Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a program proposed by Harris County, Texas, known as "Uplift Harris." The program aimed to provide $500 monthly cash payments to 1,928 Harris County residents for 18 months, with recipients chosen by lottery from applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty line living in certain zip codes. The State of Texas challenged the program, arguing that it violated the Texas Constitution’s prohibition on gratuitous payments to individuals.The State sued the County, seeking an injunction to block the implementation of the program. The district court denied the State's request for a temporary injunction, leading the State to appeal this decision and request a stay of payments under the Uplift Harris program while the appeal was ongoing. The court of appeals denied this request, prompting the State to seek mandamus relief in the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas granted the State's motion for temporary relief, prohibiting all payments under the Uplift Harris program pending further order of the court. The court found that the State had raised serious doubt about the constitutionality of the program, and that potential violation of the Texas Constitution could not be remedied if payments were to commence while the underlying appeal proceeded. The court also noted that once the funds were distributed to individuals, they could not feasibly be recouped if it was later determined they were paid in violation of the Texas Constitution. The court concluded that temporarily preventing the expenditure of these funds while the State's appeal proceeded ensured public funds were not irrecoverably spent in violation of the Texas Constitution. The State's appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction remains pending in the court of appeals. View "In re The State of Texas" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and two market participants, RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC. Following Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require that protocols adopted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) must be approved by the PUC before they take effect. ERCOT then adopted a revision to its protocols, which was approved by the PUC, setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions. RWE challenged the PUC's approval order in the Third Court of Appeals, arguing that the order was both substantively and procedurally invalid.The Third Court of Appeals held that the PUC's order was both substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for PUC rules. The court found that PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. Therefore, the Third Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the actions of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) during Winter Storm Uri, when the Texas electric grid was on the brink of collapse. The Commission issued two orders that effectively raised the market price of electricity to the regulatory ceiling of $9,000/MWh to incentivize generators to add supply and large industrial users to reduce their demand. This led to some market participants going bankrupt and subsequent litigation.The court of appeals held that the Commission’s orders exceeded its authority under Chapter 39 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) because the statute prohibits price-setting. The court of appeals did not address whether the Commission complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural rulemaking requirements.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' decision. It held that the Commission’s orders did not exceed its authority under PURA. The court also found that the Commission substantially complied with the APA’s procedural rulemaking requirements, an issue the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment affirming the orders. View "Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants. View "Texas Tech University System v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Mark and Birgit Self owned a tract of rural land that adjoined a portion of Farm-to-Market Road 677 in Montague County, Texas. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) had a right-of-way easement that reached fifty feet from the centerline of the road in each direction, which burdened part of the Selfs’ property. As part of a highway maintenance project, TxDOT contracted with T.F.R. Enterprises, Inc. (TFR) to remove brush and trees from the right-of-way. TFR subcontracted with Lyellco Inc. to remove the trees. Following TxDOT’s instruction to TFR to “clear everything between the fences,” Lyellco workers cut all trees up to the Selfs’ fence line, including trees that were outside the State’s right-of-way easement. The Selfs sued TxDOT for negligence and inverse condemnation.The trial court denied TxDOT’s plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity from both causes of action. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that there was a fact issue on whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waived immunity for the negligence cause of action, but reversed the trial court’s judgment on the cause of action for inverse condemnation, holding there was no evidence that TxDOT intentionally destroyed the Selfs’ property.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals. It held that the Selfs had not shown either that the subcontractor’s employees were in TxDOT’s paid service or that other TxDOT employees operated or used the motor-driven equipment that cut down the trees, as required to waive immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the negligence cause of action was dismissed. However, regarding inverse condemnation, the court found that the Selfs had alleged and offered evidence that TxDOT intentionally directed the destruction of the trees as part of clearing the right-of-way for public use. Therefore, the cause of action for inverse condemnation was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. SELF" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Houston, which appealed a wrongful-death suit filed by the family of Dwayne Foreman, who was killed in a collision with a police cruiser. The police officers were responding to a suicide call at the time of the accident. The City argued that it was immune from the lawsuit because the officer was performing a discretionary duty in good faith and within the scope of his authority.The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, and the City appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a fact issue existed on the officer’s good faith, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts. It held that, as a matter of law, the officer was performing a discretionary duty while acting within the scope of his authority in responding to the emergency call and was acting in good faith. The court reasoned that a reasonably prudent officer in the same or similar circumstances could have believed the actions were justified. Therefore, the court reversed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. SAULS" on Justia Law

The case involves two plaintiffs, Michael Grim and Jim Maynard, who were employees of the Denton Municipal Electric (DME), a local electric utility owned by the City of Denton. The plaintiffs supported the construction of a controversial new power plant, the Denton Energy Center (DEC). Keely Briggs, a member of the Denton city council, opposed the new plant and leaked internal city documents about the project to a local newspaper. The plaintiffs reported Briggs's leak of confidential vendor information, alleging it violated the Public Information Act and the Open Meetings Act. They claimed that this report triggered the protections of the Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs were later fired, which they alleged was retaliation for their report about Briggs.The case was initially heard in the district court, where the city argued that the Whistleblower Act did not apply because the plaintiffs did not report a violation of law "by the employing governmental entity or another public employee." The court was not convinced, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a $4 million judgment for the plaintiffs. The city appealed, raising several issues, including the legal question of whether the Whistleblower Act applied in this case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Whistleblower Act did not protect the plaintiffs because they reported a violation of law by a lone city council member, not by the employing governmental entity or another public employee. The court found that the lone city council member lacked any authority to act on behalf of the city, and her actions could not be imputed to the city. Therefore, her violation of law was not a "violation of law by the employing governmental entity." The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a viable claim under the Whistleblower Act, and rendered judgment for the city. View "CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) and the cities of Conroe and Magnolia, Texas. The SJRA and the cities had entered into contracts obligating the cities to buy surface water from the SJRA. When a disagreement over fees and rates arose, the cities stopped paying their full balances, leading the SJRA to sue the cities for recovery of those amounts. The cities claimed immunity from the suit as government entities.Previously, the trial court had granted the cities' plea to the jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The court of appeals held that the SJRA had not engaged in pre-suit mediation as required by the contracts, and therefore, the cities' immunity was not waived.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that contractual procedures for alternative dispute resolution, such as pre-suit mediation, do not limit the statutory waiver of immunity for contractual claims against local government entities. The court also found that the mediation requirement did not apply to the SJRA's claims. Furthermore, the court rejected the cities' argument that the agreements did not fall within the waiver because they failed to state their essential terms.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to resolve the SJRA's claims on the merits. View "San Jacinto River Authority v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a developer, Campbellton Road, Ltd., and the City of San Antonio, specifically the San Antonio Water System (SAWS). The developer entered into a contract with SAWS in 2003, which included an option for the developer to participate in and fund the construction of off-site oversized infrastructure for a municipal water system. The developer planned to develop two residential subdivisions and needed sewer service for them. The contract stated that if the developer decided to participate in the off-site oversizing project, a contract would form, and the developer would earn credits that could be used to satisfy some or all of the collection component of assessed impact fees.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas concluded that the Local Government Contract Claims Act did not apply, and therefore did not waive immunity, because there was no agreement for providing services to the system. The court held that the system had no contractual right to receive any services and would not have “any legal recourse” if the developer “unilaterally decided not to proceed.”The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Act waived the system’s immunity from suit because the developer adduced evidence that a contract formed when the developer decided to and did participate in the off-site oversizing project. The court found that the contract stated the essential terms of an agreement for the developer to participate in that project, and the agreement was for providing a service to the system that was neither indirect nor attenuated. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Campbellton Road, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law