argument; and (3) Relator's procedendo claim failed. View "State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to identify the reasons for its denial of Employer's request for reconsideration of its order directing Employer to continue paying for Employee's drugs prescribed in connection with Employee's work injuries, holding that the Commission must reconsider Employee's motion in light of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3.After Employer, which was self-insured for workers' compensation purposes, informed Employee that it would no longer reimburse Employee for his prescriptions in connection with his work-related injuries, Employee filed a motion asking the Commission to order Employer to continue paying for his drugs. The Commission granted the motion and denied Employer's request for reconsideration. Employer then sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to vacate its order and deny continued reimbursement for the prescriptions. The court of appeals granted a limited writ. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and denied in part and granted in part the writ of mandamus, holding that the Commission should have considered Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3 in its determination of Employee's motion. View "State ex rel. T.S. Trim Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissing these appeals of final determinations of the tax commissioner on the grounds that they were untimely, holding that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197 tolled the time limitation for filing the appeals, and Appellant filed the notices of appeal with both the tax commissioner and the BTA during the tolling period.On April 29, 2020, the tax commissioner journalized his final determinations upholding the tax assessments in each case. Service was completed by certified mail on May 4, 2020. Appellant delivered a notice of appeal to the tax department on June 26, 2020. The next day Appellant filed the notices of appeal with the BTA. The BTA dismissed both appeals as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 22(A)(1)(c) of H.B. 197 tolled Appellant's appeal period and that Appellant's appeals were timely filed. View "Chapman Enterprises, Inc. v. McClain" on Justia Law