Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that upheld three use-tax assessments based on Appellant's purchase of three trucks, holding that the BTA erred by failing to correlate its findings with the distinct primary uses of the trucks.The trucks at issue were two Peterbilt trucks and one Lodal truck. Appellant argued that because it purchased the three trucks for use in its business as a for-hire motor carrier, the purchase were exempt from sales and use tax under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(32)'s "highway transportation for hire" exemption. The tax commissioner and the BTA determined that the exemption did not apply to the purchases because Appellant's use of the trucks to transport waste material to landfills did not qualify as the transportation of "personal property belonging to others." The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) for purposes of section 5739.02(B)(32), waste is "personal property belonging to" the person or entity that generated it when the person or entity has an agreement with the hauler that specifies where the waste is to be taken for disposal; and (2) because the generators of the waste hauled by the Peterbilt trucks designated the destination of the waste, the Peterbilt trucks were entitled to the exemption. View "N.A.T. Transportation, Inc. v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying U.S. Tubular Products, Inc.'s complaint in mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its decision requesting John Roush's request for an award of additional compensation, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by evidence in the record.Under Ohio Const. art. II, 35, a worker who sustains injuries as a result of her employer's violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) may seek an award of additional compensation. Roush sustained injuries while working at U.S. Tubular, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed for numerous conditions. Roush later filed an application for a VSSR award, claiming that U.S. Tubular had violated specific safety requirements set forth in the Ohio Administrative Code. The Commission granted a VSSR award of an additional twenty-five percent in compensation. U.S. Tubular filed a mandamus complaint seeking a writ compelling the Commission to vacate the VSSR award. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's determinations were supported by evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. U.S. Tubular Products, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose to appoint Sharon Sweda to the Lorain County Board of Elections, holding that the Lorain County Democratic Party Committee did not demonstrate its entitlement to a writ of mandamus under the circumstances of this case.In rejecting the Committee's recommendation to appoint Sweda for appointment to the Lorain County Board of Elections, LaRose concluded that Sweda had not demonstrated "the judgment or adequate level of integrity necessary to ensure voter confidence." Thereafter, the Committee commenced this expedited action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Committee failed to prove that LaRose abused his discretion when he rejected the Committee's recommendation. View "State ex rel. Lorain County Democratic Party Executive Committee v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus to compel changes to ballot language for a proposed amendment to the Cincinnati City Charter, holding that Relators showed that the Hamilton County Board of Elections abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law.Relators sought to amend the Charter to require the City of Cincinnati to require the City to provide funding for affordable housing and neighborhood stabilization. The Secretary of State approved the ballot language over Relators' objection. Relators then brought this action seeking to compel the Board and Secretary of State to approve new ballot language. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relators failed to show that City Council or the Secretary of State had a clear legal duty to provide the requested relief; and (2) the Board improperly prepared and certified ballot language stating that the use of two potential funding sources for a proposed affordable housing trust fund would violate state law. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Action for Housing Now v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relators compelling Respondents - the Ohio Secretary of State, the Medina County Board of Elections, and the City of Medina - to change the ballot language of a local issue on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.In this case arising out of the City's efforts to move the Medina Municipal Court to the Medina County courthouse building and citizen opposition to those efforts, Relators filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to amend the ballot language for Ordinance No. 222-20, as Relators requested. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Relators failed to show that the Secretary of State and the City were proper respondents for the relief they sought; and (2) the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in approving the ballot language. View "State ex rel. Walker v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling with Ohio Department of Commerce and the Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program (collectively, the Department) to approve or deny Fire Rock, Ltd.'s application to expand its marijuana cultivation area, holding that Fire Rock was entitled to the writ.Fire Rock submitted an application requesting approval to expand its Akron-based cultivation facility. When the Department took no action on the expansion request, Fire Rock filed a complaint for writ of mandamus ordering the Department to approve or deny Fire Rock's application. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ, holding (1) Ohio law does not prohibit a cultivator like Fire Rock from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative; (2) the Department had a clear legal duty to act on Fire Rock's application, and Fire Rock had a clear legal right to that relief; and (3) Fire Rock lacked an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Jerone McDougald to compel Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, the public-records custodian at Toledo Correctional Institution, where McDougald was an inmate, to make available for inspection a certain video, holding that Sehlmeyer presented evidence supporting her claim that allowing McDougald to inspect the video would create undue security risks.McDougald send a public-records request to Sehlmeyer asking to inspect video surveillance footage of a use-of-force incident involving him. Sehlmeyer did not provide the video to McDougald. McDougald then filed this original action asking the Supreme Court to compel Sehlmeyer to allow him to inspect the video. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Sehlmeyer did not have a clear legal duty to allow McDougald to inspect the video. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus ordering the Public Employees Retirement Board to transfer Appellant from the "combined" plan in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System to the "traditional" plan, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.After the court of appeals denied the writ, Appellant appealed, asserting six propositions of law sounding in mandamus and in common-law tort. Appellant also filed a motion for oral argument. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the motion for oral argument, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish a clear legal right to relief or a clear legal duty on the part of the Board to provide it; and (2) this Court and the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over Appellant's common-law tort claims. View "State ex rel. Tarrier v. Public Employees Retirement Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the City of Akron and its police chief (collectively, the City) to inform Kimani Ware, the relator in this action, of the cost for copying the public records he sought, holding that Ware was entitled to the writ.Ware, an inmate, sent two letters to the Akron Policy Department requesting various public records. When he did not receive a response Ware filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. After receiving the complaint, the City responded to Ware with two letters. The City noted in an affidavit the total cost for copying the requested records and informed Ware that the records would be sent to him once he paid the requested amount. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) because the City was willing to provide copies of the records once Ware had paid for the copies, a writ compelling the City to provide the records was unnecessary; (2) this Court grants a writ ordering the City to provide the invoices to Ware so he may decide whether to pay for the copies; and (3) Ware was not entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Akron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing Defendant-doctor's convictions on the ground that the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating answers he gave during a medical board investigation, holding that the State may use incriminating answers given by a doctor during a medical board investigation in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the doctor.Defendant was convicted of three third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress statements he had made to the medical board investigator as having been illegally compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a medical license is a property right, the threatened loss of which is a form of coercion that can compromise the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (2) for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of statements made during a medical board investigative interview, the person making the statements must subjectively believe that asserting the privilege against self-incrimination could cause the loss of the person's medical license, and that belief must be objectively reasonable; and (3) Defendant's belief that he could lose his medical license if he refused to truthfully answer questions posed by the medical-board investigator was not objectively reasonable. View "State v. Gideon" on Justia Law