Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

EMAC, LLC filed a declaratory judgment action against the County of Hanover and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Hanover (collectively, Defendants) challenging the Board’s decision to deny EMAC’s application for an extension of a conditional use permit. The circuit court granted Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, concluding (1) EMAC was required to prove that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its property and that it failed to allege any facts to satisfy this requirement; and (2) the Board’s decision denying EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in ruling upon Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, the court properly interpreted the allegations in the amended complaint and the exhibits attached to it; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that EMAC was required to allege that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its land in order to state a cause of action; but (3) the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. View "EMAC, LLC v. County of Hanover" on Justia Law

Two weeks after Preston McKellar announced that he would be retiring as a structural welder for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, McKeller was injured during the course of his employment. Two weeks later, McKeller retired as scheduled. McKeller filed a claim against Northrop Grumman seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. A deputy commissioner with the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission awarded medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits. The Commission affirmed the award of medical benefits but denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that McKellar’s retirement, rather than his injury, caused his loss of compensation because the record supported the Commission’s finding that McKellar intended to retire and not seek other employment income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy commissioner correctly found that McKeller was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because he was totally disabled and lacked all earning capacity. View "McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding" on Justia Law