Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the tax commissioner concluding that Appellant’s purchase of an aircraft and then leasing it to its sole corporate member was taxable, holding that Appellant failed to carry its burden to show that it met the requirements of the sale-for-resale exception. See Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(E) and 5741.02(C)(2).Appellant purchased the aircraft without paying sales or use tax on it and then leased it to its sole corporate member. The tax commissioner assessed used tax against Appellant for this purchase, thus rejecting Appellant’s argument that the purchase was nontaxable under the definition of “retail sale,” commonly known as the sale-for-resale exception. Specifically, the tax commissioner found that Appellant was not “engaging in business” within the meaning of the exception. The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA (1) did not misapply the sale-for-resale exception; (2) did not run afoul of due process in disregarding certain portions of Appellant’s brief; and (3) did not err in making certain discovery rulings. View "Pi In The Sky, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

This case was brought by the North Idaho Building Contractors Association, Termac Construction, Inc., and other class members (collectively, “NIBCA”), to declare a sewer connection/capitalization fee the City of Hayden enacted in 2007 to be an impermissible tax. The action was originally dismissed on the City’s motion for summary judgment; but, on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the record did not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the 2007 Cap Fee complied with controlling Idaho statutes and case law. On remand, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court found that the 2007 Cap Fee was an impermissible tax and taking of property without just compensation in violation of federal takings law. In doing so, the district court refused to consider expert evidence propounded by the City which opined that the 2007 Cap Fee complied with the applicable Idaho legal standards and was reasonable. The district court subsequently ruled on stipulated facts that NIBCA was entitled to damages in the amount paid above $774 per connection, together with interest, costs, and attorney fees. The City appealed the district court’s refusal to consider its evidence and NIBCA cross-appealed the award of damages. The Idaho Supreme Court again vacated the judgment because the district court improperly refused to consider the City’s evidence on remand. View "No ID Bldg Cont Assoc v. City of Hayden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluding that because Great Lakes Bar Control’s service of cleaning beer-tap lines was primarily a maintenance service, any cleaning was merely incidental to that maintenance and was therefore not subject to sales tax as a “building maintenance and janitorial service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(B)(3)(j), holding that the beer-line service did not fit the plain meaning of “cleaning” in the context of providing a “janitorial service.”Great Lakes provided services related to selling, installing, and servicing beer-dispensing systems and provided a beer-line maintenance service to remove buildup of sediment and prevent lines from becoming blocked. The Ohio Department of Taxation determined that the beer-line service involved cleaning of tangible personal property under section 5730.01(II) and was subject to the sales tax. The BTA reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the beer-line service did not fit the plain meaning of “cleaning” in the context of providing a “janitorial service.” View "Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Campbell Union School District (CUSD) Governing Board enacted a fee on new residential development under Education Code section 17620. The fee, $2.24 per square foot on new residential construction, was based on a study that projected that “it will cost the District an average of $22,039 to house each additional student in new facilities.” This figure was based on a projected $12.8 million cost to build a new 600-student elementary school and a projected $24.4 million cost to build a new 1,000-student middle school. SummerHill owns a 110-unit residential development project in Santa Clara, within CUSD’s boundaries. In 2012 and 2013, SummerHill tendered to CUSD under protest development fees of $499,976.96. The trial court invalidated the fee and ordered a refund of SummerHill’s fees. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the fee study did not contain the data required to properly calculate a development fee; it failed to quantify the expected amount of new development or the number of new students it would generate, did not identify the type of facilities that would be necessary to accommodate those new students, and failed to assess the costs associated with those facilities. View "SummerHill Winchester LLC v. Campbell Union School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission finding Appellant’s claim for refund of sales tax untimely under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.190.2, holding that the refund claim was untimely because it was filed more than three years after the tax return was due and more than three years after the date Appellant paid the tax.On appeal, Appellant conceded that it filed its refund request more than three years after remitting the sales tax. Appellant, however, asserted that the request was timely because 12 C.S.R. 10-102.016(2)(A) provides that a refund claim should also be considered timely if filed within three years of the date the tax return was due and that Appellant filed the refund request within three years of the latter date. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the issue of whether 12 C.S.R. 10-102.016(2)(A) is valid and consistent with section 144.190.2, holding that, even if 12 C.S.R. 10-102.016(2)(A) is applicable, Appellant was incorrect about when its return was due, and therefore, Appellant’s refund request was untimely. View "Crescent Plumbing Supply Company v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

A member of the public cannot use a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain unrelated individual's tax records without his consent. The District Court affirmed the dismissal of EPIC's action seeking President Donald J. Trump's income tax records. The court held that the Internal Revenue Code's confidentiality protections extended to the ordinary taxpayer and the President alike. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. IRS" on Justia Law

Appellant the School District of Lower Merion challenged a Commonwealth Court decision to quash its appeal of the grant of an injunction. Appellees were residents and taxpayers of Lower Merion Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, who filed a multi-count, putative class action complaint against Appellant which asserted grievances about “proliferate spending and tax increases.” Appellees sought money damages in excess of $55,000,000 and the appointment of a trustee to undertake the responsibilities of the school board members. The amended complaint also contained a count seeking equitable relief, primarily in the form of court-supervised modifications of the procedures employed by the District’s administrators. Appellees submitted a “Petition for Injunctive Relief” seeking “immediate relief because without this [c]ourt’s intervention, the District will raise taxes and the bills for the same will go out July 1, 2016 to some 22,000 taxpayers.” Significantly, consistent with the prayer for immediate relief, the petition reflected criteria associated with a preliminary injunction, including an assertion of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. In its written response, the District made clear -- consistent with the procedural posture of the case, the request for immediate relief, and the assertion of irreparable harm -- that it believed that Appellees were seeking a preliminary injunction, and the District proceeded to address Appellees’ petition on such terms. The dispute before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether a post-trial motion was required, or whether the appellant was entitled to proceed with an interlocutory appeal as of right under Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(a)(4). The Supreme Court determined the common pleas court did not dispose of all claims for relief in its “Decision/Order”; therefore, “the decision” of the case was not rendered for purposes of Rule 227.1, and no post-trial motions were implicated under that rule. Rather, the District enjoyed the right to lodge an interlocutory appeal as of right under Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(a)(4). The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's judgment holding to the contrary, and remanded this case for consideration of the merits of the District's interlocutory appeal filed as of right. View "Wolk v. Lower Merion SD" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case was whether NRG Wholesale Generation’s proffered expert used an acceptable method to determine the “true value” of its power plant in computing ad valorem tax. The expert used a mixture of the sales-comparison approach, the income approach, and the cost approach to determine the true value of the facility. Lori Kerr, the tax assessor for Choctaw County, and Choctaw County, Mississippi (collectively, the “County”), contended that Mississippi law mandates a trended historical cost-less-depreciation approach to calculate the true value of industrial personal property. The circuit court found in favor of the County and excluded NRG’s proffered expert testimony. NRG argued the circuit court abused its discretion. In addition, NRG also argued the circuit court erred in denying its motion to change venue because because many of the jurors knew the county officials named as defendants in this case, a fair trial in Choctaw County was impossible. The Supreme Court held the Mississippi Department of Revenue (the “DOR”) regulation controlled and that NRG’s expert applied an unacceptable method to determine true value. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in excluding NRG’s proffered expert testimony. Additionally, because NRG was afforded a fair and impartial jury, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to change venue. View "NRG Wholesale Generation LP v. Kerr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court upholding the decision of the Commissioner of Revenue to include Pell grants in its calculation of Relators’ household income, holding that “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants” as used in Minn. Stat. 290A.03(3)(a)(2)(xiii) is plain and unambiguous and includes Pell grants.Household income is used to determine eligible for, and the amount of, a property tax income and includes “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants.” Relators argued that Pell grants are not scholarships or fellowships and therefore cannot be included in the income calculation made to determine the amount of the property tax refund. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Pell grants are nontaxable and therefore includable in calculating household income. View "Waters v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) affirming the tax commissioner’s denial of a charitable-use property-tax exemption for the subject property, holding that the BTA’s factual findings were supported by the record in this case.Chagrin Realty, the property owner, was a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(2). Chagrin leased the property to Community Dialysis Center (CDC), a nonprofit tenant, which operated a hemodialysis facility on the property. The Centers for Dialysis Care, Inc., a for-profit management company, contracted with the CDC and employed the personnel who worked for the CC. Chagrin Realty filed an application for real-property-tax exemption relating to the subject property, but the tax commissioner determined that Chagrin Realty did not satisfy the requirements for exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.12 or 5709.121. The BTA affirmed, thus rejecting Chagrin Realty’s contention that its 501(c)(2) federal tax status and its reliance on vicarious-exemption theories qualified it as a “charitable” institution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA reasonably and lawfully found that Chagrin Realty is not a charitable institution. View "Chagrin Realty, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law