Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on a charge imposed by a local water district in Tehama County, California. In 2022, the district adopted a resolution requiring all landowners in the county to pay an annual “well registration charge” of $0.29 per acre for three years, regardless of whether their property used groundwater or had a well. The stated purpose was to fund the administrative costs of a groundwater well registration program. The district later adopted additional resolutions to implement waivers for certain parcels and continued collecting the charge for noncompliant parcels. David Garst, trustee of a trust owning 40 parcels in the county, paid the charge and subsequently challenged its validity, arguing it violated California constitutional provisions adopted by Propositions 218 and 26.The Superior Court of Tehama County reviewed the case and conducted a bench trial. The court found that the district acted in good faith and imposed the charge for a legitimate purpose, but concluded the charge was not related to any specific government service or benefit provided to the landowners. The court determined the well registration charge amounted to a tax rather than a regulatory fee. The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the district to rescind the charge, refund all collected sums, and cease further collection.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the district’s appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified, holding that the well registration charge was an unconstitutional tax under Article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was imposed broadly without a nexus to regulated activity or specific government service. The court struck the provision requiring the district to refund the charge, finding Garst had not complied with the procedural requirements of the Government Claims Act. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Garst v. Tehama County Flood Control & Wat. Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

A roughly 600-space parking garage on the Scioto Peninsula in Columbus was owned by RiverSouth Authority, which is a “new community authority” and a “body corporate and politic.” RiverSouth owned the garage, which sat on city-owned land, and leased it to the City of Columbus under a long-term ground lease. The city then entered into a management agreement with Capitol South, a private nonprofit entity, to manage and operate the garage. Capitol South, in turn, hired LAZ Parking Midwest, a private for-profit operator, to handle day-to-day operations. The agreements required Capitol South to operate the garage in a manner consistent with city obligations, with many operational decisions ultimately subject to city oversight.The Ohio Tax Commissioner denied RiverSouth’s request for a real property tax exemption, concluding that the garage was not entitled to exemption because it was managed by a private, for-profit entity, LAZ. RiverSouth appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which affirmed the denial, but for a different reason: the Board found the garage was under the direction and control of Capitol South, the nonprofit manager, rather than the city. This basis for denial was raised by the Board on its own initiative, without prior notice to the parties.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Board of Tax Appeals erred by affirming the Tax Commissioner’s decision based on a new issue not raised below and without following statutory remand procedures. The Court further held that the city’s use of a management company to operate the garage did not deprive the city of direction or control over the property for exemption purposes. The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Tax Commissioner to grant the exemption and calculate the appropriate refund. View "RiverSouth Auth. v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute regarding the proper method for appraising three commercial condominium units in Kalispell, Montana, owned by the estate of Maxine O’Brien and the Hash Family Trust. The central issue was whether the Montana Department of Revenue (MDOR) should use the income approach or the cost approach to value the units for the 2023/24 tax cycle. O’Brien provided detailed income information from the subject property and a nearly identical adjacent property, contending this information was sufficient to mandate the income approach under Montana law. MDOR instead used the cost approach, arguing that the available data was insufficient for an income-based valuation, particularly due to limitations in its mass-appraisal data pool.After O’Brien condominiumized the property in 2021, MDOR switched from the income approach to the cost approach for the 2023/24 appraisal. CTAB accepted O’Brien’s income-based valuation and found that the basements of the units were not separately rentable and their value was reflected in the overall rents. MDOR appealed CTAB’s ruling to the Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB), which reversed CTAB, concluding that MDOR lacked sufficient income information and was justified in using the cost approach. O’Brien then sought judicial review in the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, which affirmed MTAB’s decision.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and held that MTAB erred by misinterpreting the statutory standard for sufficient, relevant income information. The Court found that O’Brien had provided adequate income information, triggering the requirement for MDOR to use the income approach. The Court reversed MTAB’s February 2025 merits decisions and reinstated CTAB’s April 2024 decisions, ordering MDOR to appraise the units using O’Brien’s income-approach valuations. View "O'Brien v. MT Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years.After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

A group of organizations and individuals challenged the constitutionality of Idaho’s parental choice tax credit, which provides a refundable tax credit for parents, legal guardians, or foster parents who incur certain educational expenses, including private school tuition, for their dependent children. The tax credit is capped annually, prioritizes lower-income applicants, and cannot be claimed for a student enrolled in public school during the relevant semester. Petitioners argued that the credit violated Article IX, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution by creating a publicly funded, nonpublic education system distinct from the public school system, and further violated the public purpose doctrine by primarily benefiting private interests.The case was brought directly to the Idaho Supreme Court through a Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition, seeking to stop the Idaho State Tax Commission from implementing the tax credit. The petitioners included advocacy groups, a school district, the state education association, a former superintendent, a legislator, an educator, and parents of public school students. The State of Idaho and the Idaho State Legislature (which intervened) opposed the petition, disputing both standing and the claim of unconstitutionality.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho first held that the petitioners lacked traditional standing but relaxed standing requirements due to the urgent constitutional question and the unlikelihood that another party would bring the challenge. The Court then held that Article IX, section 1 imposes a duty to establish a public school system but does not prohibit the legislature from supporting additional educational initiatives such as the tax credit. The Court also found the tax credit did not violate the public purpose doctrine, as education serves a public purpose even if private actors incidentally benefit. The petition was denied, and the Tax Commission was awarded attorney fees against the school district; costs were awarded to both the Tax Commission and the Legislature. View "Committee to Protect and Preserve v. State" on Justia Law

A group of property owners and a civic association challenged a North Carolina county’s use of occupancy tax revenues. The county, which experiences a large seasonal influx of tourists, imposed a tax on lodging rentals. The proceeds from this tax, by statute, could only be spent on activities that promote travel and tourism or on tourism-related expenditures. The county’s commissioners decided to allocate a significant portion of these funds to public safety services, such as law enforcement, emergency medical services, and fire response—especially in areas most frequented by tourists. The plaintiffs argued that such services are not direct tourist attractions and, therefore, not valid uses of the occupancy tax revenue under the enabling statute.After the plaintiffs filed suit, the Superior Court in Currituck County granted summary judgment in favor of the county, holding that the challenged expenditures were tourism-related. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the statute did not permit the use of occupancy tax revenues for general public safety services. The Court of Appeals relied in part on the legislative history, noting that earlier versions of the statute had explicitly referenced police and emergency services, but those references were later removed.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the occupancy tax statute did not categorically bar the county from spending tax revenue on enhanced public safety services that are connected to area tourism. The court determined that the county commissioners, vested with statutory discretion, could reasonably conclude that such expenditures are tourism-related, given the substantial increase in demand for public safety during tourist season and the importance of safety to attracting visitors. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the county on this claim. View "Costanzo v. Currituck County" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the City approved a light rail project and formed a corporation, Austin Transit Partnership (ATP), to implement it. Voters approved a tax increase to fund the endeavor, and ATP—not the City—planned to issue municipal bonds. Taxpayers challenged ATP’s authority to issue these bonds, leading the City and ATP to seek a declaratory judgment confirming their power to assess taxes and issue bonds. The Attorney General, participating as permitted by statute, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending neither the City nor ATP qualified as an “issuer” under the statute governing expedited declaratory judgment actions.In the District Court, the City and ATP sought a quick resolution so the project could proceed, while the taxpayers and Attorney General desired delay. ATP’s counsel advised the court not to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction, thus avoiding an interlocutory appeal and the associated automatic stay. The court accepted this suggestion, explicitly refusing to rule on the plea and moving forward toward trial. The Attorney General then filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, arguing the court’s actions amounted to an implicit denial. The trial court reiterated it had not ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District dismissed the appeal, finding no order granting or denying the plea and therefore no appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, holding that a trial court must rule on jurisdictional challenges before proceeding to the merits and cannot strategically avoid issuing a ruling to frustrate the government’s appellate rights. Because the absence of a ruling deprived the State of its statutory right to interlocutory appeal, and no adequate remedy by appeal existed, the Court treated the Attorney General’s petition as a request for mandamus and conditionally granted relief, directing the trial court to rule on the plea to the jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was left undisturbed. View "PAXTON v. THE CITY OF AUSTIN" on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs challenged the road maintenance fees imposed by Orangeburg and Georgetown Counties, arguing these fees constituted invalid taxes under South Carolina law as interpreted in a prior decision. Both counties had long-standing ordinances requiring an annual fee from vehicle owners for road and bridge maintenance, which were increased over time. After this Court’s decision in Burns v. Greenville County Council found similar fees invalid unless they provided a benefit distinct from that received by the general public, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and monetary relief.The Orangeburg County action was reviewed by Judge Edgar W. Dickson, who dismissed all monetary claims but allowed the request for declaratory relief to proceed. The Georgetown County action was reviewed by Judge William H. Seals, Jr., who denied a motion to strike but did not address the motion to dismiss. After the legislature amended the relevant statute via Act No. 236 of 2022—explicitly allowing retroactive application to fees imposed after 1996—the cases were assigned to Judge Roger M. Young, Sr. He found section 2(E) of the Act unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Clause, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs in Butts, and denied summary judgment for the defendants in Brown, certifying the constitutional question for appeal.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the consolidated appeals. The Court held that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to retroactively amend statutes following judicial interpretation, so long as final judgments are not disturbed and express constitutional limitations are not violated. The Court overruled prior precedent that categorically barred such retroactive legislation under the Separation of Powers Clause. Accordingly, the trial court’s orders were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Butts v. Mace" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws.After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law