Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a property owner, applied to exempt real property used as a public community school for tax year 2010. The tax commissioner denied the exemption to the property that Appellant leased to the community school. Appellant appealed, arguing that because it was wholly owned by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation whose members include the community school to whom the property is leased, the property should qualify for exemption under the public-schoolhouse exemption and an exemption for exclusive charitable use. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of an exemption, concluding that the record showed a “view to profit” on the part of the lessor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient support for the BTA’s view-to-profit finding. View "250 Shoup Mill, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

As the result of an audit, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reclassified some of Aaron’s Inc.’s employees for purposes of workers’ compensation premiums, applied the reclassifications retroactively, and billed Aaron’s for more than $2 million in back premiums. Aaron’s filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing adequately to explain why it decided to apply the reclassifications retroactively and not solely prospectively as Aaron’s had advocated. The administrator’s designee concluded that the Bureau properly exercised its discretion to apply the reclassification retroactively. Aaron’s subsequently filed the instant complaint seeking a writ of mandamus regarding the order of the administrator’s designee. A magistrate concluded that the administrator’s designee appropriately exercised his discretion in ordering the reclassifications to be applied retroactively. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it applied the audit adjustment to the twenty-four months prior to the current payroll period. View "State ex rel. Aaron's, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

James and Tina Renacci filed a joint Ohio tax return for tax year 2000 without reporting and paying Ohio individual income tax on amounts earned by a trust (Trust) that owned shares of three Subchapter S corporations. In 2003, the tax commissioner assessed the Renaccis in relation to the unreported S-corporation income. The Renaccis paid all amounts demanded by the state and then filed a refund claim for the double-interest penalty amount. The tax commissioner denied the refund claim. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the denial of penalty remission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax commissioner, under the circumstances of this case, abused his discretion in denying the refund request. Remanded with instructions that the penalty be refunded. View "Renacci v. Testa" on Justia Law

Epic Aviation, LLC, a vendor of jet fuel, sold jet fuel to AirNet Systems, Inc., collected sales tax on it, and remitted the tax to the state. Epic, on behalf of AirNet, sought a refund of sales tax paid by AirNet on its purchases of jet fuel from Epic from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2009. The tax commissioner denied the claim for refund. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Epic appealed, arguing that AirNet’s jet fuel purchases were exempt from sales tax because AirNet purchased the fuel intending to use the fuel “directly in the rendition of a public utility service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(42)(a). The tax commissioner denied the exemption, finding that the business of AirNet, which does not hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the federal government, was not sufficiently regulated to qualify as a “public utility service.” The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded, holding that Epic should have an opportunity to present evidence to establish the portion of the jet fuel purchased by AirNet that is exempt from taxation under the common-carrier standard as clarified in this opinion. View "Epic Aviation, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

For tax years 2002 through 2007, Appellants filed no Ohio tax returns, contending that income was earned outside Ohio. The tax commissioner assessed Ohio individual income tax against Appellants for the tax years at issue but initially failed to give notice of his reliance on the unrebutted presumption that Appellants were, in fact, Ohio residents and domiciliaries. Appellants challenged the commissioner’s assessment. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate an error in the commission’s final determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all income of Ohio residents is taxable, regardless of where the income is earned or received; and (2) Appellants failed to prove that they do not have to pay the amounts assessed, despite the tax commissioner’s failure to give notice of his reliance on the presumption of Ohio residency. View "Krehnbrink v. Testa" on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued a two-story office building at $2,205,000. The property owner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented an appraisal valuing the property at $1,000,000. The BOR adopted the lower value. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the BOR’s valuation. BOE appealed, arguing that the appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of value, and therefore, the BTA should not have adopted that value for the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the plain applicability of the Bedford rule, the BTA did not err in its decision. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The FirstEnergy Companies Ohio Edison Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison Company (collectively, FirstEnergy) submitted an application for an electric-security plan (ESP). The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approved the application. After FirstEnergy began implementing the terms of the ESP, it filed an application to extend the plan and identified the changes it would make to the existing plan. The Commission approved the application. Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC) and the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient probative evidence to show that the Commission’s determination was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence or clearly unsupported by the record. View "In re Application of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

Cynthia Huntsman operated a farm on which she kept multiple species of wild animals that are regulated by the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Huntsman had no permit to possess “dangerous wild animals” under the Act. The Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) ordered the transfer of multiple dangerous wild animals found in Huntsman’s facility to a temporary holding facility established by the ODA. A Stark County Common Pleas Court judge granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order against the ODA and ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman. The director of the ODA sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding in the underlying case and ordered him to vacate his previous orders in the case, holding that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Huntsman and her farm. View "State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione" on Justia Law

Marcus Pryor applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment compensation. The director of ODJFS concluded that Pryor was ineligible for benefits. A hearing officer with the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The Commission denied Pryor’s request to review the hearing officer’s findings. Pryor filed an appeal in the common pleas court naming the director of ODJFS as the appellee but failing to name the Army, Pryor’s former employer, as a party to his appeal. The common pleas court dismissed the appeal, finding that because Pryor failed to name the Army was an interested party, his notice of appeal did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 4141.282(D), thus depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court’s dismissal of Pryor’s appeal and reinstated Pryor’s administrative appeal in the common pleas court, ruling that Pryor’s failure to name the Army was not a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the naming of interested parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under section 4141.282; but (2) the Commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements in section 4141.282(D), and therefore, Pryor’s time to appeal the Commission’s decision never started to run. Remanded. View "Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law