Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this medical fee dispute between a health care provider and a worker's compensation insurance carrier over the proper amount of reimbursement for services rendered to a covered patient, holding that that administrative law judge (ALJ) who heard the case properly applied the rules of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation in allocating the burden of proof.The provider initiated a dispute resolution proceeding, and the Division determined that the provider was entitled to more than the carrier believed was due. The Division ordered the carrier to pay the additional amount. The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) upheld the Division's determination. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in placing the burden of proof on the carrier at the SOAH hearing and that the error prejudiced the carrier's substantial rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ properly applied the Division's rules in concluding that the carrier had failed to meet its burden of proof. View "Patients Medical Center v. Facility Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment declaring that the rules issued by the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners authorizing chiropractors to perform an eye-movement test for neurological problems known as VONT, holding that the challenged rules do not exceed the statutory scope of the chiropractic practice.The Texas Chiropractic Act defines the practice of chiropractic to include evaluating the musculoskeletal system and improving the subluxation complex. In 2006, the Board adopted a rule defining both terms as involving nerves in addition to muscles and bones. In 2010, the Board adopted a rule authorizing chiropractors to perform vestibular-ocular-nystagmus testing, or VONT. The Texas Medical Association (TMA) challenged the rules in court. The court of appeals concluded that the rules exceeded the scope of practice prescribed in the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged provisions are valid. View "Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Texas Medical Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the amount that air ambulance providers may recover from workers' compensation insurers, the Supreme Court held that Texas law requiring that private insurance companies reimburse the fair and reasonable medical expenses of injured workers is not preempted by a federal law deregulating aviation and that federal law does not require Texas to mandate reimbursement of more than a fair and reasonable amount for air ambulance services.PHI Air Medical, LLC, an air ambulance provider, argued that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's (TWCA) fee schedules and reimbursement standards. An administrative law judge held that PHI was entitled to reimbursement under the TWCA's standards. On judicial review, the trial court declared that the ADA did not preempt the TWCA's reimbursement provisions. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the price of PHI's service to injured workers is not significantly affected by a reasonableness standard for third-party reimbursement of those services, the ADA does not preempt that standard; and (2) the ADA does not require that Texas compel private insurers to reimburse the full charges billed for those services. View "Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. PHI Air Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that, as to Plaintiffs' fraud claims, GTECH Corporation, a private contractor, would not qualify for derivative sovereign immunity for services it provided to the Texas Lottery Commission even if the Court recognized that doctrine but that GTECH was entitled to immunity from Plaintiffs' allegations of aiding and abetting the Commission's fraud and of conspiracy with the Commission.The Commission contracted with GTECH for instant ticket manufacturing and services. Plaintiffs filed two separate suits alleging that the instructions on a scratch-off lottery ticket mistakenly caused them to believe they had winning tickets. GTECH filed pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that it was entitled to the Commission's immunity. The Dallas County trial court granted GTECH's plea to the jurisdiction. The Travis County trial court denied the plea. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court held (1) GTECH was not entitled to immunity from Plaintiffs' fraud claims because the Commission did not control GTECH's choices in writing the game instructions; and (2) GTECH was entitled to immunity from the theories of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting because Plaintiffs must necessarily override the substance of the Commission's underlying decisions in order to impose derivative liability on GTECH. View "GTECH Corp. v. Steele" on Justia Law

In this title dispute between the State and a private landowner over portions of the submerged bed of Lone Oak Bayou the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the landowner, holding that there were factual disputes to be resolved, precluding summary judgment.Lone Oak Bayou was a navigable body of water located near the Gulf of Mexico. The landowner's predecessor bought land from the State that included the Bayou's bed. Later, the Legislature passed a statute (the Small Bill) validating conveyances that included the beds of "watercourses or navigable streams." The Commissioner of the General Land Office argued that the Small Bill did not validate the landowner's title to the Bayou's bed because the tide enters the Bayou and the statute conveyed only submerged beds underlying non-tidally influenced streams. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Landowner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were factual disputes to be resolved regarding whether the Bayou is a navigable stream within the scope of the statutory conveyance. View "Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over an administrative order because E.A. did not move for rehearing before the administrative law judge and rejecting E.A.'s due process challenge based on the agency's misrepresentation of the proper procedure for judicial review, holding that E.A. was denied due process under the circumstances of this case.In Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2019), the Supreme Court held that, under the Administrative Procedures Act, a party seeking judicial review of an administrative order must first move for rehearing before the administrative law judge unless another governing statute provides otherwise. This appeal presented the issues decided in Mosley. The Supreme Court (1) agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because E.A. did not seek rehearing of the order she challenged before the administrative law judge, but (2) held that the agency misrepresented the proper procedure for judicial review in a letter to E.A., thus denying E.A. due process. View "E.A. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over an administrative order because Cheryl Wallace did not move for rehearing before the administrative law judge and rejecting Wallace's due process challenge based on the agency's misrepresentation of the proper procedure for judicial review, holding that Wallace was denied due process.In Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2019), the Supreme Court held that, under the Administrative Procedures Act, a party seeking judicial review of an administrative order must first move for rehearing before the administrative law judge unless another governing statute provides otherwise. This appeal presented the issues decided in Mosley. The Supreme Court (1) agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Wallace did not seek rehearing of the order she challenged before the administrative law judge, but (2) held that the agency misrepresented the proper procedure for judicial review in a letter to Wallace, thus denying Wallace due process. View "Wallace v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over an administrative order because Roderic Horton did not move for rehearing before the administrative law judge and rejecting Horton's due process challenge based on the agency's misrepresentation of the proper procedure for judicial review, holding that Horton was denied due process.In Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2019), the Supreme Court held that, under the Administrative Procedures Act, a party seeking judicial review of an administrative order must first move for rehearing before the administrative law judge unless another governing statute provides otherwise. This appeal presented the issues decided in Mosley. The Supreme Court (1) agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Horton did not seek rehearing of the order she challenged before the administrative law judge, but (2) held that the agency misrepresented the proper procedure for judicial review in a letter to Horton, thus denying Horton due process. View "Horton v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court affirming the conclusions of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that CPS Energy violated both Tex. Util. Code 54.204(c)'s uniform-charge requirement and section 54.204(b)'s prohibition of discrimination, holding that the PUC could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that CPS Energy violated the plain terms of section 54.204(b).The PUC concluded that a utility that invoices different telecommunications providers a uniform rate nevertheless violates section 54.204(b) if it fails to take timely action to ensure that all pole attachers actually pay the uniform rate it invoices. The court of appeals reversed, holding that if a telecommunications provider does not pay the rate the utility uniformly charges, any discriminatory effect is the telecommunication provider's fault, not the utility's. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PUC's finding that CPS Energy failed to make any serious or meaningful effort to collect from AT&T Texas was supported by substantial evidence, and the effect on Time Warner Cable was clearly discriminatory. View "Time Warner Cable Texas LLC v. CPS Energy" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals allowing the State's money-damages claims and its ultra vires claims to proceed against the Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District (District) and Sustainable Texas Oyster Resource Management, LLC (STORM), holding that governmental immunity barred the State's claim for monetary relief against the District but did not bar its ultra vires claim.The District leased submerged land to STORM for oyster production. The State sued the District and STORM seeking to invalidate the lease on the grounds that Texas law affords the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department the sole power to decide who may cultivate oysters in the area. The State also sought monetary relief. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the District's immunity from suit barred the State's claims. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed the portion of the trial court's order that permitted the State to pursue an ultra vires claim against the District itself and otherwise affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that governmental immunity barred the State's claim for monetary relief against the District but did not bar its ultra vires claim. View "Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District v. State" on Justia Law