Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
by
The Texas Attorney General alleged that Annunciation House, a nonprofit organization in El Paso, was unlawfully harboring illegal aliens. The Attorney General sought to examine the organization's records and initiate quo warranto proceedings, which could lead to the revocation of its charter. Annunciation House, which provides shelter to immigrants and refugees, was served with a records request by state officials, who demanded immediate compliance. Annunciation House sought legal relief, arguing that the request violated its constitutional rights.The 205th Judicial District Court in El Paso County granted a temporary restraining order and later a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's records request. The court also denied the Attorney General's motion for leave to file a quo warranto action, ruling that the statutes authorizing the records request were unconstitutional and that the allegations of harboring illegal aliens did not constitute a valid basis for quo warranto. The court further held that the statutes were preempted by federal law and violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the trial court erred in its constitutional rulings and that the Attorney General has the constitutional authority to file a quo warranto action. The court emphasized that it was too early to express a view on the merits of the underlying issues and that the usual litigation process should unfold. The court also held that the statutes authorizing the records request were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial court's injunction against the Attorney General's records request was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "PAXTON v. ANNUNCIATION HOUSE, INC." on Justia Law

by
The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law

by
A suspected shoplifter with an outstanding arrest warrant shot two police officers at a retail store, killing one and injuring the other. The officers were attempting to arrest the suspect at the request of an off-duty officer working as a security guard for the retailer. The deceased officer's parents and the injured officer sued the security guard, the retailer, and the security company.The trial court dismissed the claims against the security guard under the Tort Claims Act, finding his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the retailer and the security company. The plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed in part, holding that a jury could find the security guard's conduct before the warrant check was outside the scope of his police duties. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims based on the warrant check and subsequent conduct but found fact issues precluded summary judgment on other claims against the retailer.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the security guard's conduct was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal under the Tort Claims Act. The court also adopted the public-safety officer's rule, limiting the duties owed to officers injured by the negligence that necessitated their response. Applying this rule, the court found no evidence that the retailer breached its duty to warn the officers of a known, dangerous condition. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing the claims against the security guard and granting summary judgment for the other defendants. View "SEWARD v. SANTANDER" on Justia Law

by
A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

by
Tom and Becky Carlson filed a contested case against the Texas Comptroller under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA), alleging that the Comptroller’s approval of a wind turbine project resulted in a taking of their property. The case was referred to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH), where the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed it as untimely filed, stating that neither the Comptroller nor SOAH had jurisdiction. The Carlsons sought clarification from SOAH, which indicated that the case would return to the Comptroller for a final decision. However, the Comptroller later asserted that the ALJ’s order was final and appealable, leading to the Carlsons' mandamus petition.The Carlsons filed a mandamus petition directly in the Supreme Court of Texas, seeking to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order so they could appeal to district court. The State initially defended the Comptroller’s position that the ALJ’s order was final. However, after the Supreme Court requested clarification on the State’s unified position, the Comptroller issued a final decision, rendering the Carlsons' petition moot.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Comptroller’s issuance of a final decision extinguished the dispute, making the mandamus petition moot. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, as there was no longer a justiciable controversy between the parties. The Carlsons agreed with this outcome, as they would now receive the judicial review they sought. View "IN RE CARLSON" on Justia Law

by
Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. (SOS) challenged a final order by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granting the City of Dripping Springs a permit to discharge treated wastewater into Onion Creek. The central issue was the interpretation of TCEQ’s “antidegradation” rules, specifically whether TCEQ should assess water quality degradation by evaluating the water body as a whole or by focusing on numeric changes in individual water-quality parameters. SOS argued for a strict parameter-by-parameter approach, claiming that any significant change in a single parameter, such as dissolved oxygen, should prevent permit approval.The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas upheld the permit’s issuance, finding that TCEQ’s practice of assessing overall water quality conformed to regulatory requirements. The court also rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for not including a “statement of the underlying facts” supporting its findings.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that TCEQ’s whole-body approach to assessing water quality degradation was consistent with the regulatory language, which focuses on overall water quality rather than individual parameters. The court also found that substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s determination that the permitted discharge would not lower Onion Creek’s water quality by more than a de minimis extent. Additionally, the court rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for lacking specific underlying facts, noting that the order sufficiently informed the parties of the basis for TCEQ’s decision and complied with the relevant statutory requirements. View "Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

by
Kensington Title-Nevada, LLC, a Nevada-based real estate company, acquired property in Denton, Texas, which contained radioactive materials owned by US Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (USR). The Texas Department of State Health Services had denied USR’s application for a radioactive material license and ordered decommissioning of the materials. Kensington proposed a decommissioning plan, which the Department approved, and a licensed contractor began the cleanup. However, Kensington faced conflicting demands from the Department and local taxing entities, leading to a halt in decommissioning.The Department issued a notice of violation to Kensington for possessing radioactive material without a license and sought an $8,000 penalty. Kensington amended its pleading in an ongoing tax dispute to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the licensing rule did not apply to it as it did not own or possess the radioactive material. The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kensington failed to allege a proper rule-applicability challenge.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Kensington had standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a). The Court found that Kensington’s allegations of interference with its legal rights due to the Department’s notice of violation were sufficient to establish standing. The Court also concluded that Kensington’s challenge to the applicability of the licensing rule was within the scope of the statute’s waiver of immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES" on Justia Law

by
After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law

by
A private, for-profit corporation, The GEO Group, Inc., which operates correctional facilities under contracts with federal and state government entities, was assessed a deficiency in sales and use taxes by the Texas Comptroller. GEO Group challenged the deficiency, arguing that the purchases made for operating the facilities were tax-exempt as they were made on behalf of government clients. The Comptroller denied the claim, and GEO Group paid the additional taxes and sued for a refund in district court.The trial court conducted a bench trial and ruled against GEO Group, finding that it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was an "agent" or "instrumentality" of the government, thus not qualifying for the tax exemption. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that GEO Group's relationship with its government clients was too attenuated to warrant a tax exemption and that the trial court did not err in applying a heightened standard of proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the correct standard of proof for GEO Group to prove its entitlement to a tax exemption is by a preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. However, the court agreed with the lower courts that GEO Group is not an "agent" or "instrumentality" of the federal or state government under the relevant statutes and rules. Therefore, GEO Group is not entitled to a tax refund. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "The GEO Group, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the interpretation of the phrase “has proven to be operational” in the definition of “best available control technology” (BACT) under Texas law. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) is responsible for issuing permits for facilities like power plants, ensuring they use BACT, which must be technically practicable and economically reasonable. The dispute centers on whether BACT requires a pollution control method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit or if it can refer to methods deemed capable of operating in the future.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The underlying litigation about the permitting of a power plant is not pending in the Texas Supreme Court, but the court has jurisdiction to answer the certified question under the Texas Constitution.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the phrase “has proven to be operational” requires that the pollution control method must have already been demonstrated to be operational through experience and research. It does not require the method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit, nor does it allow for methods that are only deemed capable of operating in the future. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement for BACT includes considerations of technical practicability and economic reasonableness, and the administrative rule must be interpreted based on its plain text. The court rejected the notion that previously issued permits determine BACT for other facilities, stating that each facility’s proposal must be evaluated on its own merits based on real-world experience and research. View "PORT ARTHUR COMMUNITY ACTION NETWORK v. TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY" on Justia Law