Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted expedited review of this direct appeal to decide whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Acting Secretary of Health Alison Beam (“the Secretary”) lacked the power under existing law and Department of Health regulations to require individuals to wear facial coverings while inside Pennsylvania’s schools as a means of controlling the spread of COVID-19. Having determined that the Secretary exceeded her authority in issuing that directive, by per curiam order on December 10, 2021, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision nullifying the mandate, and published this opinion expounding on its reasoning. View "Corman, J., et al. v. Beam" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review involved the proposed redevelopment of a 90-year-old abandoned two-story industrial building, consisting of approximately 14,000 square feet, formerly used as a garage/warehouse facility. In 2013, Appellant Metal Green Inc. purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale for approximately $90,000. In August 2016, Mt. Airy USA, a local nonprofit, commenced a legal action against Metal Green pursuant to the 2008 Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act (“Act 135”). A court declared the property to be blighted and abandoned and ordered Metal Green to remediate the hazards that the property posed to the community. While the court possessed the authority to order the demolition of the building, it held such action in abeyance, allowing Metal Green to not only make necessary repairs, but to pursue redevelopment of the property. The Department of Licenses and Inspections denied Metal Green’s application for a building permit to convert the warehouse to apartments. The Supreme Court considered the proper legal standard to be applied when considering an application for a “use variance” under the Philadelphia Zoning Code, as well as the appropriate standard of review for such determinations. The Court held that the minimum variance requirement, as set forth in the Philadelphia Zoning Code, applied to use variances. Additionally, in determining the entitlement to a use variance, the Court concluded considerations of property blight and abandonment were more properly evaluated under the Code’s unnecessary hardship requirement, rather than under the minimum variance requirement. Finally, the Court reaffirmed its traditional abuse of discretion or error of law standard of review with respect to a court’s review of a variance determination; however, as a component thereof, the Court allowed for review for a capricious disregard of the evidence under certain circumstances. View "Metal Green Inc. v. City of Phila, et al." on Justia Law

General Motors was a Delaware corporation engaged in the sale of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania, and subject to Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax. GM contested the calculation of its 2001 Tax Year corporate income tax, after filing a report of change in its federal taxable income in March 2010. In February 2012, GM timely filed a petition for refund with the Department of Revenue’s (“Department”) Board of Appeals. It claimed that the cap on the net loss carryover (NLC) resulted in a “progressive effective tax rate” which violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It explained that “a taxpayer conducting business on a larger scale in Pennsylvania pays a higher effective tax rate than a similarly situated taxpayer conducting business on a smaller scale.” In Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Revenue, 171 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the NLC deduction applicable to corporate income tax for the tax year ending December 31, 2007 (“2007 Tax Year”), violated the Uniformity Clause. Here, the Court applied Nextel and considered GM's constitutional challenges to the NLC provisions applicable to corporate income tax in the tax year ending December 31, 2001 (“2001 Tax Year”). The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that Nextel applied retroactively to this case, however, it reversed the Commonwealth Court to the extent it remedied the violation of the Uniformity Clause by severing the $2 million NLC deduction cap, which would have resulted in an unlimited NLC deduction. Instead, the Supreme Court severed the NLC deduction provision in its entirety, resulting in no NLC deduction for the 2001 Tax Year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order to the extent it directed the Department to recalculate GM’s corporate income tax without capping the NLC deduction and issue a refund for the 2001 Tax Year, which the Court concluded was required to remedy the due process violation of GM’s rights pursuant to McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). View "General Motors Corp. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the Office or Open Records (“OOR”) has the authority to review the denial of an individual’s request for records pursuant to the Right to Know Law (“RTKL”), where a public utility has designated records responsive to the request as confidential security information (“CSI”) under the Public Utility Confidential Security Information Disclosure Protection Act. The Supreme Court held that the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) had exclusive authority to review such requests and, therefore, the OOR erred in exercising jurisdiction over the CSI-designated records. View "Energy Transfer v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether a lump-sum payment that a school district made to settle a principal’s age-discrimination claim should have been included in that employee’s retirement benefit calculation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court disregarded the Retirement Code’s statutory definition of “compensation” and instead deferred to the intent of the settling parties to treat the payment as retirement-covered compensation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Whalen v. Public School Empl. Ret Board" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (“Hearing Office”) concluded that, in the fee review setting, a non-treating healthcare provider, like a pharmacy, could not challenge a utilization review (“UR”) determination that medications prescribed by a treating healthcare provider, such as a physician, but dispensed by the non-treating entity, were unreasonable and unnecessary for the treatment of a claimant’s work-related injury. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Hearing Office’s order. However, after reaching this result, the intermediate court held that for UR procedures occurring in the future, when an employer, insurer or an employee requests UR, non-treating providers, such as pharmacies, had to be afforded notice and an opportunity to establish their right to intervene in the UR proceedings. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s result, it rejected its prospective holding that non-treating healthcare providers had to be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in UR proceedings. View "Keystone Rx v. Bureau. of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether Section 1729-A(a) of the Charter School Law imposed a mandatory deadline by which a school district had to decide to renew or not renew a charter school’s charter. In 2006, Appellant Eastern University Academy Charter School (“Eastern”), applied to the School District of Philadelphia (the “School District”) seeking to establish a charter school program aimed at enabling students to earn college credits at Eastern University while completing their high school studies. In 2009, the School District granted Eastern a charter to operate a middle school and high school for students grades 7 through 12. Eastern’s 2012 renewal application incorporated its original charter application and obligated Eastern to continue its operations in accordance with the standards and goals it had represented in its original application. However, during the ensuing term of the charter, Eastern’s program shifted, as its affiliation with Eastern University, ended. Eastern nevertheless submitted a second renewal application in the fall of 2016, seeking its continued operation as an “early college” program, the mission of which remained preparing students for postsecondary education and providing dual enrollment opportunities to high school students. While Eastern acknowledged it was no longer affiliated with the University, it indicated that its students had begun taking college courses elsewhere during the 2016-2017 school year, and that it was actively researching additional college-level opportunities for its students. On June 1, 2017, the School District’s Charter Schools Office (the “CSO”) recommended that Eastern’s charter not be renewed; after a hearing, the School District voted not to renew Eastern's charter. Eastern appealed, arguing, among other things, that the School District’s failure to issue its nonrenewal decision prior to the charter’s expiration date – June 30, 2017 – invalidated the nonrenewal under Section 1729-A of the Charter School Law. The Supreme Court determined the legislature imposed no such deadline, and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order upholding the decision not to renew Eastern's charter. View "Eastern Univ. Acad. C.S. v. Sch.Dist. of Phila." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the Commonwealth Court’s holding that, to be held liable for damages under Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation statute, an entity had to be "clothed with the power of eminent domain" to the property at issue. In 2009, Appellee, UGI Storage Company filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission” or “FERC”), seeking a certificate of public convenience and necessity to enable it to acquire and operate certain natural gas facilities. Appellee wished to acquire and operate underground natural gas storage facilities, which the company referred to as the Meeker storage field. Appellee also sought to include within the certificated facilities a 2,980-acre proposed "buffer zone." FERC ultimately granted the application for Appellee to acquire and assume the operation of the Meeker storage field, but denied Appellee’s request to certificate the buffer zone. Appellants petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers to assess damages for an alleged de facto condemnation of their property, alleging that though their properties had been excluded by FERC from the certificated buffer zone, they interpreted Appellee’s response to the Commission’s order as signaling its intention to apply for additional certifications to obtain property rights relative to the entire buffer zone. The common pleas court initially found that a de facto taking had occurred and appointed a board of viewers to assess damages. Appellee lodged preliminary objections asserting Appellants’ petition was insufficient to support a de facto taking claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "we do not presently discern a constitutional requirement that a quasi-public entity alleged to have invoked governmental power to deprive landowners of the use and enjoyment of their property for a public purpose must be invested with a power of eminent domain in order to be held to account for a de facto condemnation. ... a public or quasi-public entity need not possess a property-specific power of eminent domain in order to implicate inverse condemnation principles." The case was remanded for the Commonwealth Court to address Appellants’ challenge to the common pleas court’s alternative disposition (based upon the landowners’ purported off-the-record waiver of any entitlement to an evidentiary hearing), which had been obviated by the intermediate court’s initial remand decision and that court’s ensuing affirmance of the re-dismissal of Appellants’ petitions. View "Albrecht, et al. v. UGI Storage Co. et al." on Justia Law