Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Revenue assessing tax on an apportioned share of Cities Management, Inc.'s (CMI) income from the sale of the S corporation, holding that the income from the corporation's sale was apportionable business income.CMI, which did business in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and its nonresidential partial owner filed Minnesota tax returns characterizing the sale of CMI's goodwill as income that was not subject to apportionment by the State under Minn. Stat. Ann. 290.17. The Commissioner disagreed and assessed tax on an apportioned share of the corporation's income from the sale. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CMI's income did not constitute "nonbusiness" income under section 290.17, subd. 6 and may be constitutionally apportioned as business income. View "Cities Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

The IRS may penalize taxpayers who fail to report a “listed transaction” that the agency determines is similar to one already identified as a tax-avoidance scheme, 26 U.S.C. 6707A(a), (c)(2). IRS Notice 2007-83 listed employee-benefit plans with cash-value life insurance policies. In 2013, Mann created trusts for its co-owners that paid the premiums on their cash-value life insurance policies. Mann deducted the expenses on its tax forms, and the owners counted the death benefits as income. None of them reported the trusts as a listed transaction.In 2019, the IRS determined that the trusts failed to comply with Notice 2007-83 and imposed penalties, which were paid. After the IRS refused requests for refunds, the taxpayers filed suit. The district court granted the IRS summary judgment on a claim that the Notice violated the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice-and-comment requirements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Notice 2007- 83 was a legislative rule that lacked exemption from the requirements; “we must set [Notice 2007-83] aside” and “need not address the taxpayers’ remaining claims.”Before the district court ruled on remand, the IRS refunded the past penalties with interest and agreed not to apply the Notice to anyone within the Sixth Circuit. The district court concluded that it retained jurisdiction to set aside and vacate the Notice nationwide. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The taxpayers sought a refund of past tax penalties and prospective relief against Notice 2007-83; the IRS’s actions mooted their claim and left nothing more for the court to do. View "Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Cathey and Vonderosa Properties, LLC (collectively "Vonderosa") filed suit seeking declaratory relief against Defendant-Appellee Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County (Board) and moved for a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin the Board from enforcing and collecting a lodging tax increase passed at a special election held in McCurtain County on November 8, 2022, in conjunction with the general election. The district court denied Vonderosa's request for a temporary injunction and Vonderosa appealed, seeking emergency relief from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. On March 28, 2023, the Supreme Court entered an Order temporarily enjoining enforcement of the 2% increase to the lodging tax until the special election was fully and finally litigated. The Court expressed no opinion concerning the validity of the special election in its emergency Order. While Appellee's petition for rehearing was still pending before the Supreme Court and before the mandate issued, the district court granted Appellee-Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment and held the special election was valid. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this specific case the district court was without jurisdiction to enter summary judgment for Appellee while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court and before mandate had issued. The District Court's Order of June 20, 2023 was void for lack of jurisdiction and the Order was vacated. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions. View "Cathey v. McCurtain County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Cajun Industries LLC (“Cajun”) claimed tax credits for the 2013 tax year pursuant to § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 41. First, the Code provision at issue in this case, Section 41 offers a tax credit for “qualified research expenses” including wages and expenditures incurred in pursuit of qualified research.1 The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for qualified research activities, as defined by the Code. Appellants appealed the district court’s judgment which ejected research and development tax credits claimed by Cajun Industries LLC and upheld the resulting tax deficiency.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants’ argument that all contracts “for the product or result” are not funded improperly conflates “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research” with contracts for products or services. This argument ignores the operative portion of the sentence: “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research.” Structurally, the phrase “and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research” merely describes or modifies “amounts payable . . . contingent on the success of the research.” It does not, as Appellants urge, stand on its own to establish an additional type of contract “not treated as funding.” Further, the court explained that Appellants are not entitled to the research credit merely because SWBNO could not claim the credit. The Regulations do not require that a tax credit be allocated in every contract. View "USA v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Property Tax Division correctly followed the requirements of the Aircraft Valuation Law, Utah Code 59-2-201 subsection 4, in determining the 2017 value of Delta Air Lines' aircraft, holding that Salt Lake County failed to demonstrate that the Law, as applied to Delta's 2017 assessment, violated the fair market value provision of the Utah Constitution.For tax year 2017, the Division valued Delta's aircraft according to section 59-2-201's preferred methodology. The County appealed, arguing that the valuation did not reflect the fair market value of Delta's aircraft, in violation of the Utah Constitution. The Commission upheld the assessment, concluding that the County did not establish that the Legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Aircraft Valuation Law was not unconstitutional as applied by the Commission to assess the value of Delta's aircraft for tax year 2017. View "Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court determining that the Aroostook County Commissioners had jurisdiction over an appeal of a municipality's denial of a tax abatement application by Cassidy Holdings, LLC, holding that there was no error.Cassidy, which owned nonresidential property with an equalized municipal valuation of $1 million or greater, requested a partial abatement of its 2021 property taxes. The City of Caribou's Board of Assessors denied the request. The Commissioners declined to hear Cassidy's ensuing appeal on the grounds that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court remanded the case for the Commissioners to proceed on the merits, concluding that the Commissioners erred in determining that they lacked jurisdiction over the abatement appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of 36 Me. Rev. Stat. 844 provides for concurrent jurisdiction before either the Commissioners or the State Board. View "Cassidy Holdings, LLC v. Aroostook County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission determining that Walmart Starco LLC was exempt from use tax for its purchase and use of information technology equipment pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.018.1 and 144.615(6), holding that the Commission correctly concluded that the equipment was exempt from use tax.The Commission ultimately determined that Starco's use of the information technology equipment at issue was exempt from use tax under sections 144.018.1 and 144.615(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Starco showed that it held the equipment solely for resale pursuant to section 144.615(6); and (2) the second argument raised on appeal was unpreserved for appellate review. View "Walmart Starco LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Equalization affirming the Wyoming Departments of Audit and Revenue's mineral tax audit assessments of Chesapeake Operating, LLC's oil and gas production, holding that the State Board of Equalization did not misinterpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(iv) when it found that Chesapeake's field facilities did not qualify as processing facilities.On appeal, Chesapeake argued that the Board erred in concluding that Chesapeake's facilities qualified as processing facilities under the mineral tax statutes and that the proper point of valuation for its gas production was at the custody transfer meters. The district court certified the case directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed, holding that the Board correctly interpreted and applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-201(a)(xviii) when it found that the seven facilities at issue were not processing facilities. View "Chesapeake Operating, LLC v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Proposition 39 established a program to promote the creation of clean energy jobs. Under Proposition 39, a multistate business must apportion its tax based on a single factor—in-state sales. The proposition further provided for cable companies spending $250 million or more in California on certain expenditures to exclude half of their in-state sales when apportioning, thus lowering their tax burden under the single factor tax regime. Paintiff One Technologies, LLC, a Texas-based provider of credit score and credit reporting services, paid tax to California calculated under the single-factor method. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for refund against Defendant Franchise Tax Board (the Board). Plaintiff alleged Proposition 39 was invalid under the single-subject rule for ballot initiatives. The trial court disagreed and sustained the Board’s demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Proposition 39 did not violate the single-subject rule. The purpose of the proposition was to fund a clean energy job creation program by raising taxes on some multistate businesses. The provisions of the proposition were both reasonably germane and functionally related to that purpose because those provisions established a funding mechanism and the means of directing that funding to clean energy job creation. The special rules for cable companies reflect a determination by the proposition’s drafters that some businesses should bear the funding burden more than others, but that is still within the scope of the proposition’s purpose. View "One Technologies, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law