Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Texas evaluated a case in which a land development company, Bellpas, Inc., sought to detach property from one school district and annex it to another. According to the Texas Education Code, if the school boards of the affected districts disagree on the petition, the Commissioner of Education can resolve the issue in an administrative appeal. However, the Lampasas Independent School District (LISD) board neglected to approve or disapprove the petition, leading to a disagreement over whether the Commissioner of Education had jurisdiction over the administrative appeal.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Commissioner of Education did have jurisdiction over the administrative appeal. The court reasoned that a school board "disapproves" a petition if it does not approve it within a reasonable time after a hearing, as per the plain reading of the Education Code. The court also concluded that the Commissioner did not lose jurisdiction by failing to issue a ruling within 180 days, as the statute's deadline is not jurisdictional.The case was returned to the Court of Appeals to resolve the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court of Texas stressed that the delay in the administrative appeal process should not deprive the appellant of a decision on the merits of their petition and criticized the school board for refusing to make a decision, thus avoiding any ruling on the merits. View "MORATH v. LAMPASAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

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In Texas, the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, Christina Mitchell Busbee, objected to the sale of a property that was purchased with the District's forfeiture funds and was legally owned by Medina County. The District Attorney argued that the County could not sell the property without her consent and that she was entitled to the sale proceeds. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled that the District Attorney did not have standing to make these claims because the relevant statute, Chapter 59, authorizes only the Attorney General to enforce its terms. The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that the question of whether the District Attorney was authorized to sue under Chapter 59 did not pertain to her constitutional standing to sue, but rather to the merits of her claims. The Court concluded that the District Attorney did have constitutional standing to sue because she had alleged a concrete injury traceable to the County's conduct and redressable by court order. The case was remanded back to the trial court to consider the County's additional jurisdictional challenges. View "BUSBEE v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, TEXAS" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court dismissing Duncan House Charitable Corporation's application for a charitable organization exemption, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for later exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for an earlier exemption.For the 2017 tax year, Duncan applied for a charitable tax exemption covering its fifty percent ownership interest in a Houston historic home. The appraisal district denied the exemption, and the review board denied Duncan's ensuing protest. Duncan filed for judicial review. Thereafter, although Duncan House never applied for the charitable exemption for the 2018 tax year, it protested the district's 2018 appraisal on the grounds that the district court to apply the charitable exemption. The review board denied the protest. Duncan then amended its trial court petition to challenge the denial of the 2018 exemption. The trial court dismissed the 2018 claim for want of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for the 2018 exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for the 2017 exemption. View "Duncan House Charitable Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal District" on Justia Law

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In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to grant a temporary injunction in favor of the Houston Independent School District prohibiting the Texas Education Agency Commissioner and his appointed conservator from continuing to supervise the school district pending a final trial, holding that the District was not entitled to injunctive relief.While law permits the Commissioner to assist in improving a school district's performance through a variety of remedial measures, in question in this case was under what circumstances the Commissioner may supervise the Houston Independent School District (the District). Based on the results of an accreditation investigation, the Commissioner notified the District that it planned to appoint a board of managers for the District. The District filed petition seeking a temporary injunction barring the Commissioner from taking regulatory actions against it because the Education Code did not authorize the planned remedial measures. The trial court granted the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed the trial court to consider the Commissioner's plea to the jurisdiction, holding that the District's claims did not support a temporary injunction against the Commissioner and his conservator. View "Texas Education Agency v. Houston Independent School District" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and court of appeals holding that the law grants authority to decide whether a statutory probate court judge receives a supplemental salary for serving as the local administrative statutory probate court judge to the statutory probate court judge, not the county commissioners court, holding that the lower courts erred.Plaintiff, judge of the Galveston County statutory probate court and the county's local administrative statutory probate court judge, filed this suit against the commissioners court's members in their official capacities, arguing that Defendants abused their discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in striking from the county budget Plaintiff's supplemental salary for her services as the local administrative statutory probate judge. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Texas law grants commissioners the authority to decide whether to pay Plaintiff a supplemental salary; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any basis to find that the commissioners abused that discretion. View "Henry v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court permanently enjoining the Texas Department of State Health Services from enforcing a new Texas law that prohibited the processing and manufacturing of smokable hemp products, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.In their complaint, Plaintiffs - Texas-based entities that manufacture, process, distribute, and sell hemp products - argued that Tex. Const. art. I, 19 invalidated the challenged law and sought an injunction prohibiting Defendant from enforcing the law. The trial court declared that Tex. Health & Safety Code 443.202(4) violated the Texas Constitution and that 25 Tex. Admin. Code 300.104 was invalid in its entirety and enjoined Defendant from enforcing the statute or the rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' complaints did not assert the deprivation of an interest substantively protected by the Texas Constitution's due course clause. View "Texas Department of State Health Services v. Crown Distributing LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Houston voters approved “Proposition One,” allowing the city to create a “Pay-As-You-Go” Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund. Perez and others filed an election contest while the city enacted the Drainage Fee Ordinance (DFO), creating a new public utility and requiring Houston to establish drainage fees “against all real property in the city subject to such charges” and “provide drainage for all real property in the city on payment of drainage charges unless the property is exempt.” The DFO based the drainage fees on the benefited property’s type and square footage. Failure to pay drainage fees carried various penalties.In 2015, the Supreme Court held that Proposition One’s ballot language was misleading, rendering the Amendment invalid. Perez then challenged Houston’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of the drainage fee. In 2018, Houston passed a new charter amendment curing many of the defects Perez alleged in the drainage fee ordinance. Perez was left with ongoing claims for reimbursement of the drainage fees she paid before 2018 and for an injunction against the future expenditure of fees collected before 2018. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims but remanded to allow Perez to replead in light of intervening events. Perez’s claims required her to articulate a viable theory of the DFO’s illegality to overcome Houston’s governmental immunity; her only theory failed as a matter of law. View "Perez v. Turner" on Justia Law

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TexCom sought to develop a commercial-waste-disposal facility on a 27-acre site in Montgomery County, near Conroe, that had one existing nonoperative injection well. TexCom sought to operate the existing well and construct up to three additional wells. Class I underground injection-control wells manage industrial waste by injecting it thousands of feet underground but can potentially harm drinking water and petroleum, so these injection wells undergo an extensive permitting process with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). A permit application must be accompanied by a letter from the Railroad Commission (RRC) concluding that the proposed wells “will not endanger or injure any known oil or gas reservoir.” RRC issued such a letter for TexCom but rescinded it after six years of administrative hearings, around the same time TCEQ issued its final order granting the permit application.The Texas Supreme Court affirmed TCEQ’s order granting the permit application as supported by substantial evidence; a migration finding, combined with the injection zone’s geological suitability, is sufficient to support TCEQ’s ultimate finding that the wells would be protective of water. The rescission did not deprive TCEQ of jurisdiction, and, on these facts, TCEQ did not violate the Texas Administrative Procedure Act by declining to reopen the administrative record for further proceedings. View "Dyer v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law