Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In a matter of first impression, the issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was the appropriate test to determine whether a claimant who is otherwise entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits due to a separation from employment becomes ineligible for those benefits as a result of being self-employed pursuant to Section 402(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Act, known as the self-employment exclusion). The Court held that Section 4(l)((2)(B), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B), contained the appropriate test for determining whether or not an individual is in self-employment. If an individual was not in “self-employment,” then he remained eligible for benefits. Applying that test to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's ruling that the claimant was not self-employed. View "Lowman v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) to the judicial branch of our tripartite form of government violated separation of powers principles. On April 3, 1989, the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) Office of Adult Probation hired Appellant Michael Renner as a Parole Officer. In July 2011, Appellant informed Lehigh County Chief Probation Officer John Sikora that he had been diagnosed with a serious mental health condition and was hospitalized; he was subsequently absent from work for 4 to 6 weeks. During Appellant’s absence, Sikora telephoned him numerous times to confirm the legitimacy of Appellant’s condition. Upon his return to work, Appellant alleged Sikora and Lehigh County Benefits Manager Mark Surovy, both of whom supervised Appellant, pressured Appellant to resign or take a leave of absence. Appellant confronted Sikora about his hostilities towards him, but Sikora refused to discuss the matter. Subsequently, in March 2014, Sikora terminated Appellant for failing to administer a urine test to an offender under his supervision. Appellant claimed the test was not required and that the reason for his termination was pretextual. Appellant protested his termination to then-President Judge of the CCP Carol McGinley, but Judge McGinley refused to take any action. As a result, Appellant claimed he could not obtain other employment in any other court system, and, in 2014, he filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), against Lehigh County Adult Probation, Sikora, and Surovy. Thereafter, Appellant completed training as a municipal officer, and, subsequently, was offered a police officer position by Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs. Appellant alleged that the CCP and Lehigh County learned that Appellant was offered employment as a police officer, and caused an order to be issued banning Appellant from possessing a firearm or taser in the Lehigh County Courthouse, Old Courthouse, and Government Center. As a result, Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs rescinded their employment offers. Appellant eventually got his gun possession ban lifted, but as a condition, the CCP and Lehigh County required him to undergo a medical exam, which Appellant contended was a violation of the PHRA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that application of the PHRA to the judiciary would violate separation of powers principles, and thus, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Renner v. CCP of Lehigh Co., et al" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the level of deference courts had to afford an administrative agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Distributed Antenna System (DAS) networks were public utilities under the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code (Code), thereby reversing the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) interpretation of the definition of “public utility." This case involved the status of DAS networks as public utilities in Pennsylvania. Appellees, Crown Castle NG East LLC (Crown Castle NG) and Pennsylvania-CLEC LLC (Pennsylvania-CLEC) (collectively Crown Castle), operated DAS networks. Crown Castle’s DAS networks provided telecommunications transport services to Wireless Service Providers (WSP), such as AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, T-Mobile, and others. The WSPs offered "commercial mobile radio service" (CMRS) to retail end-users. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that DAS network operators did not provide CMRS because DAS network operators “own no spectrum, need no phone numbers, and their contractual relationship is solely with the WSPs, not with the retail cell phone user. . . . [T]he DAS network operator has no control over the generation of that signal [that it transports for the WSPs].” Accordingly, the Court concluded that DAS network operators did not furnish CMRS and were not excluded from the definition of public utility by Section 102(2)(iv). Further, the Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err in holding that the PUC’s interpretation of a clear and unambiguous statutory provision was not entitled to deference. Further, the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that DAS network service met the definition of “public utility” and is not excluded from that definition as it did not furnish CMRS service. View "Crown Castle NG East LLC, et al v. Pennsylvania Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

On March 6, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency (“Proclamation”) pursuant to 35 Pa.C.S. 7301(c), a provision of the Emergency Management Services Code. This Proclamation activated many emergency resources. Days later, the Governor issued an order closing businesses that were not considered life-sustaining. Four Pennsylvania businesses and one individual challenged the Governor's Order, alleging that it violated the Emergency Management Services Code and various constitutional provisions. On April 13, 2020, in an exercise of its King’s Bench jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Governor’s order complied with both the statute and Commonwealth Constitution. On June 3, 2020, the Governor renewed the Proclamation for an additional ninety days. June 9, 2020, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted a concurrent resolution to order the Governor to terminate the disaster emergency. The matter reached a loggerhead and went again before the Supreme Court. The Court issued an opinion stating "we find it necessary to make clear what this Court is, and is not, deciding in this case. We express no opinion as to whether the Governor’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes wise or sound policy. Similarly, we do not opine as to whether the General Assembly, in seeking to limit or terminate the Governor’s exercise of emergency authority, presents a superior approach for advancing the welfare of our Commonwealth’s residents." Instead, the Court decided here a narrow legal question: whether the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Emergency Services Management Code permitted the General Assembly to terminate the Governor’s Proclamation of Disaster Emergency by passing a concurrent resolution, without presenting that resolution to the Governor for his approval or veto. To this, the Supreme Court responded "no": "because the General Assembly intended that H.R. 836 terminate the Governor’s declaration of disaster emergency without the necessity of presenting that resolution to the Governor for his approval or veto, we hold, pursuant to our power under the Declaratory Judgments Act, that H.R. 836 is a legal nullity." View "Wolf v. Scarnati" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in determining a school bus surveillance video sought in a request for public records pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) was not exempt from disclosure under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. Rudy Miller, on behalf of The Express Times (collectively, Requester), submitted a RTKL request to the District. Therein, Requester sought information in connection with an incident involving an elementary school teacher who, according to Requester, had roughly physically disciplined a child on a school bus outside of the school. Although its rationale departed from the analysis of the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order, with instructions to redact students’ images from the video prior to disclosure. View "Easton Area Sch. Dist. v. Miller" on Justia Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was a challenge to a local judicial district’s policy prohibiting the use of medical marijuana by individuals under court supervision, such as probationers. Relevant here, the applicable statutory authority, the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act, contained an immunity provision protecting patients from government sanctions. In September 2019, the 52nd Judicial District -- comprised of the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas (the “District”) -- announced a “Medical Marijuana Policy” under the issuing authority of the president judge. The Policy prohibited “the active use of medical marijuana, regardless of whether the defendant has a medical marijuana card, while the defendant is under supervision by the Lebanon County Probation Services Department.” Petitioners were individuals under the supervision of the Lebanon County probation agency who filed suit in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction to challenge the validity of the Policy in light of the MMA's immunity provision. Separately, Petitioners filed an application for special relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction. Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth Court proceeded, sua sponte, to transfer the case to this Court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. The District then filed its response in this Court opposing preliminary injunctive relief. It claimed, among other things, that Petitioners were unlikely to prevail on the merits, arguing, inter alia, that the General Assembly didn’t intend the MMA to override the courts’ ability to supervise probationers and parolees. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Petitioners' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Policy was deemed to be contrary to the immunity accorded by the MMA, and as such, should not be enforced. "[N]othing impedes a revocation hearing or other lawful form of redress, where there is reasonable cause to believe that a probationer or other person under court supervision has possessed or used marijuana in a manner that has not been made lawful by the enactment." View "Gass et al. v. 52nd Judicial District" on Justia Law

In Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827 (2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a statutory regime per which the duration of workers’ compensation benefits could be curtailed was invalid, since integral terms of the enactment yielded an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The issue this case presented for the Court's review concerned the retroactive application of Protz to a scenario in which the pertinent constitutional challenge to the statute was advanced during the course of direct appellate review. In 2000, Appellee David Smuck (“Claimant”) suffered a work-related back injury, for which he received total disability benefits since 2003. Appellant Dana Holding Corporation (“Employer”) requested an IRE pursuant to the then-extant impairment rating regime. Claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (the “WCAB” or the “Board”), and the proceedings before the Board were stayed at Employer’s behest pending the Protz decsion. Ultimately, Claimant's total disability status was reinstated as of the date of the disputed IRE. The Employer appealed, but the Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding Protz did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court agreed: "a disability modification is not vested when it remains subject to a preserved challenge pursued by a presently aggrieved claimant." View "Dana Holding Corp. v. WCAB (Smuck)" on Justia Law

In March of 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed a Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”) request with the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) seeking disclosure of PSP’s “complete, un-redacted AR 6-9 regulation, which established policies and procedures for PSP personnel when using social media monitoring software.” The PSP provided the ACLU with “a heavily-redacted nine-page document entitled ‘AR 6-9 Real-Time Open-Source-Based Investigation and Research’” (hereinafter, “the Policy”). On April 3, 2017, ACLU filed an appeal and brief with the Office of Open Records ("OOR"), asserting that PSP had not provided a sufficient basis for its invocation of the public safety exception. After an in camera review, OOR characterized the Policy as “describ[ing] best practices, authorization procedures, purposes and limitations for PSP Troopers when using internet resources— including, but not limited to, sites commonly described as ‘social media’ sites—in a professional capacity.” OOR characterized PSP as contending that “the disclosure of the record would be reasonably likely to threaten public safety because knowledge of the restrictions and techniques under which PSP Troopers work could permit third parties to more easily evade PSP’s online efforts and hinder PSP’s attempts to investigate criminal matters or perform background checks.” The Commonwealth Court overturned OOR's "reasoned decision", but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, holding only that the lower court did not conduct an "equally careful inquiry" as OOR: "The Commonwealth Court unnecessarily denied itself the opportunity to conduct the fact-finding that the RTKL asks of it. But because the Commonwealth Court is the ultimate finder of fact under the RTKL, it would be inappropriate for us to step into its place. On remand, the court at a minimum should compare the Affidavit to the provisions of the unredacted Policy that the Affidavit describes. In keeping with its authority under the RTKL, the court also retains discretion to further develop the record." Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "ACLU of PA v. PA State Police" on Justia Law

D.R. (Father) and J.R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) resided in Greene County, Pennsylvania with their five children, ranging in age from six to sixteen years old. Father was an attorney who, as part of his private practice, represented parents under investigation by Greene County Children and Youth Services (CYS). On October 29, 2018, Greene County CYS received a report that on October 12, 2018, Father was observed to be impaired or under the influence while in the presence of one of his children. Because Father was a practicing attorney in Greene County, and to avoid a conflict of interest, the matter was referred to Fayette County CYS (the Agency). The Agency received three reports regarding Father, one of which was an allegation of abuse towards Mother (criminal charges were dropped because she refused to testify). The Agency thereafter moved to compel Parents' cooperation with a General Protective Services Assessment. Following a hearing, orders directing Parents to permit the Agency into their home to assess the living conditions of the children, and directing Parents to cooperate with the Agency were issued. The court also ordered Father to submit observed urine samples for purposes of drug and alcohol assessments. The orders further noted that Parents’ failure to comply would subject them to sanctions. Parents appealed, and a superior court reversed, finding no link between the alleged abuse and conditions in the home. Further, though there were reports of Father's intoxication, there was no specificity as to the type of impairment or whether such impairment caused the children to be abused or neglected. The Agency argued on appeal that the Superior Court erred in holding that it was without authorization to require urine samples as part of its duty to investigate reports of suspected child abuse. Finding no reversible error in the superior court judgment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of: D.R." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Northern Berks Regional Police Commission’s petition for appeal in this Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 1111) grievance arbitration appeal. An arbitrator reinstated Officer Charles Hobart to the Northern Berks Police Department, but the trial court vacated the award based on a finding that the award required the Department to commit an illegal act. The trial court’s ruling was based on factual developments occurring after Hobart’s termination. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Hobart had not yet exhausted administrative remedies that would theoretically remove the purported illegality. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the arbitrator's award was not illegal, and therefore reversed the Commonwealth Court. View "N Berks Reg. Police Comm. v. Berks Co. FOP" on Justia Law