Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by the Town of Pine Bluffs alleging that Laramie County illegally taxed a day care center that the Town owned and operated. The Town sought an injunction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-13-109(c)(i), alleging that the property was used for a governmental purpose and was therefore exempt under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-11-105(a)(v). The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the Town should have exhausted administrative remedies before resorting to an injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 39-13-109(c)(i) did not provide the Town a remedy for an error in assessing the day care center and that it needed to resort to the administrative process instead. View "Town of Pine Bluffs v. Eisele" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Luz Solar Partners Ltd., III; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., IV; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., V; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VI; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VII; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VIII and Harper Lake Company VIII; and Luz Solar Partners Ltd., IX and HLC IX (collectively “Luz Partners”) challenged the assessment of real property improved with solar energy generating systems (SEGS units) for tax years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. They contended that defendants-respondents San Bernardino County (County) and the Assessment Appeals Board of San Bernardino County (Appeals Board) erroneously relied on the State of California Board of Equalization’s (Board) incorrect interpretation of the applicable statutes governing the method of assessing the value of the property. Finding that the Board correctly interpreted the applicable law in setting forth the method of assessing the value of the solar properties, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Luz Solar Partners Ltd. v. San Bernardino County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the tax commissioner’s denial of 2350 Morse LLC’s application for tax exemption of real property leased to a community school, holding that the BTA unreasonably ignored evidence of 2350 Morse’s intent in leasing the property. Morse sought an exemption for the property for tax year 2010 under both Ohio Rev. Code 5709.07 and 5709.121. The commissioner decided that 2350 Morse was not entitled to an exemption because the property had been leased “with a view to profit” for purposes of former section 5709.07(A)(1). The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no reasonable reading of the record could support a finding that 2350 Morse leased the property with a view to profit. View "2350 Morse, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that denied a tax exemption for real property leased to a community school. The tax commissioner determined that for tax years 2008 through 2010, because the property owner had collected “substantial market-rate rent,” the property was leased “with a view to profit” for purposes of former Ohio Rev. Code 5709.07(A)(1), and therefore, no exemption was available. The BTA affirmed on the basis that the school’s rental payments exceeded the lessor’s expenses under the lease. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded the case, holding (1) the key inquiry in determining whether property is lease with a view to profit focuses on the intention of the lessor; and (2) the BTA unreasonably ignored evidence of the lessor’s intent in this case. View "Breeze, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) determining that a corporate executive’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) was not subject to the city of Cleveland’s income tax. Upon retirement, the executive became entitled to receive benefits from the SERP, which was to be paid from an annuity over the court of his and his spouse’s lives. Cleveland sought to tax the present value of those future payments at the time of the retirement. The Supreme Court held that because a Cleveland ordinance exempts “pensions” from the city income tax and because the SERP constitutes a pension, the city income tax does not apply. View "MacDonald v. Cleveland Income Tax Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which adopted $8,492,910 as the property value for a thirty-seven-acre parcel of real property for tax years 2011 through 2013. The BTA based its decision on the purchase price that Buckeye Terminals, LLC, the landowner, reported on a June 2011 conveyance fee statement. On appeal, Buckeye Terminals argued that the reported price did not accurately reflect the true value of the real property. The Supreme Court held that the BTA’s decision to retain the Board of Revision’s valuation for tax years 2011 through 2013, based solely on the June 2011 conveyance fee statement rather than an independent determination of the value of the property, was unreasonable and unlawful. View "Buckeye Terminals, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

ICN, a religious nonprofit, operates a Nashville mosque and a school. In 2008, it began building a new school building, financed by an ijara agreement, to avoid “running afoul of the Islamic prohibition on the payment of interest.” The bank essentially bought the property, leased it back to ICN, and then sold it back to ICN, with the lease payments substituting for interest payments. The agreement lasted until October 2013; the property was “continuously occupied by [ICN] and physically used solely for exempt religious educational purposes.” The transfer of title prompted the tax assessor to return the property to the tax roll. In February 2014, ICN applied for a property tax exemption, seeking retroactive application. The Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s designee regranted ICN's exemption, but not for the time during which the bank had held title. An ALJ and the State Board’s Assessment Appeals Commission upheld the decision. ICN did not seek review in the chancery court, but filed suit in federal court under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act; the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act; and the Establishment Clause. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Tennessee’s statutory provision for state-court appeal provides a plain, speedy, and efficient alternative to federal-court review, so the Tax Injunction Act bars ICN’s suit in federal court. View "Islamic Center of Nashville v. State of Tennessee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that adopted an allocated portion of a bulk-sale price as the property value for tax year 2011 for two parcels of property along the Ohio River. The owner of the property appealed, arguing that the BTA erred in not reducing the sale price by an amount that was contractually allocated to goodwill. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the landowner’s burden was to show a proper sale-price allocation; (2) the BTA reasonably applied the evidentiary standard; (3) the BTA reasonably rejected the landowner’s appraisal; and (4) the landowner failed to state a constitutional claim. View "Cincinnati School District Board of Education v. Hamilton County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the Board of Equalization’s decision affirming the ruling of the Wyoming Department of Revenue against PacifiCorp, Inc., which sought a ruling that its purchases of certain chemicals used in the process of generating electricity in coal-fired electrical generation facilities in Wyoming qualified for either the manufacturers’ sales tax exemption or the wholesalers’ sales tax exemption. The court held (1) The Board erred when it concluded that PacifiCorp is not a manufacturer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-15-105(a)(iii)A); (2) the Board did not err when it held that certain chemicals necessary to treat water and sulfur dioxide emissions during the coal combustion processes that generate electricity are not “used directly” to generate electricity and are therefore not exempt from sales tax under section 39-15-105(a)(iii)(A); and (3) the Board did not err when it held that PacifiCorp’s purchases of certain chemicals and catalysts do not constitute wholesale purchases exempt from taxation under section 39-15-105(a)(iii)(F). View "PacifiCorp, Inc. v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Delta Logistics, Inc. was a "for-hire carrier" licensed by the federal government to transport goods interstate. Delta did not own any trucks; rather, it leased trucks from owner-operators, who operated, furnished, and maintained the trucks. The Oregon Employment Department assessed Delta unemployment insurance taxes on the funds that Delta paid the owner-operators, on grounds the owner-operators did not come within the exemption in ORS 657.047(1)(b) because the leases that the owner-operators entered into with Delta were not "leases" within the meaning of the statute: to come within the exemption, the owner must be the only person operating the truck. An administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed and issued a final order upholding the assessment. Delta appealed. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by the Department's arguments and overturned the ALJ's decision, finding ORS 657.047(2) made clear that the exemption included owners who hire employees to help operate their trucks. Considering the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 657.047(1)(b), the Oregon Supreme Court did not agree with the department that Delta owed unemployment taxes on owner-operators who hired employees to help them operate the motor-vehicles they leased to Delta. The Court of Appeals was affirmed that the final of the ALJ was reversed. View "Delta Logistics, Inc. v. Employment Dept. Tax Section" on Justia Law